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ABSTRACT
     This dissertation develops an understanding of the potential for China's changing cultural role in
global politics, its leadership potential rooted in aspects of ancient Chinese philosophy and culture of
which even China itself  is  not  clearly aware. Based  upon  Roger  Ames’s East-West  comparative
approach to interpreting China on its own terms, and associated philosophical comparisons between
correlativity  (huxi)  and rationality,  I  construct  my non-western  Global Process-Relational Theory
(GPRT).  
     Using Confucian conceptions of human relations regarding appropriateness relative to 
circumstances and tendencies (xing) to change with circumstances, I develop a Confucian 
decision-making model of  “situational appropriateness” (shizhong) in roles and relations, and 
ground it in an Yijing philosophical tradition that developed independently of Anglo-European/Indo-
European traditions. I then use such a “correlative” choices model associated with conceptions of 
human moral cultivation to develop a world scenario of infinite games, he er bu tong (harmony with 
differences and diversities) of tianxia (a world of correlations). 
This focus is in sharp contrast with Western tendencies to focus on rational choice, abstract
principles, and universal values. To further strengthen my comparison and construction, I employ
Carse's  distinction between finite  games (zero-sum games having a  definite  ending)  and infinite
games  (interaction  without  end,  continuing  a  more  interesting play),  and  Kasulis's  distinction
between external (competitive, rule-based) and internal (holistic, intimate) relations. Moreover, I use
my GPRT-Ames-Carse-Kasulis  framework to  reformulate Morgenthau's six principles of political
realism through a more constructivist-like interpretation of political relationships.  
xi
INTRODUCTION
1. Humans, Relations, and Games
One of the most fundamental philosophical questions is how humans are related. Relationship 
is significant to political philosophy. In today’s world, whether we can successfully deal with global 
security problems, no matter traditional or non-traditional, depends on how we look at human 
relations.1
     There are two basic conceptions of humans and their relations. Correspondingly, “there are at
least two kinds of games.”2 One conception is the foundation of individualism: Human beings, which
can only be externally connected through contracts or principles of responsibilities and rights, are
fictionally viewed as isolated atomistic and discrete entities. Thereafter, human relations are imag-
ined as fundamentally external.3 Procedure and retribution play a definitive role in the artificial con-
struct of human community within this contractarian ideology. “Community is not the natural state of
and for human beings, but only the artificial construct of otherwise discrete individuals.”4 Further,
games of players within external relations could be called finite.5 Rules of a finite game are the exter-
nally defined contractual terms by which the players,  often superficially assumed as both identical
1 One could take a species perspective as evolutionary biology does, a cultural perspective as anthropology does, a lan-
guage group as linguistics does, a social systems perspective as sociology does, even a spiritual ontology as religions do. 
However, from a political science perspective, I contend that individuals contain in their worldviews the ideas that filter 
(interpret) “reality” and thus constitute their decision-making logic, roughly analogous to computer software in relation 
to computers. Easton took a similar view of political decision-making in his famous model linking demands and supports
to policy through leaders’ decision-making processes.  
2 See Carse, James P. Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility. New York: Ballantine Books, 
1987, p.3. It was Roger Ames who first (and on various occasions) cited Carse’s comparative theory of games in order to 
introduce Confucian role ethics beyond foundational liberal individualism, and anticipate an alternative world cultural or-
der. For details, see Ames, Roger T., “Recovering a Confucian Conception of Human Nature: A Challenge to the Ideol-
ogy of Individualism.” Acta Koreana (2017) Vol. 20 no.1.
3 For more details about external and internal relations, see Chapter 2. I paraphrase and summarize Thomas P. Kasulis’s 
comparative theory about internal and external relations. Also see Kasulis, Thomas P. Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy 
and Cultural Difference. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002. 
4 Ames, Roger T., “Introduction to the Chinese Translation” of his book Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. I translate 
this introduction into Chinese. See Ames, Roger T., Rujia Juese Lunli Xue: Yitao Tese Lunlixue Cihui (Confucian Role 
Ethics: A Vocabulary), trans. B. Hammer, C. Tian, et al., Jinan: Shandong People’s Publisher, 2017, P.1-5.
5 See Carse, op. cit., p. 6.                          
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and equal, can agree who has won after competition. Traditional IR (international relations) theory
including realism and liberalism is apparently on the basis of this kind of conception of human rela-
tions, more or less criticized by contemporary IR scholars through methods of constructivism and
other post-modern approaches. 
     According to the other conception, human being is viewed as a process of “becoming” human6
through moral cultivation of one’s family, community, and its particular roles and relations that one
lives. Association is a fact of and for human beings. Family is a governing metaphor.7 While a family
member is required to think and feel as if he/she was others (empathy, an affective form of moral
imagination),8 “a  thriving,  family-based  community  derives  from continuing familial  patterns  of
effective  communicating.”9 Thereafter,  human  relations  are  internally  defined  as  correlative  and
interdependent. A philosophical abstraction of internal relations is the Chinese yin-yang taiji diagram
in which  yin and  yang are mutually inclusive, supportive, complementary, constitutive, resonating
with each other, and even penetrating or transforming into each other. 
     In this dissertation, I would like to introduce a traditional Chinese conception of human relations
as a foundation of constructing today’s Chinese IR theory, a part of non-Western IR theory as an
alternative to traditional West-centric IR arguments. Human games within internal relations could be
called infinite.10 As “Confucianism is nothing more than a sustained attempt ‘to family’ lived human
experience,”11 infinite game is played for the purpose of continuing a more interesting play. Infinite
6 Cheng ren 成人, or “becoming relationally virtuosic”(cheng ren 成仁), See Ames, Roger T., Confucian Role Ethics: A
Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, pp. 87-88, p.126.
7 See ibid, p.96.
8 See Kasulis, Thomas P.  Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference. Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 2002 ,pp.39-40. As Kasulis also points out, “Emotionalism is the enemy of reason. This is a valuable way of con-
struing rationality, but it has inherent limitations. Many of life’s most anguishing decisions are not resolvable on logical
and empirical grounds alone.” 
9 See Ames, op. cit., p.10.
10 See Carse, op. cit., p. 8.
11 See ibid, p.98.
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game players  regard  their  wins  and losses  within  a  larger  field  of  continuing play  that  extends
beyond the finite  game,  zero-sum game, prisoner dilemma, or winner-take-all  politics,  as family
members constantly improve their interpersonal intimacy through sharing their innermost thoughts,
motives, and feelings with others, so as to achieve a level of  familial accord of each other’s inner
dynamics.  This  sense  of  family  extends,  through  social  relations,  to  whole  communities,  and
eventually nationalities and global relations. Further, it implies an infinite game to both compete and
cooperate with the end of maintaining not necessarily particular existing relations but rather the field
of relations that comprise the whole network of relations, conceivably the global system.
    This dissertation is mainly aimed at constructing a new theory of international relations, deserving
of  the  name,  “Global Process-Relational Theory”  (GPRT) grounded  in  Chinese  philosophical
thinking from the Yijing (Book of Changes). The central question in the dissertation is whether and if
so, how, it is possible to apply the insights of ancient Chinese philosophy usefully (as articulated in the
Yijing) to solving  a theoretical question about constructing a Chinese-style international relations
theory.   There  has  been  an  important  discussion  among  some  scholars  (Buzan,12 Callahan,13
Johnston,14 Feng,15 Qin,16 Yan,17 Hui,18 and so on) as to whether there is or can be a Chinese theory of
international relations (a Non-Western IR Theory), or even whether that is an important question, not
to mention whether answers can usefully be applied to international politics or global issues such as
12 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, Non-Western International Relations Theory : Perspectives on and Beyond Asia. 
London: New York: Routledge, 2010.
13 Callahan, William A. Contingent States: Greater China and Transnational Relations. Minneapolis ; London: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2004.
14 Johnston, Alastair I. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton Studies in 
International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995.
15 Feng, Huiyun. Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War, 
Asian Security Studies. London: New York: Routledge, 2007.
16 Qin, Yaqing, "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?" in ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, Non-
Western International Relations Theory. London ; New York: Routledge 2010.
17 Yan, Xuetong, Daniel Bell, Zhe Sun, and Edmund Ryden. Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 2011.
18 Hui, Victoria Tin-bor. War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe. New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005.
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potable water, food distribution, clean energy for mass mobility, financial stability, security dilemma
and so on. All in all, “our world is very much in need of an intellectual, scientific, and spiritual
vision  that  can  draw  many  different  people  into  a  mutually  beneficial conversation,  while  still
stimulating further exploration and challenge.”19 Then at the age of China’s rise, which has aroused
much attention, can we anticipate a new framework of Chinese IR theory produced on the basis of
the reemergence of Chinese traditional culture and development of Chinese philosophy? 
2. Global Predicaments, Cultural Changes, and Confucianism 
     Alongside undeniably positive effects of globalization, there have come enormous challenges
such  as  widening  gaps  of  wealth,  resource  use,  planetary-scale  climate  changes,  environmental
degradation, accentuated likelihoods of global pandemics, high risk fuel extraction and power, and
financial, economic and political crises here and there. These predicaments are no longer constrained
by  national  boundaries.  Crises  often  have  global  reach  and  even  affect  everyone  regardless  of
nationality. Moreover, these challenges cannot be met and solved by individual nations. At the same
time, however, the growth dynamics of the “global informational capitalism” and “network society”
are fueled by the multiplication and magnification of differences, which urge respect for different
civilizations or individual voices. However, there is an apparent absence of a robust global culture of
open, respectful, inclusive, and creative deliberation. From a Chinese perspective this is due to low
correlativity,  that  is,  inadequate “adaptive  leadership”20 because of  thinking in  terms of  external
relations (prior agreements, treaties, dominance relations) rather than in terms of what is becoming
useful  and  can  become  real  through  improved  mutual  understanding  and  brand  new reciprocal
relations.
19 See See Mesle, C. Robert. Process-Relational Philosophy: An Introduction to Alfred North Whitehead. Templeton 
Foundation Press, 2008. p. 10.
20 See Heifetz, R., Grashow, Alexander, & Linsky, Martin. The Practice of Adaptive Leadership Tools and Tactics for 
Changing Your Organization and the World. Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business Press, 2009.
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     There  is  growing  awareness  of  the  limits  of  Western  IR  theory  writ  at  global  scale.  In
contemporary academic rationale, the modern nation-state system has still been popularly accepted
as the basic international system. Correspondingly, the nation-state, alleged as equal with each other
on the surface, is assumed as the biggest and highest polity in the international system. International
theory,  therefore,  is  generally  a  kind  of  game  theory  between  nation  states,  dealing  with  the
maximization of national interests or strategies for balancing power, rather than a theory from the
perspective of a more global context. Within the nation-state system, maxims such as "Might is right"
and "No virtue like necessity" contrast sharply with international organizations attempting to mitigate
the cruelty of international conflicts. The United Nations and its predecessor the League of Nations,
reflecting the Kantian  ideals, failed to effectively solve problems of so-called world  anarchy; and
owing to many challenges of the new waves of globalization, the degree of conflicts within this
system has been intensified rather than mitigated in some areas such as the Middle East and northern
Africa. 
Facing with the relevant theoretical deep end, Martin Wight raised his ironical question “Why Is
There No International Theory?”21 There is the corollary recognition of needs to consider alternatives
to  traditional  IR  theories  that  inform  much  of  contemporary  national  policy-making  and
interrelations.  China’s  growth  in  the  background  of  Asian  development  is  producing  various
profound  transformations  in  the  world’s  order.  This  reconfiguration  of  economic  and  political
dominance  nevertheless  opens  possibilities  for  cultural  changes,  which  challenge  an  elite  world
cultural order.  Challenges might be posed from, for example, religious traditions like Christianity,
Islam and Buddhism, or from the perspectives of indigenous peoples. But Evidence is that many
21 In Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight ed. , Diplomatic Investigations, 1966, pp. 17-34. Originally published as 
“Why is there no [good!] International Theory?” International Relations, April 1960 2, pp. 35-48. 
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anticipate  that  Confucian  culture  can  make  valuable  contributions  to  the  articulation  of  a  new
emerging world order, given the cultural resources offered by Confucianism with human-centered
religiousness.22 
     Efforts have been made to explore critically the meaning and value of Chinese culture in a newly
emerging world order in this  dissertation.  When we look for the cultural  resources necessary to
respond to the global predicament, primary among them are resources suited to replacing the familiar
competitive pattern of individual actors pursing their own self-interests with a pattern of players
strengthening  possibilities  for  coordination  across  national,  ethnic  and  religious  boundaries.
Confucian  culture,  originated  from the  Yijing,  celebrates  the  relational  values  of  deference  and
interdependence. That is, relationally-constituted persons are to be understood as embedded in and
nurtured by unique, transactional patterns of relations—a conception of person that contrasts rather
starkly with the more familiar model of discrete individuals associated with liberal democracy. For
Confucius it would seem that the solution to global predicaments, or especially the path to conflict
resolution, is to transcend the intellectual and motivational framework of finite game within which
the  participants  compete  with  each  other  by  seriously  considering  the  much  larger  space-time
environment in which they are embedded (the “ten thousand events” worldview).
3. Purposes for the Dissertation
(1) The first  purpose  for  this  dissertation  is  to  introduce  a  new philosophical  approach (Roger
Ames’s  East-West  comparative  approach)  for  the  construction  of  a  Chinese  school  of
International Relations (IR). I will criticize old attempts at constructing Chinese IR theories. And
22 Roger Ames tries to show that “the symbiotic and coterminous relationship between achieved personal worth within 
the flourishing family, and the profoundly human-centered (indeed, ‘a-theistic’) religiosity that makes this Confucianism 
(felt) ‘religiousness’ a significant, world-affirming alternative to the more familiar Abrahamic, God-centered ‘religions.’”
For more details, see Ames, Roger T., Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011,
p. xiv.
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then I  will  construct  my theory on an appropriate  philosophy for China and world politics,
especially the Yijing and core concepts embedded in it such as correlative cosmology, correlative
thinking,  role  ethics,  distinct  Chinese style  of languages and discourse.  I  will  also draw on
ancient  Chinese  texts  and  common  sense  experience,  and  the  comparative  philosophy
methodologies of Roger Ames, David Hall, Thomas Kasulis, Henry Rosemont, Jr.,and Chenshan
Tian and so on. 
(2) By comparing  my theory  with  Western  counterparts  (different  schools  and approaches),  my
theory will serve as a bridge for communications between Chinese scholars and their Western
colleagues.  Most  importantly,  it  brings  about  a  basic  interpretive  context  for  understanding
Chinese strategic culture, a way to interpret Chinese thinking and ethics on its own terms, rather
than putting China into a certain Western epistemological framework as many people have, from
Matteo Ricci to contemporary IR theorists both inside and outside China.
(3) To lay  out  or  present  my Chinese  theory  of  IR,  I  will  detail  (a)  the  kinds  of  roles  which
Confucian traditions play in shaping Chinese ancient foreign policy, (b) the kinds of Chinese
philosophical visions which exist of alternative world futures, and (c) what kinds of ethics China
can bring about to world society. One of the most important events in today’s era is China’s
“rise.”23 Many people are thinking about Chinese foreign policy and Chinese visions for the
world future, and also the future of US-China relations. Of course, there are many reasons for
today’s Chinese foreign policy and the “competitive cooperation” (or “cooperative competition”)
characterizing  US-China  relations.  Absent  from  these  considerations,  however,  are  serious
deliberations on the importance of the various roles played by Chinese traditional culture. I focus
on Chinese philosophy and history to provide a fundamental interpretive context for modeling
23 “Rise” is a Western concept; I would call it reemergence. 
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China and its foreign policies. 
(4) To construct  my  Chinese  International  Relations  Theory  (CIRT),  or  Global  Process-Relational  Theory
(GPRT)  as a non-Western theory, I hope to bring about a number of alternative approaches for
today’s global problems such as security dilemma.24  Given the fact that the main stream of IRT
fails to solve many such global problems, a Chinese theory of global relations and processes
should be of interest. 
4. Methods and Skills: Interpreting China on Its Own Terms
    Chinese academia appears to have had no clear theoretical presentation on international relations.
In his article “Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?” Yaqing Qin, argues that “the
distinct feature of original theory is that it contains core assumptions that are not commensurable
with core assumptions in another distinct theory. If the core component is different, then it can be a
distinct research program or meta-theory or paradigm.” And such kind of original theory “is yet to
emerge in China though....there is a great potential for a Chinese school of IRT.”25 Currently, several
other leading Chinese scholars such as Xuetong Yan,26 and Huiyun Feng,27 are trying to approach it.
However,  following Ames’s arguments on translating Chinese philosophy,28 I  argue that they are
taking inappropriate methods when they use Chinese ancient texts to construct their theories, since
none  of  them  pay  enough  attention  to  language  differences  and  structural  differences  behind,
between the Anglo-European cultures and the Chinese philosophical tradition that has developed
independently  of  Europe.  Therefore, in  various  degrees  at  different  levels,  they  misconstrue  and
24  The term was coined by John H. Herz. See Herz, John H., “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” 
World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2, January 1950, pp. 157- 80. 
25 Yaqing, Qin, "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?" in ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, Non-
Western International Relations Theory. Routledge 2010, pp. 27- 8.   
26 Xuetong Yan et al., Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press).
27 Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War, 
Asian Security Studies (London ; New York: Routledge, 2007).
28 See the paragraph after next. 
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misinterpret the Chinese world view by Westernization of Chinese vocabulary, and vice versa. Their
work might result in more or less misunderstandings between readers from two different cultural
traditions,  without  benefiting  the  Western  readers  by  paving  a  way  to  China  and  solving
philosophical crises of their own cultures on the one hand, and vice versa on the other hand. 
     In  order  to  construct  my  GPRT with  an  interpretive  context  necessary  to  read  Chinese
philosophical  texts  on  their  own  terms,  Roger  Ames’s  East-West  comparative  approach to  the
traditional Chinese canonical texts will be introduced into theoretic construction in my specific field
of academic study. Currently, on the one hand, many Western scholars of IRT, such as Barry Buzan,29
William A Callahan,30 and Alastair Ian Johnston31 are looking for Chinese scholars to work together
or work independently to develop Chinese theories based on the marginalized Chinese philosophies
and histories. However, how to discover philosophies and histories really in China is a big problem
for  their  theories  to  be  truly  non-Western  without  remaining  entrapped  in  a  certain  type  of
Orientalist discourse.  On  the  other  hand,  indigenous  scholars  are  swinging  from  copying  to
constructing.  However,  they are facing the problems of  writing non-Western politics  in  English,
namely,  avoiding   self-colonization  through  indigenization  of  Western  theories or  imposition  of
Western structure on Chinese philosophical tradition. As the role of the philosopher is not just to
analyze, but also to provide better tools for analysis, my role is not just to construct a theory, but also
to introduce better philosophical tools to IR studies. In order to break down the tyranny of structures
and disciplinary boundaries that deploy exclusionary discursive practices, in particular, to pave a new
way  to  China  studies,  this  dissertation  pays  much  attention  on  non-traditional  sinological  and
29Acharya, Amitav, and Barry Buzan. Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives on and Beyond Asia.
London ; New York: Routledge, 2010.
30 Callahan, William A. Contingent States: Greater China and Transnational Relations. Minneapolis ; London: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2004.
31Johnston, Alastair I. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton Studies in
International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995
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philosophical methods to establish an interpretive context necessary to read Chinese texts on their
own terms.  
    Roger Ames summarized his philosophical methods in his  numerous articles such as “Thinking
through  Comparisons---Analytical  and  Narrative  Methods  for  Cultural  Understanding,”32
“Confucianism  and  Deweyan  Pragmatism:  A  Dialogue,”33 and  “Making  a  Text  One’s  Own:
Reflections on Reading Chinese Philosophy Properly.”34 Tan Xiaoli, a visiting professor from China
and I also interviewed Ames about translating Chinese philosophy.35 Roger Ames’ guiding thread is
that  ancient  Chinese culture must  be understood in correlative terms where Western culture has
emphasized transcendence with dualism. 
    Among Western scholars in the field of Chinese philosophy, there is an academic group who
believes that there is a structural difference (distinctly different cosmological assumptions) between
the  Anglo-European  cultures  and  the  Chinese  philosophical  tradition  that  has  developed
independently of Europe. The strand of correlative thinking of Chinese tradition David Hall  and
Roger Ames have explored along the line of Marcel Granet, Joseph Needham, Claude Levi-Strauss,
Nathan Silvin, A.C. Graham, etc. may best be expressed in one character, “correlativity,”  namely
“continuity through change” (in plain terms, processual and relational). Among the group members,
Chinese scholars such as Junyi Tang, Dongsun Zhang, Chung-ying Cheng, and Chenshan Tian share
similar  views.  This  group  of  philosophers  has  employed  the  terminology  including  “yin-yang
cosmology,” “the  yin-yang way of thinking,” “bianzheng siwei,” and “correlative thinking,” etc. to
32 In Early China/Ancient Greece: Thinking through Comparisons, ed. Stephen Durrant, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 
2002,pp. 93-110.
33 In Journal of Chinese Philosophy 30:3&4 (September/December 2003), pp. 403-17. 
34“把文本变成自己的：原原本本地阅读中国哲学之反思” (Making a Text One’s Own: Reflections on Reading 
Chinese Philosophy Properly) 跨文化對話叢刊 Transcultural Dialogue 22, “Special Issue on Global Research on 
Confucianism.” Reprinted in Boston Confucianism, ed.Huang Wansheng, Harvard-Yenching/Jiangsu Educational Press, 
2008. 
35 See Tan, Xiaoli and Tianyuan, Huang. “Translating Chinese philosophy on its own terms: an interview with Professor 
Roger T. Ames” in Asia Pacific Translation and Intercultural Studies, Volume 2, Issue 2, 2015,pp.139-49.
10
characterize the Chinese style of thinking, which differs from the Western analytical thinking with
dualism and linear causality. 
     This dissertation relies on Roger Ames’s East-West comparative approach to the traditional
canonical texts. Based on Roger Ames’ arguments on methods, I pick up a neo-pragmatic criterion, a
language  of  focus  and  field  (contextualizing  Chinese  vocabulary  to  avoid  essentialism  and
reductionism, see Table 1) for translating Chinese Philosophy (also leave the Chinese characters and the
Pinyin  Romanization of Chinese vocabulary within the texts), and Whitehead’s Process Philosophy
(possibly a Western philosophical theory similar to the  Yijing’s style of processual thinking) as a
Western reference. I also cited process philosophers such as Bernard Loomer and Robert Mesle’s
illustrations about “unilateral power” and “relational power”36 in Chapter 2. Moreover, in order to
interpret correlativity as compared with rationality, the most significant term within this dissertation,
I paraphrase and summarize Thomas P. Kasulis’s comparative theory about internal and external
relations.37 Kasulis’s  book  on  philosophy  and  cultural  difference  explores  these  two  essentially
different  ways  of  relating,  which  facilitates  my  comparative  interpretation  of  correlativity  and
rationality. Further, when I discuss about world scenarios, I paraphrase and summarize James Carse’s
theory of finite-infinite game difference,38 as applied to interpret the tendency to be exclusive or more
inclusive in international relations. 
Table 1: Language of Focus and Field
Substance language Language of focus and field
A word defined by discreteness, objectivity, 
and permanence
A word characterized by continuity, process, and 
becoming
A referential language of discrete objects A deferential language of processes and events
Linear causality, reducing all relations to those Complex correlative field of spontaneous, 
36 See Loomer, Bernard, “Two Conceptions of Power,” Criterion 15, no.1 Winter 1976, pp.7-29.
Also see Also see Mesle, C. Robert. Process-Relational Philosophy: An Introduction to Alfred North Whitehead. 
West Conshohocken: Templeton Foundation Press, 2008.
37 Kasulis, Thomas P. Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2002.
38 Carse, James P. Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility. New York: Ballantine Books, 2002.
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of external actions transactional relationships
Goals of clarity, univelocity, and stipulated 
definition prized by vocabularies of substance, 
quantity, and discreteness
The poetic allusiveness of Chinese philosophical 
discourse
Source: Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of
the Zhongyong. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001, pp.5-8.
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Table 2: Terminology of Roger Ames's Comparison between Two Philosophical Traditions
Two Traditions Anglo-European/
Indo-European
Chinese
Transcendence Judeo-Christian God
Plato’s Demiourgos
Ways of thinking second problematic thinking first problematic thinking
causal process thinking; correlative
Linear and one way road
rational correlative thinking
logocentrism
analytical thinking analogical thinking
metaphysical
dualisms
World Views teleology upward spiral direction
cosmos acosmos,  world  of  ten  thousand
processes and events
boundaries no boundaries
totality, wholeness
ordered chaotic
cosmogony acosmogony
cosmology acosmology
transcendental aims no governing purpose
sustaining principle
single-ordered world
order over chaos
Priority to rest and 
permanence
primary of change and becoming
world as such
One behind many indivisibility of one and many39
Origins 
of the Universe
linear teleology
beginning fetal beginning
beginning and end no beginning, no end, the notion is 
problematic
external agency causes are resident as things’ 
conditions
acosmism
unifying principles
a priori
monism pluralism
39 Originally coined by Junyi Tang. For Ames and Tian’s arguments on it, see 
http://en.yiduobufen.com/index.php/index/work/p/1.html. 
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Two Traditions Anglo-European/
Indo-European
Chinese
Being dao
absolutism
external and initial 
creative act
Transcendental Agent
Transcendental Deity
causal agency
Language forms language of presence language of process, correlativity
causal language correlative language
conceptual language analogous language
univocal meaning literal language
aesthetic language
How to 
get knowledge
analytical analogical, analogous
analogical ordering
pattern
logical tendencies analogical tendencies
reason, reasoning
dualisms
Ontology
ontological historical
epistemology
Logos (account, structure)
logical
Nomos (law)
Nous (mind, rational 
agency)
Arche (origin, source, 
principle)
unity uniqueness
unity over peculiarity
universalism
q
5. Philosophical Vicissitude and Research Perspective 
This is a dissertation which deals with both the West and China, and both old and new. We must
illustrate its philosophical background and research perspective at the beginning. As Roger Ames and
14
David  Hall  has  stipulated  and  endorsed  since  1987,  the  definition  of  strict  philosophical  or
theological  transcendence is “an independent and superordinate principle A originates, determines,
and  sustains  B,  where  the  reverse  is  not  the  case.”40 To  be  concrete,  “In  a  transcendental  or
metaphysical  cosmogony,  the  originative  and  determinative  principle——the  Abrahamic  God  or
Plato’s  Forms——stands  independent  of  its  creature  and,  as  an  external  source,  imposes  a
preassigned  design  on  chaos.”41 Briefly  speaking,  God  transcends  the  world  (that  is,  God  is
independent of the world, unaffected by the world) but the world does not transcend God. A variety
of  dualisms  such  as  reality/appearance,  good/evil,  God/world,  soul/body,  knowledge/opinion,
theory/practice,  form/matter,  reason/emotion,  and  essence/attribute  share  the  similar  forms  of
relationships.  This  dualistic thinking  exerts  enormous  influences  over  the  traditional  decision-
making model.
To  the  contrary,  Confucian  human-centered  religiousness  makes  much  less  appeal  to  a
transcendent deity.42 In spite of the Japanese inappropriate coinage of the term for “religion” as 宗教
(Ch. zongjiao, literally “the teachings of the ancestral temple and the extended family” in which this
family locus of religiousness is its primary reference),43 “it is a human-centered religiousness (unlike
the  more familiar  Abrahamic,  God-centered ‘religion’ with its  worship model  that ‘defers to  the
ultimate meaning of some temporally prior,  independent,  external agency’) that emerges through
conscientious attention to refining the human experience through achieved propriety in our roles and
relations.”44 Said another way, Confucianism (perhaps a kind of secular humanism45) is a  zongjiao
40 See Ames, Roger T., Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.212.
41 See ibid, p.231.
42 Although there were some creation stories with sense of transcendence in prehistoric Han Chinese myths and legends, 
they have not fully developed into an Abrahamic style, God-centered “religion” in China.
43 Liu, Lydia H. Translingual Practices: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity: China, 1900-1937. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1995 , pp. 299-301. 
44 Ames, op. cit., p.237.
45 “It is the cultivation, attainment, and contribution of this unique personal worth to the cosmos that become one’s pri-
mary warrant for the intense sense of belonging that is the substance of felt religiousness.” p.xiv, ibid. 
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(宗教 )  with human-centered “religiousness,” but it is not a  God-centered “religion.” The zongjiao
(宗教) is not identical with “religion.” Moreover and similarly, Western interpreters are encouraged,
by scholars such as Angus Graham and Roger Ames allowing Chinese tradition to speak for itself, to
be wary about their preconceptions that such concepts as Tian “Heaven” and Dao “Way” must have
the transcendence of their own ultimate principles by which to explain the “ten thousand processes
and events” in the Chinese cosmos or a transcendent origin from which they derive.46 Therefore,
Chinese terms such as  tian  (天 ) and  dao (道 ) are encouraged to be reinterpreted respectively as
“what our world is and how it is” and “the proper way” instead of Tian “Heaven” (The God of the
Bible is often referred to metonymically as “Heaven” ) and Dao “Way.”47
     Transitions of a, b, and c within Figure 1 represent my dissertation’s philosophical background,
which was summarized based upon seminars of Roger Ames and Tian Chenshan (in Beijing Foreign
Language University, Dec. 2015). 
     Transition a: There are at least  two philosophical Wests. One is before the 20th century: As
A.N. Whitehead suggested, “Western philosophy is for the most part a series of footnotes to Plato.”
The  dominant  quest  for  universal  ground  to  thought  and  value  began  with  Plato’s  Forms  and
continued through Aristotle’s  fourfold  causality,  the  medieval  and scholastic  notion  of  God,  the
Renaissance and Enlightenment’s universal application of mathematics, and the twentieth century’s
emphasis on formal logic.48 The second begins with late 19th and early 20th century pragmatism,
existentialism,  hermeneutics,  and  continues  with  mid-  to  late  20th century  structuralism,  post-
46 Ibid, p.212. Cf. Graham, Angus C. Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature. Albany, NY: State Uni-
versity of New York Press, 1990, p. 287. 
47 See Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the 
Zhongyong. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001 ,pp.63-4, pp.79-80. For more details about reinterpretations of 
Chinese terms such as cheng (诚), dao (道), de (德), he(和), jiao(教), junzi(君子), li(礼), ming(命), qi(气), qing(情), 
ren(仁), shan(善), sheng(圣), shengren(圣人), tian(天), wu(物), xiao(孝), xin(心), xing(性), yi(义), zhi(智), zhong(中), 
zhongyong(中庸), see Glossary of Key Terms, ibid, pp.61-87.
48 See Kasulis, Thomas P. Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2002, p.15.
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structuralism, and postmodernism, which collectively are rejections of the philosophical ground of
common sense within the Western philosophical traditions such as metaphysical realism,  formalism,
transcendentalism,  and  a  variety  of  dualisms  such  as  reality/appearance,  good/evil,  God/world,
soul/body, knowledge/opinion, theory/practice, form/matter,  reason/emotion, essence/attribute,  and
so on. 
    The Platonic way of thinking has become a shared target of the 20 th century revolution within
Western philosophical  narratives.  However,  Plato’s way of organizing the human experience has
exerted  significant  influence  on  Euro-American  cultural  narrative.  Although there  is  an  internal
critique within the 20th century Western philosophy classroom, the West outside the classroom still
tends to be indebted to Platonism today. 
     As David Hall and Roger Ames argue that a notion of transcendence in various guises has been a
recurrent and dominant feature since the inception of classical Western philosophy. And one obvious
signal of transcendence is the inventory of dualisms (dualism: a kind of metaphysics which assumes
that  opposites  exist  as  independent  entities,  each with its  own ontological  integrity49)  which  are
derived from a notion of transcendence, where one element in the dualism has ontological priority
over the other.50 And even though postmodernism poses a challenge to modernism and rejects the
One  Ontology  and  transcendent  origin  or  principles,  at  the  same time  it  celebrates  the  idea  of
multiple and simultaneous ontologies at its heart. 
Transition b: Confucianism views humans as correlatively interdependent; and individuals are
never independent of each other, never autonomous in the strictest sense of discreteness, never bound
together by a transcendental force or natural law, and inseparable in the sense of correlativity and
49 See ibid, p.100.
50 See Ames, Roger T. “Meaning as Imaging: Prolegomena to A Confucian Epistemology,” in Culture and Modernity：
East-West Philosophic Perspective, ed. by Eloot Deutsch. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1991, pp.227-8.
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continuity. As Robin Wang summarizes, there are seven forms of correlative relationship51:
(a) Contradiction and opposition; 
(b) Interdependence; 
(c) Mutual inclusion; 
(d) Interaction or resonance; 
(e) Complementarity or mutual support; 
(f) Change and transformation; 
(g) Transforming into each other or penetrating into each other. 
    The yin-yang correlative thinking exerts enormous influences over traditional Chinese decision-
making. However, nowadays, more and more Chinese, lacking cultural vigilance regarding structural
differences between China and the West, have been Westernized, superficially accepting Western 
terminology or actually accepting Western values such as individualistic ideology with dualist 
thinking. 
    Transition c: Conversations between the West and China: The theoretical construction of this
dissertation is based on Confucianism conversing with the new trends of Western thought emerging
from mutual approaching scenarios. The Western philosophical revolution against “ontology” (the
“science  of  Being”,  and  the  reality/appearance  distinction)  opens  and  anticipates  a  productive
conversation with Confucianism with “an ‘a-theistic’ human-centered religiousness—a religiousness
without  appeal  to  an  independent,  transcendent  Deity  as  the  source  of  order.”52 Contemporary
genetics, social psychology, sociology and for that matter political science are a lot closer to the
Chinese correlative paradigm than dualist thinking.
     Meanwhile, the thinking of the early philosophers of China might well correspond to the efforts
of some postmodernists  after  the failure of modernism in the sense of  global  predicaments, that
failure being the collapsing of belief in universal assertions of values and principles. The  Yijing’s
51 See Wang, Robin R. Yinyang: the Way of Heaven and Earth in Chinese Thought and Culture. Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2002,pp. 8-12.
52 See Ames, Roger T., Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.55.
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correlative  worldview,  thinking  modality,  and  value  systems lend  Confucianism the  capacity  of
responding to issues of modernity and the various problems troubling mankind in the postmodern
era. This provides people with alternative perspectives to understanding their way ahead in a new
world. 
Figure 1: The West (Anglo- European/Indo-European) and China: Old and New
Note: A, b, and c are above-mentioned transitions. This figure was originally used by Chenshan Tian in his lecture notes. 
Axial Age is a term coined by Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), characterizing the period from about the 8th to the 3rd century 
BC. In the Western world, Axial Age included the rise of Platonism, which would later become a major influence 
throughout both Christianity and secular thought during the middle Ages and into the Renaissance. In China, Confucian-
ism and Daoism also arose during this era. There are three philosophical processes within this imaginary graph. As to 
Transition “a” with an up arrow, just image: the West was a single-ordered world like a circular cone ruled by universal 
principles from the top to the ground. This circular cone of ideology presumably has been weakened (shifts to dotted 
lines) nowadays. As to Transition “b”, just image: a traditional China symbolized by a yin-yang Taiji diagram has been 
weakened and westernized in a certain way. Nevertheless, an unshaded triangle on the right representing contemporary 
China is still weaker to a certain extent in the sense of transcendence than the shaded triangle on the left representing 
contemporary West. As to Transition “c”, just image: philosophically, the postmodern West is getting closer and closer to 
the traditional China. Transition “c” serves as a basis for our communication between China and West. 
6. My Attitudes & Strategies for Cross-culture Comparisons
(1) Harmony but not without differences (he er bu tong): harmony with creative tensions.
Uncovering differences between Chinese  and Western philosophical  traditions brings about a basis
for dialogues  and exchanges  between  two  different  civilizations.  In  other  words,  the purpose of
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cultural  comparison  is not  to  see  conflicts  or  contradictions  as  misinterpreted  from a  dualistic
perspective of cultural chauvinism. In order to promote diversity of theories and perspectives in the
discipline of International Relations, I start to uncover what these hidden or neglected differences of
world views,  ways of thinking, and political values (see  Table  5 in Chapter 1) are; differences
which if understood and assimilated would enable really constructive dialogues and thereafter avoid
clashes  among  civilizations.  In  this  dissertation,  Chinese  world  view  and  way  of  thinking  are
respectively named as  correlative  yinyang acosmology and correlative thinking.  On the basis of
such a  comparison between Chinese  and the  Western  philosophical  traditions,  I  develop my IR
theory: GPRT, with Chinese philosophical characteristics. 
     (2) “Pervasive or general” rather than “universal”: Although I am using “global,” I am not
seeking a universal theory since universalism does not exist within Chinese philosophy. “Chinese
culture is not shaped by any appeal to universal categories defining human nature and establishing
“the unity of mankind.”53 Harmony in a he er bu tong（harmony but not without differences) world
is the vision of Global Process-Relational Theory. In order to illustrate the conception of Confucian
harmony and Confucian attitudes towards cultural exchange, I would like to cite two comparative
philosophers as follows. Roger Ames once pointed out,54 
Confucian  harmonious  order  is  an  invariably  negotiated,  emergent,  and  provisional  harmony
contingent upon those many elements that constitute it; it is neither rigidly linear nor disciplined
toward some given end. Confucian harmony (he) although consummatory is not expressible in the
language of conformity, completion, perfection, or closure. It is a continuing aesthetic achievement
made possible through ars contextualis, “the art of optimal contextualizing within one’s roles and
relations.” Such achieved harmony is most appropriately expressible in the aesthetic language of
elegance, complexity, intensity, balance, disclosure, efficacy, integrity, and so on. Without appeal to
some originative principle and the linear  teleology that  comes with it,  the world has  no grand
preassigned  design;  its  governing  purpose  is  a  localized  and  temporalized  self-sufficiency---  a
53 See Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames.  Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture.
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 90.
54 See Ames, Roger T., Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.84.
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collaboration among the participating elements to make the most out of each situation. This then is
the meaning of Confucian harmony (he). 
     As Daniel A. Bell pointed out in the foreword to Li’s book, “Westerners tend to think of harmony
as  synonymous  with  conformity  and  uniformity,  but  Li  shows  that  this  view  is  fundamentally
mistaken,”  Li  Chengyang  make  central  argument  of  his  book  of  The  Confucian  Philosophy  of
Harmony as follows,
Contrary to a common view in the West, Confucian harmony is not mere agreement but has to be
achieved  and  maintained  with  creative  tension.  Under  the  influence  of  a  Weberian  reading  of
Confucianism  as  “adjustment”  to  a  world  with  an  underlying  fixed  cosmic  order,  Confucian
harmony  has  been  systematically  misinterpreted  in  the  West  and  in  contemporary  China  as
presupposing a fixed grand scheme of things that pre-exists in the world to which humanity has to
conform.55
 (3) A generalization with exceptions: “A generalization is not the same as a universal 
qualifier,”56 and “Generalities always have qualifications or exceptions.”57 This dissertation 
focuses on two distinctively different basic ideologies of humans and their relations and 
games, while there have been a great amount of similarities between Chinese and Western 
daily lives. Moreover, the contrast between Chinese (summarized by the Yijing) and the 
Western (Anglo-European/Indo-European) philosophies and theories are a generalization with 
exceptions: For example, as to International Relations Theory, in Chapter 5, I mainly use 
Table 9 to summarize theories and perspectives into four major conceptions as pillars, 
compared with four terms of my GPRT in Table 10. I mention some exceptions as notes 
after Table 9. 
There is no China and West dualism or dichotomy in this dissertation, since it is unlikely that
any culture is ever a very perfect example of “either…or…” However, as Roger Ames points out,
“While it is always dangerous to make generalizations about complex cultural epochs and traditions,
55 See Li, Chenyang., The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony. London and New York: Routledge, 2014, p.1.
56 See Kasulis, Thomas P. Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2002, p.8.
57 See ibid, p.11.
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it is even more dangerous not to...The differences between the classical Chinese world view and
those classical Greek, Roman, and Judeo-Christian assumptions that dominate and ground Western
traditions are fundamental.”58 “Generalizations come first; then, with further study, one discovers the
exceptions, the nuances, and the qualifications. Without the generalization, however, people cannot
proceed in their quest for understanding any more than they can use most databases without first
defining the fields of entry.”59 Generalization is a common, necessary, and inevitable aspect of our
learning.60 Therefore,  the  major  question  of  this  dissertation  is  not  about  the  exceptions,61 but
whether  my  contrast  does  indeed  catch  the  main  drift  of  the  cultural and  relevant  theoretical
differences. Thereafter, I take the following comparative strategy: 
(4) Wholesale and retail analogies & associative and contrastive analogies: This dissertation
does not select one philosopher or one theory or perspective as a basis for comparisons. According to
Roger  Ames,62 who  does  not  select  one  philosopher  as  a  basis  for  cultural  comparisons,  all
comparisons must be retail (partial, and on specific issues) rather than wholesale, and can be both
associative and contrastive.  When comparing different theories and perspectives,  this dissertation
needs to be analogically retail and piecemeal rather than working in whole cloth so that we can see
from  many  different  references  to  Chinese  ancient  philosophy  and  also  the  analogies  can  be
productive of both associations and contrasts. 
For  example, Whitehead’s  Process  Philosophy63 can  be  used  as  a  Western  reference only
marginally and for specific issues, while Dewey is a much more successful representative of process
58 See Ames, Roger T., Sun-Tzu The Art of Warfare. New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1993,p.45.
59 See Kasulis, Thomas P. Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2002,pp.7-8.
60 Ibid.
61 In this dissertation, I still spend a small amount of time dealing with exceptions. 
62 See Ames, Roger T., Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011,p.38.
63 Whitehead is a failed process thinker, wanting to think process while maintaining his hold on transcendence (primor-
dial nature of god and eternal objects).
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thinking,  whose  vocabulary  (see  Table  3)  can  be  a  reference  for  Confucian  terms.  For  another
example, I pay most attention to Morgenthau's six principles of political  realism of international
relations; however, I also make partial comparisons, both associative and contrastive, between other
Western IR theories and my Global Process-Relational Theory. 
Table 3: Deweyan Vocabulary as Reference
Confucian vocabulary Deweyan vocabulary as a reference
道 dao experience
和 he consummatory experience, democracy
仁 ren personality, individuality, and equality
礼 li religiousness64
人性 renxing processual human nature
Source: p.384, Ames, Roger T. “Ruxue yu duwei de shiyong zhuyi 儒学与杜威的实用主义：一种对话” 
(“Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism: A Dialogue) in He er bu tong: zhongxi zhexue de huitong 和而不同: 中西哲
学的会通 (Seeking Harmony not Sameness": Comparative Philosophy and East-west Understanding). Beijing: Peking 
University Press, 2009.
7. Ambiguous Concepts
There are four important ambiguous concepts in my dissertation. Since it is a multi-disciplinary 
work, I first want people from both philosophy and political science backgrounds to understand each 
other’s meaning when reading a concept. In the following chapters I will use the following four 
terms as interpreted below: rationalism, realism, idealism, and anarchy. 
Table 4: Ambiguous Concepts: Different Meanings within Philosophy and IR
Philosophy/
political philosophy
International Relations/ 
Foreign Policy
rationalism Rational thinking is a modality of 
causal thinking about extrinsic 
relatedness of things. Rational thought
generally requires its users to accept a 
range of unexamined, or at best 
unproven, assumptions that then 
predetermine the conclusions that can 
be reached logically with deductive 
1. The Rational Choices Model of Decision-making: A 
rational actor tends to make short-term and small-scale 
decisions for maximizing his/her interests as final goals of 
economy, politics, and social life, minimizing his/her costs at 
the same time, after considering facts available, alternative 
choices, possible gains and losses, and also weighing benefits 
and costs, and opportunities and risks. Realists and most 
policymakers begin with the rational model, in which foreign 
64 Confucian religiousness is characterized by “the symbiotic continuity between the natural and cultural context and the 
human experience”(tianren heyi 天人合一), “distinguishing Confucian familial and communal reverence from Abra-
hamic God-inspired worship.” See Ames, Roger T., Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2011, p.92.
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rigor. 
From the 17th century rationality 
began to marginalize spiritual, 
emotional, intuitional, intentional 
(will), and experiential inquiry, hence
was further associated with a 
peculiarly “linear” or “single-track” 
mindset.
Rationalism believes that reality is 
knowable independently of experience
through innate ideas, while 
empiricism believes that all we know 
is dependent on sense data derived 
from experience. 
In politics, Rationalism, since the 
Enlightenment, has historically 
emphasized a "politics of reason" 
centered upon rational choice, 
utilitarianism, secularism, and 
irreligion.
Three important characteristics of 
modernism65 are rationalism, 
individualism, 
and universalism. Modernism is a 
rational ideology. Modern society is 
represented by human reason. 
policy is conceived of as actions chosen by the national 
government that maximize its strategic goals and objectives. 
The state is assumed to be a unitary actor (Once a decision is 
made, the state speaks and acts with one voice.) with 
established goals, a set of options, and an algorithm for 
deciding which option best meets its goals.
2. Rationalism as a paradigm: Rationality also refers to a 
way of understanding within the Anglo-European/Indo-
European tradition, originating from ancient Greek 
Cosmology. Most of the mainstream western theories and 
perspectives on international politics take a rationalist 
paradigm for theoretical constructions. 
      As to realism, research on nation-states within the 
anarchical international system tends to be dominated by 
rational actor models which shun subjective elements such as 
world views, ways of thinking process, and political values of 
leaders, in favor of objective facts available, seeking essential 
meanings through definitions and causal logic, although 
substantial literature exists critical of this approach (cf. 
Stoessinger, Janis, and Allison and Zelikow)…
The Fourth Great Debate (between "rationalists" and 
"reflectivists") was started by Robert Keohane in an 
International Studies Association debate in 1988 and can be 
considered an epistemological debate, about how we can know
‘things’. Rationalist approaches include such approaches as 
neo-realism, and neo-liberalism/neo-liberal institutionalism. 
Reflectivist approaches include such approaches as 
constructivism, feminism, post-structuralism, post-colonialism
and Critical Theory. Reflectivism is a broad umbrella label, 
used primarily in International Relations theory, for a range of 
theoretical approaches which oppose rational-choice accounts
of social phenomena and substantialism, atomism, and 
positivism more generally.
3. The conception of Rationalism in politics is also seen as the 
midpoint in the three main traditional viewpoints of realism 
embodied by Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, 
rationalism (or internationalism) by Hugo Grotius, and 
universalism or revolutionism by Immanuel Kant. Rationalists
believe that through the existence of international 
organizations and international laws, the international system 
65 I am referring mostly to the philosophical modernism of the West.
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is less anarchic than Realists claim.  According to such 
rationalism, “since all men partake of reason, they must 
sooner or later meet on that common ground, discovering that 
their conflicts …can all be solved by a rational formula 
acceptable to all.”66 
“This philosophy recognizes only two forces determining the 
historic process: reason, and unreason as its counterpart.”67 
“Except for ignorance and emotion, human reason would 
solve international conflicts as easily and as rationally as it has
solved so many problems in the natural sciences.”68 Hans 
Morgenthau (1904-1980) criticized such rationalistic 
philosophy bearing “an ‘historical optimism’ that was rooted 
in the Utopian belief that human beings could always master 
any problem.
realism Reality exists independently of 
observers.
Realism, as both informally and formally espoused by such 
famous thinkers as Niccolò Machiavelli (1449–1516), Thomas
Hobbes (1588-1679) and Hans Morgenthau, holds that in the 
anarchic system that is international relations one value above 
all others explains the actions of states, that value being the 
pursuit of power.   World politics is driven by competitive self-
interest.
idealism Reality is fundamentally mental, 
mentally constructed. Ideas are the 
only reality.
Idealism is a theory of international relations deeply rooted in 
Western liberal traditions. Unlike political realists, idealists 
see human nature as essentially altruistic and human beings as 
capable of other interests beyond selfish needs for power.  The
idealist seeks to use it toward the project of building an 
international community that will replace the anarchy that 
rules the international system.  The most famous idealist 
thinker may be Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who in 1795 
produced his short essay on international relations titled 
Perpetual Peace. 
anarchy  Anarchy refers to a state of 
lawlessness and disorder. 
Anarchy is a Greek word that means 
"no ruler" (archy=ruler, an=no). It is a 
state that exists in the absence of an 
organized government or authority.
There is no world government acting with police powers.
66 See Morgenthau, Hans. Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th revised edition. New York: Al-
fred Knopf, 1973, pp.43-4.
67 See Morgenthau, Hans. Scientific Man vs Power Politics. University of Chicago Press, 1946,p.38.
68 See Morgenthau, op. cit.,p.44.
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CHAPTER  1:  INTRODUCING  THE  YIJING TO  GLOBAL
POLITICS
    In this chapter, I introduce philosophy of the ancient Chinese book "Yijing" (otherwise 
known as "I-Ching," the Book of Changes, also known as the Chinese ancient “Bible”) into the 
discussion of global politics, through interpreting two key Yijing terms of correlativity (huxi 互系) 
and situational appropriateness (shizhong 时中), occupying special places in my theory. 
1.1 Yijing: the Living Water Source of Chinese Philosophy
The Yijing is an ancient Chinese classic that dates back at least two thousand years. There is a
commentary on the Yijing that is attributed to Confucius. The Yijing has been called head of the five
Confucian Classics, head of the cluster of classics in Chinese intellectual history, or “the living water
source of  the endless flow of  Chinese philosophy,”69 just like the  snow-covered Geladandong, the
main peak of the Tanggula mountains, where the Tuotuohe River, the headwater of the Yangtze River
(Changjiang, “Long River”), originates from. The  Yijing provides not only a primordial strand of
philosophy of dao for most of the schools of thought in the Chinese tradition, but also a summary of
yin-yang correlative cosmology that is shared by most classical Chinese thinkers such as Confucians,
Taoists, Legalists, Mohists, and Militarists (Bingjia 兵家）and so on, who generally believe that the
religious,  natural,  and  cultural  context  and  the  human  experience  are  continuous  and  mutually
entailing.70 
69 According to Chung-ying Cheng, Founding President of the International Society for the I’Ching (ISIC), “Zhouyi de 
xingcheng shi zhongguo zhexue siwei de yuantouhuoshui  周易的形成是中国哲学思维的源头活水.” See Cheng, 
Chung-ying, Yixue Bentilun (易学本体论 Theory of Benti in the Philosophy of Yijing), Beijing: Peking University Press,
2006, p.1.
70 Compared to the disagreements among schools of thought in the Chinese tradition, the differences between the 
classical Chinese world view and those classical Greek, Roman, and Judeo-Christian assumptions that dominate and 
ground Western traditions are much more fundamental, as I cite Roger Ames in the Introduction of this dissertation. 
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However,  the  Yijing philosophy  including  the  Chinese  yin-yang correlative  worldview  of
tianxia (all in a world of correlations) has not been paid enough attention by modern policy makers
or strategic thinkers, especially political realists of international relations. The Yijing contains most
of the fundamental principles in the world, including the correlative relationship between yin and
yang, or two opposing forces, which themselves include polarities such as bright and dark, moving
and static, weak and strong, hidden and visible, and so forth. When applied to human society, the
relations between different polities are also in the network of such changes and interactions. This
ancient book as a philosophical expression of tradition and transformation of the world is not just a
divination text as it is usually interpreted, as the book contains philosophical thinking on the cosmos
and its development. As it talks about nature, human, and civilization, it  can readily be used to
illuminate global politics even in the 21st Century. For example, based on the Yijing, Reg Little, an
Australian diplomat for 25 years,  working in Japan, Laos,  the United Nations (New York), and
China, also summarized four principles for policy makers: 
     Change and resilience is a constant concern of the mature and thoughtful.
     Internal and external balance of opposites is key to all development.
     Considered and diverse reflection should guide decision making.
     Tradition is best respected in designing change and modernization.71
In this dissertation, I develop my project on Confucian Global Process-Relational Theory to
chiefly make the Yijing into policy consideration as non-western efforts to systematize and theorize
the Confucian worldview, mode of thinking, and values. To be specific, the Yijing frames a Chinese
multi-tiered, comprehensive perspective on global problem-solving in this globalized world. I argue
that many elements (e.g., yin-yang correlativity 阴阳互系, situational appropriateness 时中,
renxing 人性 ,  tianxia 天下 , harmony not without differences 和而不同 ) in the  Yijing related to
71 Little, Reg. A Confucian-Daoist Millennium. Berkeley, CA: Connor Court Publishing, 2006, p. 160.
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diplomatic relations can be theorized and integrated into narratives for shaping the future of global
dynamics, to optimize flexibility and self-regenerative character of human relations. 
1. 2 The Yijing and Correlativity 
The central concept of this dissertation is huxi (互系), translated as―correlativity. If we were to
choose just one English word to characterize the Chinese way of thinking, making decisions, and
producing knowledge, that word would be “correlativity” (continuity through change, or in plain
terms, processual and relational),  which inevitably renders a diversified harmonious culture other
than a certain unified “Me” culture. My dissertation identifies correlativity as a clear style of thinking
formulated in the  Yijing, which has had a powerful influence on Chinese ancient understanding of
world order. 
In ancient Chinese philosophy, correlativity presents an image of two things being tied to each
other, each of which constitutes continuity with the other, and being seen associated with a change
from one thing into the other  and/or  transforming into yet  something72 else. Huxi  (correlativity)
consists of three key ideas in the Yijing: polarity, continuity, and change. In the Yijing the world is
viewed  as  a  world  of  correlations  (of  any  type,  loose  or  tight,  multilevel,  multidimensional,
multifold, and multicategory73). In such a world, as Hall and Ames point out, there is no element or
aspect that in the strictest sense transcends the rest: Every element is related to one another, and all
elements  are  correlative.74 I  attempt  to  identify  correlativity  as  a  clear  style  of  thinking  (or
philosophy), a style which is distinctly Chinese, but not necessarily uniquely Chinese. Formulated in
Chinese ancient philosophical literature such as the  Yijing, it has a powerful influence on Chinese
72 Even the term “something” implies a tendency to think in terms of essences (substance ontology vs. procedural meta-
physics).
73 See Tian, Chenshan. Chinese Dialectics: From Yijing to Marxism. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2005,p.27. 
74 See Hall, David L., Roger T. Ames, and Confucius. Thinking through Confucius. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987, 
p.18.
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decision-makers  and intellectuals  in  their  understanding  of  global  politics.  I  expect  that  such  a
tradition can become a basis for a global theory, distinct from the Anglo-European/Indo-European
tradition with a strong sense of rationality that is a basis of contemporary International Relations
Theory.
As dao is fully expressed in one sentence in the Yijing: a yin and a yang exemplify dao,75 the
salient feature of the Yijing philosophy is that the complementary and contradictory interactions of
the two basic elements of a polarity like yin-yang constitute the forces, and produce change. With no
transcendence, every element is relative to every other and all elements are thus "correlative." Each
particular is both self-determinate and determined by every other. An explanation of relationships
requires  a  contexualist  interpretation  of  the  world  in  which  events  are  strictly  interdependent.
"Polarity" implies a relationship of two events, each constituting a necessary condition for the other.
Yin always  suggests  becoming-yang,  and  vice  versa.  Any  two  events  constantly  alternate  each
another, change into each other, exchange with each other, and displace each other, and so on.
To be concrete, there is no sense of dualism and transcendence (associated with ancient Greek
Cosmology) in  Yijing philosophy. The sky, earth, and ten thousand  events mutually correlate with
each other. It is interactions of the two basic elements of a polarity like yin-yang that constitute the
forces,  and  produce  change.  The  Confucian  "polarity"  implies  a  relationship  of  two  events  for
example, each of which constitutes a necessary condition for the other. Each particular element is
both  self-determinate  and determined  by every  other  particular  element.  A polar  explanation  of
relationships  requires  a  contextualist  interpretation  of  the  world  in  which  events  are  strictly
75 The Chinese original is “Yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao 一阴一阳之谓道” Yijing, Xici I, ch. 5. 
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interdependent.76 Such correlative polar metaphysics precludes all dualistic, absolute, and essentialist
conceptions such as self/other, identity, human nature, nation-state, and anarchy, which often appear
in the Western international relations theory. Instead of concepts such as international, human nature,
nation-state,  and  anarchy,  I  use  correlative  terms  such  as  ―global,  renxing (human  tendency),
tianxia (all under the sky literally, or all in  a world of correlations), and harmony with differences
(he er bu tong)  to  construct  my theory,  which reflects  Chinese correlative  yinyang cosmology.77
Thus,  a  correlative  thinking  and  scheme  of  contextualization  replaced  ontological  and  dualistic
assumptions that have accompanied Western concepts.
   To understand correlativity in Chinese tradition, we may look to a Chinese theory in the field of
architecture, i.e.  Tixing Huanjing Lun  (体形环境论 Theory of Planning Physical Environment),
founded by Liang Sich eng. Liang Sicheng (梁思成  Liang Ssu-ch'eng, 1901–1972) was the son of
Liang Chaotic (1873-1929), a well-known Chinese political thinker in the late Bing Dynasty. Liang
Sich eng returned to China from the United States after studying at the University of Pennsylvania.
He was recognized as the “Father of Modern Chinese Architecture.” Liang was the founder of the
Architecture Department of Northeastern University in 1928 and Tsingyuan University in 1946. He
was the Chinese representative in the Design Board of the United Nations headquarters in New York.
Liang’s Tixing Huanjing Lun is a very good example of correlativity: 
In recent years, people in the field of architecture, have realized that during the past years, the notions
of  building are  misleading.  Thanks  to  some leading  thinkers’ efforts  to  advocate,  new trends  of
architecture have been accepted. The basic purpose of these trends of thoughts is to build architecture
76 According to Roger Ames, the art of ―contextualizing can be illustrated by an analogy of ―the relationship that exists
between any particular note in a symphonic performance and the symphony as a whole. There is a sense in which the 
value and meaning of each note can only be understood within the context of the entire symphony. In these terms, then, 
each note has the entire symphony implicate within it. At the same time, the symphony is only available through one note
at a time as particular perspectives on the symphony…Ames, Roger. Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare. New York, NY: Bal-
lantine Books, 1993, p.69.
77 Strictly speaking, Chinese correlative yinyang cosmology is an acosmology, in which “a-” as a prefix means negative 
or not.  David Hall and Roger Ames used “acosmology” in their book of Anticipating China: Thinking through the Nar-
ratives of Chinese and Western Culture. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. 
For more details about the meanings of cosmology and acosmology, also see Table 5. 
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with its physical environment suitable for “heartrending” (身心)78 of humans who live or work in it.
With this purpose as a guiding principle, the notion of building has changed completely. The old-
generation  architects  only  paid  attention  to  the  building  itself,  while  forgetting  the  collateral
relationship between the building and the surrounding ecology. Moreover, most of the many-storied
buildings  were  designed  for  high  ranking  officials,  and  factory  plants  were  only  good  for  the
bourgeoisie,  while  many aspects of  ordinary people's  daily life were forgotten. In addition, most
designers  only  took  into  account  the  building  itself,  while  forgetting  all  the  furniture  inside  the
building, and even the constitutive relationship between daily utensils and human life and work. In
other words, the range of so-called 'building' should be expanded now: rather than just a house, it
must  include  the  ecology  for  human  “heartrending.”  In  other  words,  the  so-called  “physical
environment” is a living ecology, including something as small as a desk lamb and an ink slab, or a
cup and a dish, and as big as even an entire city, or even more the networks of cities in an area, and as
extensive as culture, politics, business... for human life and work, which is an appropriate stage for all
above-mentioned collateral and constitutive aspects as research objects of the Theory of Planning
Physical Environment. The Tsingyuan University’s architecture curriculum is designed to fulfill such
a goal to meet the requirements of the Theory of Planning Physical Environment.79
My comments: Liang’s Theory of Planning Physical Environment is based on fengshui  (风
水 ),  an ancient Chinese philosophy which develops a dynamic system to deal with the issue of
harmonizing human existence with the surrounding environment, and which can be traced back to
the correlative cosmology of the yijing. In the correlative cosmology, nothing in isolation, all is in a
state  of  unbroken  continuity.  Liang’s  Theory  of  Planning  Physical  Environment  stands  as  an
alternative to some Western modernist perspectives rooted in analytic thinking which often is used to
examine components of phenomena in isolation. For Liang, starting from discreteness is replaced
with recognition that buildings are  intrinsically connected with life, work, the environment, and
concomitant relations with economics,  culture,  politics and so on. In sum, based upon Kabulis’s
theory  on  Intimacy  or  Integrity,80 I  would  further  argue  that  Liang  thoroughly  enthrones  a
78 According to Roger Ames, Chinese tradition is “eventful” rather than “essential,” so gerunds are better than nouns for 
translating Chinese concepts. Moreover, it is better understood as a qualitative disclosure of a continuous, holistic experi-
ence rather than the integration of disparate things. See Ames, Roger. “‘Bodyheartminding’: Reconceiving the Inner Self 
and the Outer World in the Language of Holographic Focus and Field” in Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 2015, 10 (2), 
pp.167-80.
79 Excerpted from Wu Liangyong's book Renju Huanjing Kexue Daolun (人居环境科学导论 Introduction to Sciences of 
Human Settlements), Beijing: China Architecture & Building Press, 2001, pp.155-6. Wu Liangyong was Assistant to 
Liang Sicheng in Tsinghua University. I translated this paragraph into English. 
80 See Kasulis, Thomas P. Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2002 ,p.101.
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metaphysical framework of “ecology” (“Eco” from the Greek for “home,” an interdependent system
from which nothing can be separated) like Figure 11 (Internally Related Whole with Interdependence
and Overlapping Relations),  in  place of “environment” (“surrounding”)  implying a metaphysical
framework like Figure 11 (Externally Related Whole Consisting of Atomistic and Discrete Entities).
Liang’s  theoretical  construction  is  on  the  basis  of  Chinese  correlative  worldview,  of  which
Traditional Chinese Medicine also lends itself to an exploration.81  
In this Chapter, I start from theorizing the yijing’s world views, ways of thinking, and political
values. I also go deeper to explore the differences between Chinese and Western world views, ways
of thinking,  and (political) values behind IRT and  my  GPRT.  As this inquiry processes, we will
witness the unfolding of two different orientations constructed by both sides in understanding the
world and acting with it. 
Table 5: World Views, Ways of Thinking, and Political Values behind IRT and GRT
 Anglo-European/Ido-European Yijing
World view
Cosmology
Cosmogony
Cosmos: the totality of things constitutes 
a single-ordered world/ the antithesis be-
tween Chaos (nonrational, unprincipled, 
anarchic, and lawless) and Cosmos82 
What? A transcendental Being83
acosmology (a natural cosmology)
acosmogony
“acosmos”: Absence of belief in a single-ordered world 
and the employment of aesthetic over logical senses of or-
der / world of the sky, earth, and ten thousand events mu-
tually correlating with each other: ziran (self-so-ing, self-
do-ing), auto-creativity
How? One yin and one yang are called ado (一阴一阳之
81 See Ames, Roger. Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011,pp.56-61.
82 See Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames. Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western 
Culture. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, pp.3-12.
83 While the Western philosophical tradition prioritizes the question of “what,” the Chinese side maintains a “how-priority
attitude.” So with no separation between phenomena and ontological foundations, the Chinese cosmological question is 
like “How should our world hang together?” To the contrary, the Western side tends to focus on metaphysical and onto-
logical questions: “What is the One behind the many?” or “What is the Being behind the beings?” Therefore, questions 
like “What is Dao?” might be non-indigenous. For more on Chinese cosmogony, see “Thinking through Comparisons---
Analytical and Narrative Methods for Cultural Understanding,” in Early China/Ancient Greece: Thinking through Com-
parisons, ed. Stephen Durrant. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002, pp.98.
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 Anglo-European/Ido-European Yijing
Transcendentalism, absolutism and dual-
ism 
Substance ontology
Priority to rest and permanence
谓道): Yin-yang correlativitism: continuity through change
in the relations between persons and among the myriad of 
things and events between the earth and the sky.
Ontology of events within process: absence of ontologi-
cal assertions that there is some underlying substratum-es-
sentialism/ no superordinate (One standing independent of
the world ordered as its efficient cause)
Primary of change and becoming
Mode of 
thinking
Rational thinking
Causal thinking/
linear and single-track thinking/
analytic thinking/ Logo-centrism
Individualism other than holism
(Part and whole: atomism and holism)
Correlative thinking
correlative thinking (including rational 
thinking)/process thinking/
analogical thinking/
full account of context
Focus and field84: a holographic understanding of world 
systems; recognition that each and every unique 
phenomenon is continuous with every other phenomenon 
within one’s own field of experience. 
Fico and fields or “ecologically situated events” and their 
“environments”: intrinsic and constitutive nature of 
relations. 
For any individual person: field could be as small as a 
family and as big and extensive as an entire world society,
or universe.
Values
“God”-oriented values
Truth, Good and Beauty
Human beings as most fundamentally 
 ado-focused “values”
the continuity between the natural context and the human
experience
hong  “being appropriate or not”  
he  “harmony of differences” , “Harmony but not 
without differences”
84  What David Hall and Roger Ames refer to as a “focus and field” model is a model in which an individual is considered as relative 
rather than absolute, that is, as within a network of relationships that can change fundamentally as well as superficially. The self 
as a focus is on “correlativity” or interrelatedness, interdependence, appropriateness. See Hall, David L., Roger T. 
Ames, and Confucius. Thinking through Confucius. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987, P.237.
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 Anglo-European/Ido-European Yijing
free, rational, and self-interested autono-
mous individuals85
“individual happiness”/
Competition
Either individualism or collectivism
(dichotomy between selfishness and altru-
ism; Individualism associated with auton-
omy, equality, rationality, freedom)
Individual interest as final goal of econ-
omy, politics, and social life, capitalism, 
expansion…/
Modern liberal theories of individual-
ism
Government and corporations: extended 
concepts of the individual. 
The social and interrelated persons, basically as 
comembers of human communities where freedom is not a
given, but achieved in the company of others86
appropriate and pleasant relationships/
mutual help, the idea of “friendship first, contest sec-
ondary”
Both individualism and collectivism (Mutualism)
The self as a focus is on “correlativity” or interrelatedness,
interdependence, appropriateness (hong). Actions are 
expected to be properly and particularly situated within 
roles and relations/ Pursuit for appropriateness fitting 
within the specific circumstances. 
Confucian role ethics
Why is the Confucian politics a fico/fields structure?
No transcendental One; no absolute principles
No competition （infinite game）
No dualisms but continuity and correlation; the individual 
as correlative and a continuity with any other individuals
Not the individual, but the correlations of a person with 
other persons, group, community or Dian/di.
Cf.  Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames.  Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western
Culture. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995. 
1.3 Situational Appropriateness：Decision-making according to the Yijing
 The  Yijing includes 384  yao  symbolic hexagram lines. Each  yao tells people in one specific
situation how one can seek propitiousness (ji 吉) and avoid unpropitiousness (xiong 凶). The Yijing
85 Henry, Rosemont, Jr., "Two Loci of Authority: Autonomous Individuals and Related Persons" in ed. Peter D. Hershock 
and Roger T. Ames, Confucian Culture of Authority, State University of New York Press 2006. 
86 Ibid.
34
does not teach one rational skills in becoming a self-interest maximizer,  because maximization of
individual self-interests is not necessarily considered as propitiousness (ji 吉) on the basis of proper
focus and equilibrium (zhong 中 , or translated as appropriateness)  from perspectives of long-term
tendency and large-scale context. The example of prisoner's dilemma does illustrate this point.
This way of thinking about appropriateness and specific situations is called  shi-hong  (时中
situational appropriateness, or translated as appropriately timed focus and equilibrium), which is
the central idea of the  Book of Changes,87 telling us about how to seek propitiousness and avoid
unpropitiousness (qu hi bi xiong 趋吉避凶) fitting within specific circumstances, as time changes
and circumstance varies.    
The Confucian way of  acting or  decision-making (Correlative  Choices  Model  as  I  further
defined in Chapter 2, 3, 4, and 5) is directed at  shi-zhong (situational appropriateness) and further
harmony  through  equilibrium.  That  is,  when  the  cultivated  person  exercises  zhong  (or  more
precisely, situational appropriateness 时中), “which is adjusted to fit specific time and situation, he is
in harmony with the rest of the world through equilibrium.”88 Shi-zhong (situational appropriateness)
and harmony are considered as a correlative  yin-yang paring: “Without  zhong, harmony cannot be
achieved; without harmony,zhong is pointless.”89 
As Li Chechnyan points out, “‘shi 时’ in ‘shi-zhong’ here means ‘he shi 合时’ or ‘ying shi 应
时 ,’ namely  ‘opportune’ or  ‘appropriately  timed’…When the  situation  is  right  and  a  favorable
tendency is formed, one should seize the opportunity and forge ahead. Good timing takes place in the
entire context of an action.”90 Since “zhong 中 ”  “ takes into consideration multiple factors in a
87 See Yijing, Chapter 4, Menggua, Tuan zhuan. The Chinese original is from “Meng, heng. Yi heng xing, shizhong ye 蒙，
亨。以亨行，时中也.” 
88 See Li, Chenyang., The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony.  London and New York: Routledge, 2014 ,pp.79-80.
89 See ibid, p.86.
90 See ibid, p.79.
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specific situation, including timing,”91 the Confucian moral perspective of situational appropriateness
values  situational  “responsiveness”  within  particular  roles  and  relations,  instead  of  universal
principles of rights and “responsibilities.” To be concrete, correlative actors should take full account
of  context  or  qu shi (tendency,  advantage,  and  context),  make  a  never-ending  environmental
scanning  to  identify  contingencies,  correlations  and  correspondences  as  well  as  coherence  and
processes,  and also make constant  adjustments to the whole environment so that  one is  not  left
unprepared  for  the  unwanted  surprises  that  often  accompany  simplistic  rationalist  certainties.
“Harmony implies being well adjusted and balanced.”92 
Zhong stands for (taking) the unright, unbiased, and balanced way, (making) the right choice,
or (doing) the right thing, which actually goes over the finite game’s logic of wins and losses. To be
more concrete, actions are required to be appropriate (yi 义), which means doing what is fitting in
a proper and in a fitting manner, given the specific situation. Within a tradition in which person is
viewed as irreducibly social, and the “I” and the social context are reflexive and mutually entailing, 93
an actor thus is required to accommodate the interests of all concerned, rather than being only self-
interested (li 利), and at the same time required to take into account of both means and ends, and
also both longer term and larger scale. 
Appropriateness (yi 义) and self-interest (li 利) are also considered as a correlative yin-yang
paring. Chinese people tend to consider both yi 义 and li 利, and take a appropriately timed way (a
way  to situational  appropriateness)  in  order  to  pursuit  holistic  harmony  (he).  Appropriate
interest  (yi-li 义利 , balance  between  appropriateness  and  self-interest) is  generally  viewed  as
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid,  p.80.
93 See Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the 
Zhongyong. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001, p. 84.
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propitiousness (ji 吉) in the yijing. Strictly speaking, Book of Changes is an incomplete translation of
the “Yijing,” since the “Yijing” not only literally means  Book of  “Changes,” but also tells people
about what should be “unchanged”: (situational)  appropriateness.  All  timely actions of changes
should be taken to pursuit (situational) appropriateness; otherwise actions might be unright, biased,
or unbalanced, and certainly unpropitious.
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CHAPTER 2: CORRELATIVITY VS. RATIONALITY: 
RELATIONS AND GAMES
     This chapter further interprets “correlativity,” the central term of this dissertation, in three ways.
First, I compare correlativity with its Western counterpart, rationality. Second, I interpret correlativity
based on  paraphrase and  summarization of  Thomas P. Kasulis’s comparative theory about internal
and  external  relations.94 Third,  based  upon  Roger  Ames’s  philosophical  comparison  between
Mencius (372-289  BCE)  and  Aristotle (384-322  BCE),  I  take  “human  tendency”,  which  is  my
starting  point  of  sage-tianxia-harmony  connectional  framework  in  Chapter  5,  as  an  example  to
illustrate  correlative  or  processual  understanding of  “human nature,”  one  of  the  most  important
topics of international theory and also a common starting point shared by many social theories.  
2.1 Correlativity vs. Rationality    
     Correlativity,  the  central  concept  of  my  dissertation,  will  be compared  with  rationality  as
developed in the European family of cultures (see Table 5 and 10). Explicitly,  my study is also an
experimental project providing a comparative study of rationality here mainly referring to rational
thinking (way  of  thinking),  rational  choices  model in  foreign  policy  decision-making(way  of
acting), and rationalism as a major paradigm in the construction of International Relations Theory
(way of understanding). As shown in Table 5 and 10, I compare rationality with correlativity mainly
referring to correlative thinking, “correlative” choices model, and “correlativism” as a Chinese
paradigm in my construction of Global Relations Theory. 
94 Kasulis, Thomas P. Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
2002.
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     First, I try to compare two modes of thinking, rational thinking and correlative thinking, and
the world views behind them and political values after them (see Table 5). Distinct from correlative
thinking, rational thinking is a modality of causal, linear and single-track thinking, originating
from ancient Greek Cosmology. Within Chinese Yijing tradition, because of absence of belief in a
single-ordered world and One standing independent of the world ordered as its efficient cause, and
the  employment  of  aesthetic  over  logical  senses  of  order,  the  world  of  the  sky,  earth,  and  ten
thousand  events are considered as mutually  correlating with each other.  It  should be noted that
correlative thinking is distinctly Chinese but not necessarily uniquely Chinese and it is a kind of
Peircian  abduction--detective  sleuthing  and  medical  diagnostics  in  which  you  are  looking  for
productive  correlations.  It  is  a  holistic  approach  that  includes  giving  reasons  and  patterns  of
coherence--whatever we might take as a definition of rationality. 95 The rational logic is causal, while
the other is correlative logic. In other words, individuality (therefore, discreteness) and relationality
(therefore, continuity) are entry points of the two types of logics. The interpretation here is more or
less abstract. It can be recognized that in one concrete decision-making situation there may be both
correlative thinking and rational thinking. 
Second, I compare how a rational actor makes decisions with how a correlative actor within
a focus and field model96 does. A rational actor tends to make short-term and small-scale decisions
for  maximizing his/her  interests  as  final  goals  of  economy,  politics,  and social  life,  minimizing
his/her costs at the same time, after considering facts available, alternative choices, possible gains
95   This discussion is based on personal communication with Roger Ames.
96  What David Hall and Roger Ames refer to as a “focus and field” model is a model in which an individual is considered as relative
rather than absolute, that is, as within a network of relationships that can change fundamentally as well as superficially. The self as
a focus is on “correlativity” or interrelatedness, interdependence, appropriateness. 
See Hall, David L., Roger T. Ames, and Confucius. Thinking through Confucius. Albany: State University of New York Press,
1987, p.237.
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and losses, and also weighing benefits and costs, and opportunities and risks. Rational choices model
is  consistent  with  individualism  and  utilitarianism,  associated  with  dualistic,  absolute,  and
essentialist conceptions such as human nature, autonomy, equality, and freedom. It can be argued that
corporations and even national government are extended concepts of the individual. As shown in
Table  10  in  Chapter  5,  according  to  international  relations  theories,  methods  for  nation-state  in
anarchy to maximize national interests are mainly  collective security/mutual assistance,  balance of
power, self-help, and institution–cooperative interaction between states, and so on. 
    As a correlative actor, a person envisions him/herself in their multiplicity of relations and roles
they live,  their  organizational  contexts,  and  their  larger  significance  in  the  natural  and  human
environment.  There  are  a  numerous  ancient  Chinese  texts  showing  the  importance  of  changing
circumstances on human actions. For example, “The key and defining idea in  Sun-tze: The Art of
Warfare is  shi: manipulating circumstances to create a strategic advantage as an alternative to the
commitment of brute force.”97 Therefore and furthermore, actions are expected to be properly and
particularly  situated  within  roles  and  relations,  pursuing  for  appropriateness  fitting  within  the
specific circumstances, as time changes and as circumstance varies. He/she must be prepared for the
art of contextualizing and take full account of qu-shi (long-term tendency and large-scale context,
correlating with short-term and small-scale facts available). A never-ending environmental scanning
to identify contingencies, correlations and correspondences as well as coherence and processes, and
constant adjustments to the whole environment are required especially in  a globalized  era  full of
uncertainties. 
In other words, quantitatively, a  correlative actor’s decisions might be thus longer-term and
97 See Sun, Bin, D. C. Lau, and Roger T. Ames. Sun Bin: The Art of Warfare: A Translation of the Classic Chinese Work 
of Philosophy and Strategy, Suny Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2003, p. 86.
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larger-scale, as compared with what a typical rational actor makes98; and qualitatively, the actions are
required to be appropriate (yi), which means doing what is fitting in a proper and in a fitting
manner, given the specific situation. Within a tradition in which person is irreducibly social, and the
“I” and the social context are reflexive and mutually entailing,99 a correlative actor thus is required to
accommodate the interests of all concerned, rather than being only self-interested (li) , and at the
same time required to take into account of both means and ends. That is to say, appropriateness
and self-interest are considered as correlative polar yin and yang, similar to the cases of means and
ends,  or  collectivism  and  individualism. Appropriate  interest  (yi-li,  balance  between
appropriateness and self-interest), or  mutualism (balance between  collectivism and individualism)
are valuable in the Chinese model of decision-making. It is widely accepted that Chinese people tend
to consider both  inseparable sides of  yin and  yang and take a  balanced way (zhong) in order to
pursuit holistic harmony (he).  
2.2 Internal Relations/External Relations  
For purposes of exposition it may be useful to draw such a sharp contrast, because there is the
advantage  for  exposition  purposes  to  contrast  extreme forms of  correlative  vs.  rational  decision
making as  two “actor  models.”  These actor  models  are  used as  shorthand for  making clear  the
differences in terms of their theoretical and practical implications. 
The  differences  between  correlativity  and  rationality  could  be  approximately  interpreted
through the  doctrines  of  internal  and external  relations,  which have  been discussed in  detail  by
Thomas P. Kasulis.100 Internal relations are always holistic and thus inclusive of context; external
98 When I made such a comparison in terms of term and scale, I was inspired by Richard Chadwick’s article (when it was a working 
paper) on “Fraud and Deceit, or a Failure of American Political and Social Sciences: Towards a Theory About the Impact of Banking 
on the Rise and Fall of Civilizations,” in International Relations and Diplomacy, October 2014, Vol. 2, No. 10, pp.639-54.
99 See Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the 
Zhongyong. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001, p. 84.
100 See Kasulis, Thomas P. Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2002.
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relations  are  often  reductionistic,  and  thus  limited  in  context.  The  pervasiveness  of  substance
ontology that goes back to Aristotle gives privilege to a imaged world of “nouns” or “objects” that
are externally related. The doctrine of internal relation compared with external relation is constructed
by comparative philosophers such as  Thomas P. Kasulis  in order to remind Westerners of the very
possibility  of  another  ideology  of  human  relations,  and  its  influence  over  some  other  cultural
traditions. Before such academic efforts to indicate cultural disparities, human beings are fictionally
viewed  as  isolated  atomistic  and  discrete  individuals,  and  it  has  been  taken  for  granted  that
individuals can only be related extrinsically. It is the same with rationalistic paradigm dominant in
traditional orientations in theorizing inter“national” relations or constructing inter“national” relations
theory (as shown in Table 9 in Chapter 5). As Kasulis points out, “If we could…focus on what is not
normally emphasized in our culture, we might be able to attain quite suddenly a glimpse into the
other culture.”101 
       Then what is the concrete meaning of internal relationship to replace external relationship?
According to Thomas Kasulis holding internal relationship in esteem, there are many examples102:
Engagement and compassion may replace detachment and charity. Interconnectedness may replace
autonomy. Situational responsiveness may replace dogmas of responsibility.103 The common ground
shared among adversaries may be even discovered. Overlapping and interdependent identities may
be paid much more attentions to because the success of one is considered as interdependent with all
others. “Think globally; act locally” may be replaced by “think locally; act globally”  since the universal
101 See Ibid, p.22.
102 See Kasulis, Thomas P., "The Mosaic and the Jigsaw Puzzle：How It All Fits Together" in ed. Roger T. Ames and Pe-
ter D. Hershock, Value and Values: Economics and Justice in an Age of Global Interdependence. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press and East-West Philosophers’ Conference, 2015, p. 47.
103 According to Kasulis’s observations, “in very general terms, Japanese tend to raise their children to be responsive (co-
ordinating oneself to the behavior and concerns of others), Americans to be responsible (to act freely within defined lim-
its); the Japanese to be situational, the Americans to be rule-governed; the Japanese to value an affective intuition, the 
Americans to value cognitive “objectivity”; and so forth. See Kasulis, Thomas P. Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and 
Cultural Difference. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002, p.4.
42
model for what is best for everyone everywhere must be replaced by true engagement involving
listening and learning and encouraging localized creativity and innovation instead of the application
of a preconceived master plan. 
     Moreover, the corresponding two ways of thinking might be rational thinking and correlative
thinking. The corresponding two notions of power might be unilateral power and relational power.
Thereafter,  the corresponding two ways of gaming might  be infinite  game and finite  game104(as
shown in the following tables). Of course, there are also two distinctive types of “security” concepts.
In other words,  Confucius doesn’t see human struggle in terms of winners and losers but rather in
terms that transcend the conflict. This goes beyond the “either-or, neither-nor, both-and” logics (as
shown in the following tables). In practice, a correlative approach might ask, for example, how can
we arrange our affairs so that the basic needs we all have in common, can be achieved through
cooperative competition,  or  competitive  cooperation, rather  than  adversarial competition,  or
conflict？
     To  be  specific,  the  relatedness  defining  of  the  Confucian  worldview  is  intrinsic  and
constitutive (correlation),  instead of extrinsic as shown in a world of substances. Namely,  Chinese
“guanxi” is a notion of internal relation.  “The readers should expect to find in classical Chinese texts a
more relational focus; not a concern to describe how things are in themselves, but how they stand in
relation to something else at particular times.”105 Correlation is diagrammed by Roger Ames and
Henry Rosemont, Jr.106 as:  
104 See Carse, James P. Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility. New York: Ballantine Books, 
1987.
105 See Confucius, Roger T. Ames, and Henry Rosemont, Jr.. The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation. 1st 
trade pbk. ed, Classics of Ancient China. New York: Ballantine Books, 1999, p.23.
106 See ibid, p.24.
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Figure 2: Internal Relation (Correlation)
      Source: Cf. Kasulis, op. cit, p.37 and p.59.
As Figure 2 shows, the internal relation is part of the relatents (both A and B) themselves. In an
internal relation, the relatents are interdependent instead of independent. For example, “my intimate
relations (internal rather than external) are more than connections I have made; they are actually part
of what I am or have become.”107 That is to say, my roles and relations are constitutive (correlation). 
By contrast, in an external relation, the relatents exist independently. “In a (imaged) world of
substances, people or things are related extrinsically, so that when the relationship between them is
dissolved, they are remaindered intact.”108 The extrinsic relatedness can be represented as follows,
since an external relationship maintains the space between the relatents even as it bridges the gap
between them. 
Figure 3: External Relation
Source: Cf. Kasulis, op. cit, p.37 and p.59.
Discreteness  (individuality)  can  be  represented  as  follows  in  Figure  4.  Human  beings  are
fictionally viewed as isolated atomistic and discrete entities. Individual A and individual B have no
107 See ibid, p.37.
108 See Confucius, Ames, and Rosemont, op. cit., p.24.
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relations. For example, John and David each have a soul, and thus have individual autonomy. They can only be
externally  connected  through  contracts  or  principles  of  responsibilities  and  rights.  Within  this
contractarian ideology, procedure and retribution play a definitive role in the artificial construct of
human community. Therefore, with the erasure of the connecting line between A and B, each A and B
exists as an unbroken and inviolate whole. To dissolve the external relationship (in Figure 3) would
merely disconnect A and B, while “to dissolve an internal relationship would not merely disconnect
them; it would actually transform an aspect of the relatents themselves.”109 
Figure 4: Discreteness (Individuality)
Further, it is also necessary to illustrate conceptions of “power” and “competition” when we
discuss  about  international  relations.  According  to  Bernard  Loomer,  a  process  philosopher  and
theologian,  “unilateral  power (as compared with relational  power110)  is  the capacity  to influence
another, to control or manipulate the human or natural environment, in order to realize one's purpose.
This is the conception of power that has dominated western thought and practice from the beginning.
Science  is  the  hand-maid  of  this  kind  of  power.” 111 Therefore,  the  unilateral  power  or  rational
thinking (one-dimensional, linear, and single-track) can be represented as: 
109 See Kasulis, op. cit., p.37 and p.59.
110 “Two conceptions of power are defined, analyzed, compared and evaluated....Relational power, which involves the ca-
pacity both to influence and to be influenced, is the ability to sustain an internal relation.” See Loomer, Bernard, “Two 
Conceptions of Power,” Criterion 15, no.1 (Winter 1976), pp.7-29.  
111 See ibid. As Mesle’s comments, “‘Unilateral power’ is a label applied to that traditional vision by the process philoso-
pher and theologian Bernard Loomer.” See Mesle, C. Robert. Process-Relational Philosophy: An Introduction to Alfred 
North Whitehead. West Conshohocken: Templeton Foundation Press, 2008, p.66.
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Figure 5: Unilateral Power or Rational Thinking
    And then “competitiveness” can be thus represented as:
                                                 
Figure 6: Competitiveness
Competition (for individual selfish ends, an external relation between individuals) is not in the
dictionary of Confucian philosophy (less favorable to competition) emphasizing internal relation and
infinite game, though today’s  China has to use  the  US’s language of “competitive cooperation” or
“cooperative competition,” and “win-win” or “all win” to dialogue with the USA. Otherwise, the
government of the latter may not be able to understand China normally assumed as a rising power.
The Chinese indigenous discourse is “friendship first, contest secondary” (see Table 5, Chapter 1),
which is  very much  close to infinite game. That is to say, competition is not highly regarded as
human  behaviors  and  psychological  tendencies.  Individual  heroism  deserves  critique,  since
individual is not an ultimate end. This  intellectual tradition based upon correlative worldview and
correlative thinking has more or less become certain psychological factors in Chinese culture such
as: Individual ends are inseparable from community; Harmony with nature and community is one’s
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first priority; A loss is sometimes happiness (seek one’s spiritual happiness); Individual yielding,
modesty, tolerance, considerateness, and even self-sacrificing in helping the weak out of sympathy
are encouraged in order to cultivate harmony; No first attack, no retaliation; Never adopt first strike;
no drive of  expansion of territories and cultural  bounds by “national  interest”;  Invasions  out  of
nationalism would not be considered as glorious. 
Table 6: Comparisons between Rationality and Correlativity through the Doctrines of Internal
and External Relations
Characteristic Rationality Correlativity 
form of 
Relationship112
external relation internal relation
entry point of theory individuality (discreteness): identity in 
isolation
relationality (continuity):identity in roles and relations
way of thinking rational thinking correlative thinking
type of power113 unilateral power: one 
way;competitive;coercive; 
hierarchical;closed;cultural 
relational power: mutual relationship;multi-way; 
creative co-creativity; not competitive; non-coercive; 
non-hierarchical;open;ecological
ethical relation114 ethical external relation:
universal principles or maxims/
rights and “responsibilities”
ethical internal relation:
situational “responsiveness” within roles and relations
type of trust115 trust that each negotiator is responsible
for abiding by the contract and will 
keep to their promises in upholding the
agreements 
Based on our overlaps, trusting my colleagues to be 
responsive more than responsible: understanding and 
incorporating my intimations into their own selves, or 
making my interest into our interests. Anyone’s 
suffering is our suffering.
type of achieving 
global cooperation116
rules, contracts(such as trade 
agreements), sanctions/
responsibility and rights/ compromise 
(contract) bridging opposing poles
building a consensus (collective perception) as 
inherently shared viewpoints and feelings out of the 
overlap of opposites, leading to a strong sense of 
common purpose;
“Something explicit is said only after the internally 
related sensing of common ground is completed.”117
type of security 
concept
dualistic, independent, autonomous, 
atomic, 
unilateral, universal, static
correlative, collateral, constitutive, holographic, 
relational, situational, dynamic 
112 Kasulis, op. cit., p.71.
113 I cite, paraphrase, and summarize Robert Mesle’s descriptions of “unilateral power” and “relational power.” See 
pp.65-78. Mesle, op. cit, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. 
114 Kasulis, op. cit., p.132.
115 Kasulis, op. cit., pp.130-1.
116 Kasulis, op. cit., p.132.
117 Kasulis, op. cit., p.131.
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Characteristic Rationality Correlativity 
type of game118 Finite game is played in order to be 
won when they end. The purpose of 
play is to arrive at a decisive 
conclusion about triumph and defeat. 
Finite games include chess, or 
traditional wars, or any contest in 
which opponents understand the rules 
and agree on a winner and loser. 
Finite games may offer wealth and 
status, power and glory.
The boundaries of contest -- date, 
place, and membership -- of each finite 
game are externally defined. The rules 
of a finite game are the contractual 
terms by which the players can agree 
who has won. The rules must be 
published before play, and the players 
must agree to them before the 
beginning of the play. 
Infinite game is played for the purpose of continuing 
the play and bringing as many people as possible into 
the play. The rules, boundaries and participants may 
change, as long as the game keeps going, never allowed
to come to an end. The rules are changed when the 
players of an infinite game agree that the play is 
imperiled by a finite outcome--that is, the victory of 
some players and the defeat of others.
Infinite players regard their wins and losses in whatever
finite games they play as but moments within a larger 
field of continuing play that extends beyond the 
finite game. That is, infinite games offer something far 
more subtle and far grander, because the goal is to keep
everybody in play. What is your future, and mine, 
becomes ours. We prepare each other for co-creative 
surprise. 
A finite player seeks power; the infinite one displays 
self-sufficient strength. 
Infinite Game is not bounded by time, space, or 
eligibility. Infinite games are internally defined, 
because each play of an infinite game eliminates 
boundaries, it opens to players a new horizon of time. 
Finite players play within externally defined 
boundaries, while infinite players play with internally 
or co-creatively defined boundaries.  
Type of harmony119 harmony of order externally imposed
harmony with conformity:
dichotomy of a single-ordered world 
and anarchy/
“Think globally; act locally.”
harmony of better relations
harmonization with auto-creative tensions and not 
without differences and diversities: 
a self-so-ing process/
“Think locally; act globally.”
2.3 “Human Tendency”: Thinking about Human Nature in a Correlative Way
    Based upon Roger  Ames’s  philosophical  comparison between  Mencius (372-289 BCE)  and
Aristotle (384-322  BCE),  I  take  “human  tendency”  as  an  example  to  illustrate  correlative
understanding of“human nature.” Correlative thinking in theorizing “person” precludes all dualistic,
absolute,  and essentialist  conceptions  such as  self/other,  identity,  human nature  .  .  .  In  Chinese
118 I paraphrase and summarize James Carse’s descriptions of “finite game” and “infinite game.” See Carse, James P. Fi-
nite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and Possibility. New York: Ballantine Books, 1987. 
119 More details about harmony will be provided in Chapter 5 and 6. 
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processual cosmology (rather than substance ontology), correlative thinking appeals to renxing人性
(human tendency)—an expression usually rendered “human nature” that is at the center of a debate
that  begins  at  least  as  early  as  Mencius  and  that  continues  down  to  the  present  day  in  such
contemporary  philosophers  as  Tang  Junyi  (1909-1978)  and  Mou  Zongsan (1909-1995). This
paragraph compares Chinese and Western traditions in order to answer: what does Mencius mean by
renxing and how does it differ from an Aristotelian account of “human nature” (Aristotle’s issue of
“potentiality”  dunamis)?  This  processual  understanding  of  human  nature  is  the  foundation  of
Confucian human cultivation as discussed in the next paragraph, and also my starting point of sage-
tianxia-harmony connectional framework in Chapter 5.
(1)Mencian renxing (human tendency) vs. human nature
Roger Ames wrote articles like “The Mencian Conception of renxing 人性：Does it Mean
'Human Nature'?”120 and “What Ever Happened to Wisdom? Mencius and ‘human becomings,’”121
and book chapters like “Mencius and a Process Notion of Human Nature,”122 focusing on questions
about Mencian renxing and the ways of translation of renxing into English. He also deals with such
questions in books such as Confucian Role Ethics: a Vocabulary123 and Anticipating China: Thinking
through the Narratives  of  Chinese and Western Culture.124 I  try  to  summarize his  arguments  on
Mencian xing according to the above mentioned works as follows,
     First,  xing comes  closer  to  “character,”  “personality”,  or  “constitution”  than  what  was
generally understood by “nature”. Thus Roger Ames uses the  Romanization xing  rather than any
120 Ames, Roger T. “The Mencian Conception of Ren xing 人性: Does it Mean ‘Human Nature’?” In Chinese Texts and 
Philosophical Contexts, Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham, ed.Henry Rosemont, Jr., La Salle, Illinois: Open Court 
Publishing Company), 1991, pp.143-75.
121 Asia Major, third series, volume XXI, part I, 2008, pp.45-68.
122 Ames, Roger T. “Mencius and a Process Notion of Human Nature,” in Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations, ed. 
Alan K. L. Chan, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2002, pp.72-90.
123 University of Hawaii Press, 2011. 
124 Hall, David L. and Roger T. Ames. Thinking Through Confucius. Albany: State University of New York, 1987.
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English equivalent.  The prevailing interpretations of xing as  “nature” have been inappropriately
skewed in favor of what is continuous, general, and enduring about the human being at the expense
of what is novel,  particular,  and creatively achieved. The interpretative prejudice has stressed an
ahistorical “given.”
Second, Mencian construal  of  xing as  an  achievement led to  cultural elitism,  one of the
defining  characteristics  of  classical  Confucianism.  For  Mencius,  an  undeveloped  human  being,
someone who is resolutely uneducated and uncultured is a beast, other than in any important sense
“human.” 
     Third, xing defined as an achievement means that “humanity” is open to profound re-visioning. In
the Chinese classical tradition, there is a presupposition concerning the profound educability and
createability of the human being, as is witnessed in its commitment to education and re-education
with more flexibility and a more creative range.
Fourth,  xing is  the  signature  of  participatory  and contributory  membership  in  a  culturally
informed  community.  The effects  of  environment  upon one's  humanity would be profound and
inescapable. Success or failure in the project of becoming human would largely be a function of the
quality of one's social background. 
     Six, in the classical Confucian tradition, this construal of xing as the coordination of one's unique
defining conditions into some optimal relational harmony accounts for the familiar correlativity of
the personal, social, political, and also cosmic order.
In a clearer way, Roger Ames summarizes his arguments on xing into eight points.125 Xing is: 
(a) a dynamic process which covers initial dispositions, growth, and ultimate demise;
(b) holistic, inclusive of bohh hhose pscchicll lnd phcsicll conditions which lre distinchlc hualna
125 Ames, Roger T. “The Mencian Conception of Renxing 人性: Does it Mean ‘Human Nature’?” in Chinese Texts and 
Philosophical Contexts, Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham, ed. Henry Rosemont, Jr., La Salle, Illinois: Open Court 
Publishing Company, 1991, p.165.
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(c) describlble in genetic heras ls ln eaergenh order which, froa initill  stirrings,” is cultivlhed bc lp-
pell ho hishoricll aodels ho constihuhe oneself hhrough enculhurltion ls hhe cenher of l cenhripehll 
feld of unique, plrticullr, lnd concrehe circuashlncesa
(d) describlble in aorphologicll heras ls l relltionlllc defned alhrii of conditionsa
(e) ln lchieved order which pursues l hlraonc defned hhrough hhe aliiaizltion of hhe plrticiplting 
conditionsa
(f) ln  inspirltionll” rlhher hhln  lspirltionll” process involving ln lppell ho hhe lchieved qullihc of his-
horicll aodels rlhher hhln hhe rellizltion of lbshrlch idells or principles, lnd hence chlrlcherizlble 
aore in heras of  poetic” hhln prlcticll or hheoreticll productiona
(g) correlltive wihh sociopoliticll lnd ultialhelc, cosaic ordera
(h) generllizlble (like l surnlae), ho identifc hhe plrticipltion lnd conhribution of l group of siaillr plr-
ticullrsl
(2) Aristotle’s notions of actuality and potentiality 
    In Metaphysics Æ, Aristotle126 introduces the distinction between matter and form and he connects
the matter/form distinction to another key distinction that between potentiality (dunamis) and actual-
ity (entelecheia or energeia). Further, Aristotle distinguishes between two different senses of the
term dunamis. In the first sense, a dunamis is the power that a thing has to produce a change. A thing
has a dunamis in this sense when it has within it a source of change in something else. In the second
sense of dunamis—and it is the one in which Aristotle is mainly interested—that is conventionally
translated as “potentiality.” In this sense dunamis is related not to actuality (energeia). A dunamis in
this sense is not a thing's power to produce a change but rather its capacity to be in a different and
more completed state. 
    As he gives form priority over matter, Aristotle similarly gives actuality priority over potentiality.
He argues for the priority in substance of actuality over potentiality in two ways: (a) Aristotle argues
that actuality is prior in substance to potentiality. Nothing that is eternal can exist only potentially—
what is eternal must be fully actual. The eternal is prior in substance to the perishable and the eternal
can exist without the perishable. (b) Aristotle makes use of his notion of final causality. Things come
126 Cf. Aristotle's Metaphysics (first published sun oct 8, 2000; substantive revision mon jun 11, 2012). See http://plato.s-
tanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/#subcaubei
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to be moved toward an end (telos). The actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the
potentiality is acquired. Form or actuality is the end toward which natural processes are directed.
Actuality is therefore a cause in more than one sense of a thing's realizing its potential. One and the
same thing may be the final, formal, and efficient cause of another. 
 
(3) Afte Aristotelian potentiality: human becomings and human cultivation 
     There is a tendency of translation to reduce xing to what is “given” like “nature.” However, it is
necessary  to  save  the  notion  of  “person” from an essentialist  understanding of  discrete  “human
beings.” That is, xing cannot be reducible to what is innate and the Confucian notion of relationally
constituted  “human  becomings”  can  take  place  of  “human  beings.”  Unfortunately,  there  are
numerous problematic examples of  xing being used as “starting conditions.” For example, Zhang
Dainian suggests that “since the sage is also a man, the xing that the sage has is the  xing that all
people have.”127 However, as Roger Ames critically points out,128 the assumption here is that xing like
xin (heart  and  mind)  is  a  given  potential shared  by  all  and  that  the  sage  is  simply  one  who
successfully actualizes it. 
As  Roger  Ames  critically  points  out,129the  application  of  Aristotelian  potentiality/actuality
distinction  is inappropriate to  theorizing  human  cultivation  in  Confucian  philosophy.  Such  a
dualistic  potentiality/actuality  distinction  is  fundamentally  progressive,  entailing  an  efficient,  a
formal, a final cause, and even a steady advance toward a predetermined perfection according to
progressionist  theories.  Behind such a  distinction of  potentiality/actuality,  there are  cosmogonies
127 Ames, op. cit., p.165.
128 Ames, Roger T.,Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, p.150. 
129 Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames. Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture. Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1995, p.191.
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entailing a Creator/creature dualism, making the human being the product rather than the producer.130
By contrast, the Mencian xing cannot be understood by appeal to systemic teleological models
which  appear  to  be  goal-directed  and  thus  teleological.  Unlike  teleology  introduces  a  goal,
decontextualizing  and  dehistoricizing  the  process,  the  Confucian  model  of  humanity  with  more
flexibility  and  creative  range  is  correlative  with  sociopolitical  order,  free  of  any  definite  and
specified goals. This model of “becoming human” is on the basis of an acosmotic tradition with a
manner “in which it renders unnecessary any recourse to notions such as ‘Being’ or ‘essence,’” and
“the things of the world do not require a hierarchy of beings or essences in accordance with which
they may be said to form a coherent cosmos.”131
Conversely,  the  social  processes  in  which  persons  are  created  are  ignored  by  Aristotelian
potentiality/actuality distinction. The creation of a person may be not just as simple as the growth of
a seed into a plant, as sometime understood. At least, “the ‘potential’ for becoming human is not simply the
first inklings, something inborn ‘within’ the person that is exclusive of family relations.”132 As Dewey points
out,  “persons  are  incomplete  without  a  social  component  and  develop  into  what  they  are  ——
individual members of groups, socially grounded selves——in the ongoing process of living in a
social environment.”133 And Dewey also ushers in Lincoln as a metaphor: “Lincoln is not Lincoln
independent of the circumstances of history,  nor are the circumstances  of history the making of
Lincoln. Indeed, Lincoln is a collaboration between person and circumstances expressed as those
thick habits of conduct with whom Lincoln is identified.”134
130 Ibid, p.190.
131     Ibid, pp.194-5.
132 See Ames, Roger T., Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.155.
133 Ibid,  p.150.  Cf.  Campbell, James.  Understanding John Dewey: Nature and Cooperative Intelligence. La Salle, IL: Open Court,
1995, p.40.
134 Ibid, p. 295. Cf. Dewey, John. The Essential Dewey. Vol.1, Pragmatism, Education, and Democracy, ed. Larry Hick-
man and Thomas M. Alexander. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998, pp. 223-4.
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2.4 Human tendency, Human Cultivation, and Confucian Theory
This  chapter  compares Chinese and Western conceptional  traditions of “human nature,”  i.e.
human tendency vs. human nature.  As a philosophical presupposition, traditional  Western political
thoughts (even before  the  Enlightenment) have  often held that  human nature is  essentially  self-
serving and ruthless, and man is innately bad,135 so that in the Western traditional theories there were
less attention paid to notions such as human self-cultivation,  social  exemplary roles, and relational
moral power as Chinese philosophy did. 
To the contrary, in the Chinese tradition,  xing is viewed as a  pluralistic and dynamic human
tendency,  which  leaves  the  similar  sort  of  flexibility  in  human  behavior  and  thinking  as
constructivists  do  in  comparison  with  classical  and  neoclassical  realists.  Chinese  conception  of
“human being” is actually “human becoming” in roles and relations; thus it contains possibilities of
moral cultivation from xiaoren (petty person) to junzi (exemplary person as the role model for social
interactions) to shengren (sage, top of junzi). Individuals as foci are viewed within fields of human
relations  as small as a family, and as big and extensive as an entire society, or  tianxia. From the
perspective of Confucian role ethics, individuality is relationally understood as an accomplishment:
becoming distinguished in roles and relations.    
Further, the typical Confucian scenario of the world is tianxia governed by worthies and sages,
who are required to be moral examples with their relational moral power (dao, de, quan and shi as
discussed in Chapter 3). A ruler has to be a morally distinguished leader through self-cultivation in
the social environment wherein all people pursuit  moral self-cultivation. The actions of rulers are
required to be appropriate (yi), accommodating the interests of all concerned, rather than being only
135 Even though some thoughts of liberalism hold that human nature is essentially good and individuals are rational hu-
man beings.
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self-interested (li).  The  harmonization  of  tianxia not  only  depends  on  moral  cultivations  of  all
humans, but also depends on exemplary roles of big countries or rulers above all. Even though we
are still surrounded with international power politics today, we still need have more positive beliefs
in “human nature” and therefore pay more attention to human moral cultivations. 
    On the basis of the above-mentioned conceptions of human tendency (a processual understanding
of human nature), I will discuss about Confucian relational moral power (associated with Confucian
human moral cultivation) in the next paragraph, and further develop in the following chapters my
basic model of sage-tianxia-harmony connectional framework as shown in Table 8 and 6.1. 
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CHAPTER 3: A CHINESE VOCABULARY: POWER AND SECURITY
     In this chapter, I compare and contrast the concepts of Western Realist School of International
Relations with their counterparts within ancient Chinese philosophy as articulated in the  Yijing for
the  construction  of  my  new Chinese  theory.  In  order  to  construct  my  Confucian theory  in  the
following chapters, it  is  necessary to comparatively interpret a Chinese vocabulary consisting of
correlative terms such as li (理), huxi (互系 correlativity), de (德), quan (权), and shi (势), and an
(安), besides renxing (人性 human tendency) and its associated discussion about human cultivation
in Chapter 2. 
     First, I compare the world views and ways of thinking behind the Western “Realist School” of 
International Relations and ancient Chinese philosophy. Second, I compare and contrast four Realist 
IR concepts of “reason,” “rationality,” “power,” and “security” with its Chinese counterparts based 
on comparisons between two types of world views and ways of thinking. Last, I try to make a short 
summary about the significance of the identified differences or similarities for the construction of my
theory, as I put Chinese terms of li, huxi, de, quan, shi, and an back into my entire theoretical 
formulation. See Figure 7 as follows,  
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Figure 7: Basic Structure of Comparisons and Contrasts of Terms    
3. 1 Discussions on World Views, Ways of Thinking and Loci of Authority
As to why I start from discussion about two different world views, ways of thinking and loci of
authority (Table 5 in Chapter 1) behind the Western “Realist School” of International Relations and
ancient Chinese philosophy as articulated in the Yijing, I would like first to refer to what Roger Ames
did ahead of his philosophical translations of numerous Chinese ancient texts such as the Analects of
Confucius, Dao De Jing, Sun-Tzu’s Art of War, and Sun Bin’s Art of Warfare. 
For example, when Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr. translate the Analects of Confucius,
they first attempt to describe for English readers the world as experienced by the ancient Chinese, in
order  to  avoid  cultural  reductionism appearing  in  numerous  translations  of  Chinese  texts  into
English, which may be even more dangerous than making cultural generalizations, since underlying
the grammar of the contemporary English language is a rather different “world” as they claim. To say
this, they focus on different presuppositions underling discourses about the world, about beliefs, and
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about attitudes, rather than trees, birds and mountains, and most everything else in China, which do
not differ radically from their counterparts in the West, or concrete or specific beliefs and attitudes
which may have counterparts in other cultures. 
As Roger Ames and Henry Jr. Rosemont claim, “English (and other Indo-European languages)
is  basically  substantive and  essentialistic,  whereas  classical  Chinese should  be seen more as  an
eventful language.”136 And “the  readers  should  expect  to  find  in  classical  Chinese  texts  a  more
relational focus; not a concern to describe how things are in themselves, but how they stand in
relation  to  something  else  at  particular  times.”  137 The  relatedness  defining  of  the  Confucian
worldview is  intrinsic and constitutive (correlation),  instead of extrinsic as shown in a world of
substances.  Correlation is diagrammed by Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr.138 as shown by
Figure 2 in  Chapter  2.  By contrast,  the  extrinsic  relatedness  can  be  represented by  Figure 4 in
Chapter 2.   
Then the  readers  can  find the  point,  generalized as  follows:  “no-thing  and no-body has  an
essence,” but is “temporally contextualized” and “can be defined only ‘correlationally, at any given
time, with differing relations holding at other times.”139 This point also implies in what way we can
define Chinese terms such as li (理), huxi (互系 correlativity), de (德), shi (势) ,quan (权), and an
(安) in the Yijing. 
Moreover, given the space of this dissertation, I would like to use Table 5 in Chapter 1 to show
two world views, ways of thinking and loci of authority in a more concise and clear way. And more
detailed discussion and explanation about philosophical background behind Chinese and Western
136 See Confucius, Roger T. Ames, and Henry Rosemont, Jr.. The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation. 1st 
trade pbk. ed, Classics of Ancient China. New York: Ballantine Books, 1999, p.20.
137 Ibid, p.23.
138 Ibid, p.24.
139 Ibid, p.25.
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theories can be found in the following chapters.  
3.2 Discussions on Two Clusters of Concepts or Terms
     Based on discussions about the world views and ways of thinking behind two clusters of concepts
or terms, I will try to compare and contrast Realist IR concepts of “reason,” “rationality,” “power,”
and “security” correspondingly with Chinese terms of li (理), huxi (互系 correlativity), de (德), shi
(势 ),  quan (权 ), and an (安 ) in the  Yijing. I prefer to discuss about “rationality” and huxi  (互系
correlativity) ahead of others. 
(1) Rationality and Huxi (互系 Correlativity)
 Rationality is one of the most important concepts within Western IR theory, while at the same
time,  huxi  ( 互系 correlativity)  is  the central  term within my Chinese Global  Process-Relational
Theory.  Considering  that  both  rationality  and  correlativity  have many  different  meanings  or
indications throughout history,140 I provided my definitions of rationality and correlativity in Chapter
2  and  I  discuss  about  them from only  three  perspectives:  my  study is  an  experimental  project
providing a comparative study of rationality mainly referring to rational thinking (way of thinking),
rational choices model in foreign policy decision-making (way of acting), and rationalism as a major
paradigm in the construction of Realist IR Theory (way of understanding). I compare rationality with
correlativity  mainly  referring  to  correlative  thinking,  “correlative”  choices  theory,  and
“correlativism” as a Chinese paradigm in my construction of Global Process-Relational Theory. As
indicated  above,  rationality  mainly  refers  to  a  way of  thinking,  a  way of  acting,  and a  way of
understanding within the Anglo-European/ Indo-European tradition, originating from ancient Greek
Cosmology. It should be noted that the philosophy of rationalism that Morgenthau criticized in his
books has nothing to do with the rationalism which I am working on.  The following are excerpts
140 About different meanings of rationality, also see Table 4 in the Introduction. 
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from Michael Williams on Morgenthau, and Morgenthau himself in different publications, to show
the consistency of Morgenthau’s logic:
The  philosophy  of  rationalism  that  Morgenthau  criticized  in  his  books  distinguishingly  and
specifically refers to “an ‘historical optimism’ that was rooted in the belief that human beings could
always master any problem, thanks to their capacity for rationality”141 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
or the belief held by liberalism “in the limitless power of scientific formula” for peace in politics.142
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
And it is named by Morgenthau as “scientific utopianism” for his lack of a better term.143
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
To be concrete,  it  is  a “combination of  rationalistic  philosophy and the moral,  intellectual,  and
political needs of the rising middle classes.”144 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
As Morgenthau points out, according to such rationalism, “since all men partake of reason, they
must sooner or later meet on that common ground, discovering that their conflicts are apparent
rather than real and can all be solved by a rational formula acceptable to all.”145 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Furthermore, “this philosophy recognizes only two forces determining the historic process: reason,
and unreason as its counterpart.”146 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Therefore,  “Conflicts  among  nations  are  due…  to  maladjustments  arising  from  lack  of
understanding and to the influence of political passions. Except for ignorance and emotion, reason
would solve international conflicts as easily and as rationally as it has solved so many problems in
the natural sciences.” 147 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Moreover, as Morgenthau criticizes, the contemporary utopians “superimpose upon a recalcitrant
reality a theoretical scheme that satisfies the desire for thorough rationalization.”148 
However, based upon discussions about presuppositions underling discourses about the world, about
beliefs, and about attitudes, first, I would like to discuss about the two ways of thinking: Originating
from ancient Greek Cosmology and appearing in a  pervasive manner in the Western Realist  IR
141 See Williams, Michael C. Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations. 
Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.124.
142 See Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th revised edition. New York: Alfred Knopf, 
1973, p.51. 
143    See ibid, p.43.
144 See Morgenthau, Hans. Scientific Man vs Power Politics. University of Chicago Press, 1946, p.19.
145 See Morgenthau, op. cit., pp.43-4.
146 See Morgenthau, op. cit., p.38.
147 See Morgenthau, op. cit., p.44.
148 See Morgenthau, Hans. Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade.1960-70. Praeger, 1970, p.243.
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theory,  rational thinking is a modality of basically linear and single-track causal thinking about
extrinsic relatedness  of  things,  while correlative  thinking is  a holistic  modality  of  multilevel,
multidimensional, multifold, and multicategory thinking about intrinsic and constitutive relatedness
of events within process, formulated in Chinese ancient philosophical literature such as the Yijing. 
Second,  although  Morgenthau criticizes  the  specified  “rationalism”(an  offshoot  of  liberal
progressivism in the academy149), realists and most policymakers begin with the  rational choices
model, in which foreign policy is conceived of actions chosen by the national government (assumed
as unitary state actor) that maximize its interests, as I indicated and compared with “correlative”
choices model aiming at situational appropriateness and harmony not without differences (with an
historical example of Chinese ancient Admiral Zheng He) in Chapter 5. 
Third, Morgenthau and other realist school theorists take a rationalist paradigm for theoretical
constructions. Their research on rational actor (in a nation-state-centric international system) is in
favor of objective facts available, seeking essential meanings through definitions and causal logic.
For  example,  the  first  one  of  Hans  Morgenthau’s  famous  six  principles  of  political  realism is:
“Politics,  like society in  general,  is  governed by objective laws that  have their  roots  in  human
nature, which is unchanging: therefore it is possible to develop a rational theory that reflects these
objective  laws.”150 I  have  discussed  about  the  essential  meanings  of  “human  nature”  and  also
compare it with xing from the perspective of Chinese correlative philosophy in Chapter 2.  Human
nature “as a psychobiological starting point” in Realist IR theory is “an internalized, universal, and
objectifiable notion of human being” in contrast with xing as a historically, culturally, and socially
149 See Williams, Michael C. Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations. Oxford ;
New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, p.119.
150 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th revised edition. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973,
pp. 4-15. 
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emergent definition”151of socially related person in Chinese correlative philosophy. “Correlativism”
serves  as  a  Chinese  paradigm  in  my  construction  of  Global  Process-Relational Theory.  A
holographic understanding of tianxia, a world system of all human becomings (“processual” human
beings) will be provided in my Global Process-Relational Theory.  
(2) Reason and Li (理, 理性)
Although reason and li (理 ,  理性 ) is often simply translated into each other, appeals to  li in
Chinese correlative philosophy always presuppose an art of contextualization, which is not consistent
with the strict logos style of reasoning. As Tian Chenshan put it, “In the lack of an ontological mode
of thinking, the act of understanding and articulating the dao (ways of correlation) of things cannot
have an ontological reference.”152 Moreover, li is “performed with continuity between things, as time
changes and as circumstance varies, and takes into account of the appropriateness of both means and
ends.”153 In  other  words,  li does  not  have  the  same  meaning  of  “reason”  and  perhaps  means
(situational)  appropriateness  of behaviors in Chinese. People are required or expected to behave
according with li (heli 合理). 
(3) De 德, Quan 权, and Shi 势 (Confucian Relational Moral Power)
According to Mingst, “States are critical actors because they have power, which is the ability
not only to influence others but to control outcomes so as to produce results that would not have
occurred naturally.” And “to realists,” power is “the means by which international actors deal with
each  other.”154 In  Leviathan  (1651),  Hobbes  presented  one  of  the  first  systematic  definitions  of
human power. He wrote: “The Power of a Man, (to take it Universally) is his present means, to
151 Ames, Roger T., 1991: “The Mencian Conception of Ren xing 人性: Does it Mean ‘Human Nature’？” in Chinese
Texts and Philosophical Contexts, Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham,  ed.Henry Rosemont, Jr..  La Salle, Illinois:
Open Court Publishing Company, p.143.
152 See Tian, Chenshan. Chinese dialectics: from Yijing to Marxism. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2005, p.175.
153 Ibid.
154 See Mingst, Karen A. Essentials of International Relations. 3rd ed. New York: Norton, 2004, p.108.
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obtain some future apparent Good. And is either Original, or Instrumental.”155 
     The third one of Hans Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism is: “Realism assumes that
interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid ... Power is the control
of  man  over  man.”156 Morgenthau  even  argues  that  “international  politics,  like  all  politics,  is  a
struggle  for  power.  Whatever  the  ultimate  aims  of  international  politics,  power  is  always  the
immediate aim.”157
     I attempt to summarize the above mentioned three definitions into three points: first, national
power is the means of nation-states as rational actors like autonomous individuals; second, power
relationship  is  basically  causal,  linear,  single-track,  and  extrinsic;  third,  power  is  essentially
competing and contradictory, the same as international politics shaped by such conceptions of power.
In sum, we can find a strong sense of rational thinking behind each concepts of power. 
Confucianism is not very much interested in concrete “means” (called qi 器. Qi and dao 道 are
within a yin-yang polarity. And dao seems more interesting to Chinese traditional scholars. ) so that it
may be hard to find a single and accurate word (with abstract or essential meaning, the same as what
happening in a tradition of rationality) as a counterpart of “power” in Chinese correlative culture, if
we are on the alert for cultural reductionism. Within Chinese correlative philosophy, we may only
find a cluster of correlative or processual terms like de 德, quan 权, and shi 势, perhaps relevant to
“influence”  (not  necessarily  “power”  as  Morgenthau  argues158).  It  may  be  argued  that
poststructuralist theorists like Foucault tend to think like Chinese: Foucault does not locate power in
decision-making individuals or institutions. For him, the idea that power is the ability of A to direct
155 See Hobbes, T. Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.62.
156 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th revised edition. New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 1973, pp. 4-15.
157 Ibid, p. 31.
158 Ibid, p. 33.
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the action of B is too impoverished an account of what he sees as the multidirectional nature of
power.” Power does not operate in only a top-down manner and necessarily linked to domination.159 
      The term de 德  (most often simply translated as “virtue”) carries the senses of “excellence,”
“potency,” or “power,” and also refers to “favor” or “bounty” extended outward, and further, the
gratitude it evokes as a response.160 Therefore, de is an example of Chinese-style relational power,
which “describes the most appropriate relationship.”161 In other words, like most of Chinese terms,
de  needs  to  be  viewed  as  a  polarity  of  yin  and  yang.  Said  another  way,  de encompasses  both
determining  agency  and  its  effects  since  it  constitutes  social  patterns  of  both  excellence  and
deference. On this basis, David Hall, and Roger Ames suggests “virtuality” in the archaic sense of
“having inherent virtue or power to produce effects” as their working translation of de.162 
      According to D. C. Lau and Roger Ames,163 the term quan 权  (conventionally translated as
“power,”  “command power,”  and “authority”  literally),  means “weighing with the  lever  scales.”
Quan is  dynamic and situational  rather than agent-centered so that  quan is the action of decision
makers’ weighing a situation before making the decision, adapting to exceptional circumstances. 
The term shi  势  (conventionally translated as “power,”  or  “force”)  is  not  limited to the
specific  parties  in  a  dispute.  Shi  is  defined as  “manipulating circumstances  to  create  a  strategic
advantage  as  an  alternative  to  the  commitment  of  brute  force.”164 It  is  a  holistic “force  of
circumstances.”165 The classical Chinese language tends to locate an action (focus) within a situation
159 See Ashe, Fidelma. Contemporary Social and Political Theory: An Introduction. Buckingham: Philadelphia: Open 
University Press, 1998, pp.82-3.
160 See Hall, David L. and Roger T. Ames. Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture. 
State University of New York Press, 1998, p.38.
161 See Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the 
Zhongyong. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001, p.65.
162 See Hall and Ames. , op. cit., p.39.
163 See Sun, Bin, D. C. Lau, and Roger T. Ames. Sun Bin: The Art of Warfare: A Translation of the Classic Chinese Work 
of Philosophy and Strategy, Suny Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2003, pp.64-7.
164 Ibid, p.62.
165 See Hall and Ames. , op. cit., p. 39.
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or a process, rather than within a discrete and static unit or agency. Shi 势 is an important example of
“field” of actions within a focus and field model. Here, perhaps the combination of quan 权 and shi
势  represents most of the Chinese decision-making process.  Shi 势  is “situational tendency. When
the situation is right and a favorable tendency is formed, one should seize the opportunity and forge
ahead.” 
    Further, if we also put de and dao (the proper way of human experience) into a focus (de) and field
(dao) model (dao-de,道德), and look at the four terms of dao, de, quan, and shi together, we can get 
a more holographic picture of Confucian relational “moral power,”166 which is dynamic, 
situational, and holistic. 
(4) “Security” and An 安167
When it comes to the comparison between “security” and  an 安 , I provide some explorative
discussions within two different philosophical traditions: Although “security” and an 安 is often
simply translated into each other, they have different meanings and philosophical background. An 安
is a term within correlative relationship among interdependent xin (heart and mind) and body, self
and others (or society),  humans and environment,  and so forth.  An 安  is  related to the term of
“harmony” (with nature and community). An 安 is a foundation or a principle for harmony. Without
an 安, harmony cannot be achieved; without harmony, an 安 is pointless. An 安 and harmony must be
understood in the context of each other. In short, an 安 is much more intrinsic, constitutive, holistic,
comprehensive, and dynamic than “security.” 
For  example,  the  realist  school  of  international  relations  pays  much  attention  to  national
security and military security, while from a correlative and comprehensive perspective, research on
166 Cf. Cheng, Chung-ying, and Tianyuan Huang. Yijing Wenmingguan: Cong Yixue Dao Guoji Zhengzhi Xinsiwei (易经
文明观：从易学到国际政治新思维 Philosophy of the Yijing: New Thinking on International Politics), Beijing: Peo-
ple's Oriental Publishing & Media Co. Ltd, 2017. 
167 Also see Table 6, Chapter 2. 
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“security” should be extended to include non-traditional security of economy, ecology, culture, and
psychology of tianxia (all in the world of correlations), which refute understandings of security that
emphasize traditional  concerns such as military,  territory and national  sovereignty. For example,
nontraditional security problems  in terms of terrorism,  food and water,  pollution, climate change,
transnational  crime,  investments  overseas,  transnational  financial  stability,  confrontation  and
competition between different cultures, and even transcivilizational disputes of different visions of
world’s future should be also included into a holistic or holographic conception of security. 
For another example, senses of security are related to views about “human nature.” That is,
different views about human nature lead to different psychological conditions. As I have discussed
about “human nature” and renxing  (human tendency) on the basis of a summary of Roger Ames’s
arguments in Chapter 2, in Confucian discourses, human relations are interdependent. Humans are
inseparable from community and nature. Moreover, human nature is changeable. Therefore, I would
further argue that “security” and  an 安 can be discussed along two loci of authority: autonomous
individuals vs.  socially  related persons,168 or  correspondingly along two loci  of security:  an old-
fashioned zero-sum understanding of security that encourages neighbors to treat national territory
disputes as central issues vs. a more positive story of economic growth, cooperation, and integration,
putting aside disagreements and making suspicious neighbors into friends, more conducive to the
well-being of the people and more favorable to shared prosperity of tianxia. In other words, it is
necessary to cultivate a correlative sense of security as an alternative to the traditional conception of
security in individuals and world society so as not to arouse lack of trust, suspicion, and hostility as
normal cases due to “Me” culture’s tendency for psychological self-isolationism and psychologically
168 See Rosemont, Henry, Jr., "Two Loci of Authority: Autonomous Individuals and Related Persons" in ed. Peter D. Her-
shock and Roger T. Ames, Confucian Culture of Authority, State University of New York Press 2006.
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typecasting others as threats.
3.3 A Correlative Lesson from China’s NFU Nuclear Policy: “Put Oneself in the Others’ Place”
      China is the only country among the NPT signers who has promised not to be the first to use
nuclear  weapons.  Unlike  the  U.S  and  Russia  who  often  emphasize  preemptive  strikes to  gain
initiative,  China renounces the first strike option.169 China has become the first country to propose
and pledge no-first-use policy (not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any
circumstances) when it first gained nuclear capabilities in 1964. Moreover, the Chinese government
also undertakes non-use of nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries. China is the only one
among the five major nuclear powers to publicly declare no first use of nuclear weapons and no use
of nuclear  weapons against  non-nuclear  states.170 Further,  China  has  kept the size of  its  nuclear
arsenal much smaller rather than competing in an international arms race with the United States and
the Soviet Union. Beijing has never engaged in a nuclear arms race with another country.171 China’s
defensive  nuclear  policy  including  renunciation  of  a  first  strike  option  (on  the  basis  of  China’s
maintained ability to launch a devastating counter strike with its strategic confidence that China can
survive a first strike) reduces the psychological threat posed by China to other countries. 
During the Cold War, Russia boasted the world's largest inventory of nuclear warheads designed
for  preemptive  strikes,  followed  by  the  U.S.  who  similarly  considered  the  quantity  of  nuclear
weapons it possessed as a symbol of its global leadership.  Each side believes that the size of its
nuclear arsenal affects one’s ability to guarantee its security. The more, the better. Frustratingly, both
the U.S. and Russia have fallen into the trap of a Richardson-like arms race.with the logic of a
169 See Pande, Savita. “Chinese Nuclear Doctrine” in IDSA Strategic Analysis, March 2000 Vol. XXIII No. 12, 
http://www.idsa-india.org/an-mar00-2.html. For an overview, see https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/overview.htm.
170 Neither UK nor France subscribe to the doctrine of “no first use,” but they do claim to use them only in defense if at-
tacked (though this might be preemptive), as does the USA.
171 Although some Chinese people including scholars, netizens, and even officials, constantly requested for a drop of 
NFU policy, following the U.S. or Russian nuclear logic of preemptive strikes... 
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prisoner’s dilemma.172  The nuclear arms race cost both the US and Russia, and even our world too
much.  Their  infamous,  huge  nuclear  arsenals with  meaningless  abilities  to  destroy  our  planet
numerous times led to not only heavy national burdens, but also to moral bankruptcy. To be specific,
in the effort to build these arsenals, huge amounts of collateral damage to Russian and American
populations occurred in  the forms of radiation-induced illness,  environmental  contamination and
distorted economies, as well as the costs of proxy wars that threatened the use of some of these
weapons.
The  lessons from  a  perspective  of  longer  time  and  larger  space  are:  Coercive  diplomacy
increases  suspicion,  distrust,  hatred,  resistance,  and  competition.  Costs  increase  over  time  and
opportunities diminish. To think like a correlative decision-maker, you aim to make yourself feel
more secure by making your neighbors feel more secure, for only if you make your neighbors feel
more secure can you yourself increase the orderliness and stability of the relationship. One’s security
in the context of global interdependence means no longer maximization of your own unilateral power
or capacity on the basis of rationality marginalizing the subjective (for example, others’ feelings or
emotions) in favor of certain objective connotations. To achieve one’s security,  “put oneself in the
others’ place (shu 恕),” as Confucius emphasized as “the one expression that can be acted upon until
the end of one’s days.”173 In contrast with China’s relational understanding of power and security
associated with Confucian moral cultivation, the rational choice of maximizing national power of
deterrence  following  a  certain  linear  or  single-track  thinking  does  not  always  lead  to ji  ( 吉
172 See Richardson, L., Arms and Insecurity: a Mathematical Study of the Causes and Origins of War, Pittsburgh: Box-
wood Press, 1960 ; and Rapoport, A., and Chammah, Albert M. Prisoner's Dilemma:a Study in Conflict and Coopera-
tion, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965.
173 See Ames, Roger T. Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. University of Hawaii Press, 2011, pp. 194-200. As Ames 
pointed out, Shu 恕 is defined negatively as “do not impose on others what you yourself do not want.” 
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propitiousness) as shown in the  Yijing. The real tragedy of great power politics174 is: Only brutal
force left! No soft power! No smart power!175
There has been evidence to show that this no-first-use nuclear policy with lower financial costs
has successfully benefited China’s economic development for enhancing people’s livelihood. Even
from a rational perspective,  launching a first strike is not in China’s interest; the anticipated costs
outweigh the benefits.  From the perspective of  Confucian role  ethics  (a more constructivist-like
interpretation of political relationships), China’s exemplary role in its leading option of no-first-use
and nuclear-arms-control also wins better soft power of promoting worldwide nuclear disarmament
and paves an alternative way to world peace and harmony.  While China’s policy can be seen as a
confidence-building measure, it could also be cynically interpreted as a way to  morally  encourage
others to disarm, thus gaining power relatively. Obviously, China’s morally relational nuclear policy
option is an alternative to Herman Kahn style of thinking – the realist worldview trap. However,
although China has persistently called on the United States to adopt a no-first-use policy, the United
States has repeatedly refused these calls. Is it because of another kind of worldview? My answer is:
at least partially yes. 
3.4 A Short Summary
     In this chapter, I articulate my comparisons and contrasts between concepts like power in Realist
IR theory with a Chinese conception of “Confucian relational moral power” including terms such as
de 德, quan 权, and shi 势 in the Yijing. I also made a comparative discussion on two different types
174 Mearsheimer contends that the tragedy in great power politics is that neither side wants the outcome policies of offen-
sive realism. The real tragedy might be adopting the bankrupt philosophy that leads to this result, the definition of the sit-
uation that leads to the Richardson arms race and Rapoport and Chammah’s prisoner’s dilemma that results, in other 
words, in long term inappropriate decision making because of thinking dualistically rather than correlatively.
175 Cf. Center For Strategic International Studies, Commission On Smart Power, Armitage, Richard Lee, & Nye, Joseph 
S. CSIS Commission on Smart Power a smarter, more secure America. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies, 2007. 
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of security concepts. Based upon comparative studies on  “power” and  “security,” I provide a case
analysis of China’s correlative nuclear policy as compared with costs of non-correlative decisions of
the US and USSR. 
Rationality and  huxi (correlativity) take the responsibility of logically linking the forehead
discussions about the philosophical traditions (those concepts or terms belong to) with the detailed
articulations of IR or GR theory.  When making the comparisons and contrasts  between Western
concepts  and Chinese  terms,  I  return  to  their  philosophical  traditions  in  order  to  avoid  cultural
reductionism. I expect this kind of comparisons or contrasts of concepts and terms can bring about
clearer, easier, and deeper understanding on Chinese terms and thus stronger foundations for my
construction of GPRT. 
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Chapter 4: Correlative Epistemology: Reformulating Morgenthau's Six 
Principles
     This Chapter introduces a cultural epistemology for comparative studies of Chinese and Western
international relations (IR) theories,  suggesting ways in which ancient Chinese texts,  originating
from the Yijing, help us first to reconceptualize political realism from a Confucian perspective and
second formulate a “Confucian correlative epistemology” of international relations, through which
this chapter reformulates and extends Hans Morgenthau's six principles of political realism. 
     Hans Morgenthau's six principles of political realism encourage us to think about IR theory
building in terms of constructing a rational diplomacy with universal applications to anarchical world
politics. However, modern critical thinkers question the preeminence of power in international affairs
both  in  terms  of  the  implied  substantialist  epistemology,  and  in  terms  of  the  need  to  be  more
inclusive of multiple realities such as non-state institutions and moral values. What is lacking in
these critiques, however, is an alternative epistemology and worldview that locates political realism
in a more comprehensive philosophical context, one more suited to an evolving family of distinctive
and  complexly  interrelated  cultures  in  an  ever  changing,  global  political-economic  system.  A
“Confucian correlative epistemology” and worldview provide such an alternative.  Six Confucian
principles  developed  from Confucius’s  principle  of  the  “correlation  between opposites”  invite  a
broadening of realism to include larger and longer space-time frames and value complexities.
Critics of contemporary realism have already raised many questions about realism. I hope to
make a link between a growing critical perspective on international relations theory and Confucian
political philosophy. Adding a Confucian perspective to its discourse could also help make the field
of international relations more accessible to Chinese scholars and practitioners. I was inspired by 
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J. Ann Tickner’s article on Hans Morgenthau’s principles of political realism: a feminist reforma-
tion,176 which provides a similar comparison between Morgenthau’s six principles with feminist ap-
proaches. Hans Morgenthau's six principles of political realism represent one of the most important
realist statements from which several generations of scholars in the academic field of international
relations in the United States have been nourished. Morgenthau's six principles of political realism
can be drawn from his book Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace as follows,
(1) Politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human na-
ture, which is unchanging: therefore it is possible to develop a rational theory that reflects these ob -
jective laws. (2)The main signpost of political realism is the concept of interest defined in terms of
power which infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical
understanding of politics possible. Political realism stresses the rational, objective and unemotional.
(3) Realism assumes that interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid
but not with a meaning that is fixed once and for all. Power is the control of man over man. (4) Politi-
cal realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the tension be-
tween the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. (5)Political realism re-
fuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the uni-
verse. It is the concept of interest defined in terms of power that saves us from moral excess and po-
litical folly. (6 ) The political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere; he asks “How
does this policy affect the power of the nation?” Political realism is based on a pluralistic conception
of human nature. A man who was nothing but “political man” would be a beast, for he would be com-
pletely lacking in moral restraints. But, in order to develop an autonomous theory of political behav-
ior, “political man” must be abstracted from other aspects of human nature.177 
In this chapter, I propose to reexamine the six principles of political realism formulated by Hans
Morgenthau in his classic work Politics Among Nations. First, I shall use some ideas from East-West
comparative texts to show that the way in which Morgenthau describes and explains international
politics, and the prescriptions that ensue are embedded in a Western traditional perspective. Then I
shall suggest some ways in which Confucian theory might help us begin to reconceptualize a world
view from a correlative perspective and to formulate a Chinese epistemology of international rela-
tions. Finally, I shall conclude with a Confucian reformulation of Morgenthau's six principles. 
4.1 Rational Thinking vs. Correlative Thinking
176 Tickner,  J.Ann.  "Hans  Morgenthau's  principles  of  political  realism:  a  feminist  reformulation,”  in  Gender  and  International
Relations, ed. Rebecca Grant and Kathleen, Newland (Indiana Univ. Press, 1991). 
177 Morgenthau, Hans.  Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th revised edition (New York: Alfred Knopf,
1973), pp. 4-15. 
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I try to compare two modes of thinking, rational thinking and correlative thinking, and the
world views behind them and political values after them. Distinct from correlative thinking, rational
thinking is a modality of causal, linear and single-track thinking, originating from ancient Greek
Cosmology. Within Chinese Yijing tradition, because of absence of belief in a single-ordered world
and One standing independent of the world ordered as its efficient cause, and the employment of aes-
thetic over logical senses of order, the world of the sky, earth, and ten thousand events are considered
as mutually correlating with each other. It should be noted that correlative thinking is distinctly Chi-
nese  but  not  necessarily  uniquely  Chinese  and  it  is  a  kind  of  Peircian  abduction——detective
sleuthing and medical diagnostics in which you are looking for productive correlations. It is a holistic
approach that includes giving reasons and patterns of coherence——whatever we might take as a def-
inition of rationality.
4.2 Rational Actor vs. Correlative Actor
A rational actor tends to make short-term and small-scale decisions for maximizing his/her in-
terests as final goals of economy, politics, and social life, minimizing his/her costs at the same time,
after considering facts available, alternative choices, possible gains and losses, and also weighing
benefits and costs, and opportunities and risks. Rational choices theory is consistent with individual-
ism and utilitarianism, associated with dualistic, absolute, and essentialist conceptions such as human
nature, autonomy, equality, and freedom. It can be argued that corporations and even national gov-
ernment are extended concepts of the individual.
As a correlative actor, a person envisions him/herself in their multiplicity of relations and roles,
their organizational contexts, and their larger significance in the natural and human environment.
Correlative  actors  are  context-sensitive  instead  of  “Me” ——sensitive  of  egoism. There  are  a
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numerous  ancient  Chinese  texts  showing  the  importance  of  changing  circumstances  on  human
actions. For example, the key and defining idea in Sun-tze: The Art of Warfare is shi: manipulating
circumstances to create a strategic advantage as an alternative to the commitment of brute force.178
Therefore and furthermore, actions are expected to be properly and particularly situated within roles
and relations, pursuing for appropriateness fitting within the specific circumstances, as time changes
and as circumstance varies. He/she must be prepared for the art of contextualizing and take full
account of qu shi (long-term tendency and large-scale context, correlating with short-term and small-
scale facts available). A never-ending environmental scanning to identify contingencies, correlations
and correspondences as well  as coherence and processes,  and constant adjustments to the whole
environment full of uncertainties are required so that one is not left unprepared for the unexpected
surprises that often accompany rationalist certainties.
Therefore, qualitatively, a correlative actor is committed to doing what is appropriate for ev-
eryone in the situation (yi), i.e. taking under consideration the sometimes competing yet still legiti-
mate interests of all concerned, rather than just doing what is more narrowly to self-serving personal
advantage (li), and at the same time to taking into account appropriateness of both means and ends.
Quantitatively, a correlative actor is required to extend one’s range of concern and take full account
of long-term tendencies and large-scale contexts, correlating with short-term and small-scale facts
available. This correlative model of decision-making stands in stark contrast to that of rational real-
ists acting in narrowly defined self-interest terms, in which the ends justify the means.
178 See Sun, Bin, D. C. Lau, and Roger T. Ames. Sun Bin: The Art of Warfare: A Translation of the Classic Chinese Work of 
Philosophy and Strategy, Suny Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003,
p.86.
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4.3 Confucian Correlative Epistemology179 
    Inspired by Chinese philosopher Zhang Dongsun (1886-1973)’s pluralistic epistemology, distin-
guishing both from epistemological monism and from epistemological dualism, I present a Confu-
cian correlative epistemology as follows,
(1) The relation between our subjectivity  and  the  external world is  correlative  and interactive.
Sensations are not representations of external things. 
(2) Unlike Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy is not a philosophy of substance. It lacks a con-
cept of substance. Chinese philosophy tends toward process. Atomicity and continuity are viewed as
two aspects of one thing. 
(3) Knowledge is social and cultural. Knowledge should be seen as socially valuable and as part of
culture. Even scientific knowledge is recreation other than representation. The fact that scientific
knowledge may be valid across cultures does not prove that it is objective and culture-free. Culture
plays a significant role in forming our knowledge and knowledge is culturally and socially deter-
mined. To talk about knowledge, we must talk about culture. 
4.4 Towards a Confucian Correlative Epistemology of IR
The above-reviewed philosophical epistemology could help us to begin to formulate a Confu-
cian correlative epistemology of international relations. Morgenthau encourages us to construct a ra-
tional outline or map that has universal applications of theory building. In contrast, Confucians in
general are skeptical about the possibility of finding a universal and objective foundation for knowl-
edge. The Confucian literature,  especially the  Yijing,  also reviewed here emphasizes interdepen-
dence, ambiguity, fragility, contingency, difference, complexity, diversity, context, and process. 
179 See Jiang, Xinyan, "Zhang Dongsun: pluralist Epistemology and Chinese Philosophy" in ed. Chung-ying Cheng and 
Nicholas Bunnin, Contemporary Chinese Philosophy. Blackwell 2002, pp.57-81. I paraphrase and resummarize Zhang 
Dongsun’s arguments based on Jiang’s illustrations. 
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Confucian thinkers generally dislike dichotomization and the distancing of subject from object
that goes with scientific or abstract thinking, both of which encourage a we /they attitude characteris-
tic of international relations. Moreover, conceptual dichotomies such as objectivity vs. subjectivity,
reason vs. emotion, mind vs. body, culture vs. nature, self vs. other, autonomy vs. relatedness, and
knowing vs. being do not exist in Confucian texts. Instead, Confucian literature urges us to construct
correlative epistemologies that value ambiguity and difference,  thus encouraging inclusionary atti-
tudes. These qualities could urge us to begin to build a human theory of international relations which
contains elements of both Chinese and Western modes of thought.
Most of all, the Western liberal notion of rational economic man, an individualist and a welfare
maximizer, similar to the image of rational political man on which realism has based its theoretical
investigations, does not make any sense in the Chinese correlative world view where the individual is
seen as individual acting within social relations. If we combine this view of human behaviour with
Confucian holistic perspective which stresses the interdependence of all things, including nature and
humans, it may help us begin to think from a more global perspective, which appreciates cultural di-
versity but at the same time recognizes a growing interdependence, which makes anachronistic the
exclusionary thinking fostered by the political logic of nation state system. Chinese correlative world
view and processual thinking all point us in the direction of an appreciation of interbecoming of poli-
ties, a way of thinking that has been sadly lacking in the history of international relations. 
    I am not going to argue that Morgenthau is incorrect in his portrayal of the international system. I
do believe, however, that it is a partial description of international politics. I share with other critics
of realism the view that, in a world with sea changes, we must begin to search for modes of behavior
different from those prescribed by Morgenthau. We need to transcend the particular concern of Hans
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Morgenthau over international warfare, considering that nation state, the primary unit (constitutive
element) of the international system for Morgenthau and other realists, is no longer able to deal with
an  increasingly  pluralistic  array  of  problems  ranging  from  nuclear  weapons  to  economic
interdependence to  environmental degradation.  Then could Confucianism make a contribution to
international relations theory by constructing an alternative perspective on international politics that
might help us to search for more appropriate solutions to these interdependent global problems? 
4.5 Morgenthau's Principles of Political Realism: a Confucian Reformulation and Extension180
     Drawing on the above explorations, this conclusion will present a Confucian reformulation and
extension of Morgenthau's six principles of political realism of international relations, which might
help us to think global politics differently in a Confucian way. I conclude this chapter with my six
principles of Confucian Global Process-Relational Theory as an alternative opinion to contemporary
international theory: 
(1) A Confucian perspective believes that objectivity is culturally defined and supposedly “objective”
laws of unchanging human nature are based on a dualistic and essentialist understanding of human
nature.  Human nature is viewed as a pluralistic and dynamic human tendency; it contains moral
elements  of  self-cultivation.  Therefore,  individuality  is  relationally  understood  as  an
accomplishment: becoming distinguished in relations.   
(2) A Confucian macroscopical, comprehensive, and holistic perspective believes that in the era of
globalization the primary unit of the world system is  tianxia (all in a world of correlations), rather
than nation-state. The national interest cannot be separated from the interest of tianxia. Therefore,
national interest cannot be defined only in terms of national power any longer. The national interest
180 I was inspired by J.Ann Tickner’s article on Hans Morgenthau’s principles of political realism: a feminist reformation, 
which provides a similar comparison between Morgenthau’s six principles with feminist approaches.
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demands all-win or at least cooperative rather than zero sum solutions to a number of global prob-
lems such as nuclear proliferation, financial crises, and global warming. Considering about military,
economic and environmental security in interdependent concepts suggests the need of new efforts
that seek to achieve mutually beneficial, rather than zero sum, ends. 
(3) Power as domination and control is socially and culturally constructed. A unilateral understand-
ing of power would ignore the possibility of relational power.  
(4)  A Confucian correlative perspective rejects  the possibility of separating morality from global
politics, while recognizing all political action has moral importance. Moreover, the Confucian moral
perspective of “situational appropriateness”  values situational “responsiveness” within roles and
relations, instead of universal principles of rights and “responsibilities.” 
(5) Based on fully recognizing the moral aspirations of particular cultures, a Confucian perspective
seeks to pursue good relationship instead of seeking mere moral agreements. Building a consensus
(collective perception) as inherently shared viewpoints and feelings out of the overlap of opposites
and  putting aside disagreements could become the bases for  de-escalating international conflicts
and building harmony of tianxia with co-prosperity of different civilizations. 
(6) A Confucian  correlative  perspective attaching importance to ambiguity, fragility,  contingency,
difference, complexity, diversity, context, and process, denies the realist autonomy of the political in the
rational theory, associated with a particular culture, since disciplinary efforts to abstract a so-called
"political man" and construct a chaotic and conflictual nation-state system are on the basis of partial
and dualistic thinking and exclusionary attitudes.
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Table 7: Critiques of the Six Principles of Morgenthan's Political Realism & Six Principles of
Confucian Global Theory
Six
Principles
Morgenthau's International Theory of
Political Realism
Confucian Global Theory & Critique of
Morgenthau 
(1) Human     
Nature & 
Theory
"Politics, like society in general, is governed 
by objective laws that have their roots in 
human nature, which is unchanging: 
therefore it is possible to develop a rational 
(and unemotional) theory that reflects these 
objective laws." 
A Confucian perspective believes that objectivity
is culturally defined and supposedly 'objective' 
laws of unchanging human nature are based on a
dualistic and essentialist understanding of human
nature. 
Human nature is viewed as a pluralistic and 
dynamic human tendency; it contains moral 
elements of self-cultivation. Therefore, 
individuality is relationally understood as an 
accomplishment: becoming distinguished in 
relations.  
(2) Unit, 
Interest & 
power
"The main signpost of political realism is the 
concept of interest defined in terms of power 
which infuses rational order into the subject 
matter of politics, and thus makes the 
theoretical understanding of politics possible. 
Political realism stresses the rational, objective
and unemotional." 
A Confucian macroscopical, comprehensive, and
holistic perspective believes that in the era of 
globalization the primary unit of the world sys-
tem is tianxia (all in a world of correlations), 
rather than nation-state. The national interest 
cannot be separated from the interest of tianxia.
Therefore, national interest cannot be defined 
only in terms of national power any longer. The 
national interest demands all-win or at least co-
operative rather than zero sum solutions to a 
number of global problems such as nuclear wars,
financial crises, and global warming.
(3) Power "Realism assumes that interest defined as 
power is an objective category which is 
universally valid but not with a meaning that is
fixed once and for all. Power is the control of 
man over man." 
Power as domination and control is socially and 
culturally constructed.
 
A unilateral understanding of power would ig-
nore the possibility of relational power. 
(4) Morality 
& politics
"Political realism is aware of the moral 
significance of political action. It is also aware 
of the tension between the moral command 
and the requirements of successful political 
action." 
A Confucian correlative perspective rejects the 
possibility of separating morality from global 
politics, while recognizing all political action has
moral importance. 
The Confucian moral perspective of “situational
appropriateness” values situational 
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Six
Principles
Morgenthau's International Theory of
Political Realism
Confucian Global Theory & Critique of
Morgenthau 
“responsiveness” within roles and relations, 
instead of universal principles of rights and 
“responsibilities.” 
(5) National 
interest & 
Universal 
Morality
"Political realism refuses to identify the moral 
aspirations of a particular nation with the 
moral laws that govern the universe. It is the 
concept of interest defined in terms of power 
that saves us from moral excess and political 
folly." 
Based on fully recognizing the moral aspirations 
of particular cultures, a Confucian perspective 
seeks to pursue good relationship instead of 
seeking mere moral agreements. 
Building a consensus (collective perception) as 
inherently shared viewpoints and feelings out of 
the overlap of opposites and putting aside dis-
agreements could become the bases for de-esca-
lating international conflicts and building har-
mony of tianxia with co-prosperity of different 
civilizations. 
(6) Political 
Man & 
Theory
"The political realist maintains the auton-
omy of the political sphere; he asks 'How 
does this policy affect the power of the na-
tion?' Political realism is based on a pluralis-
tic conception of human nature. A man who 
was nothing but 'political man' would be a 
beast, for he would be completely lacking 
in moral restraints. But, in order to de-
velop an autonomous theory of political be-
havior, 'political man' must be abstracted 
from other aspects of human nature." 
A Confucian correlative perspective attaching 
importance to ambiguity, fragility, contingency, 
difference, complexity, diversity, context, and 
process, denies the realist autonomy of the 
political in the rational theory, associated with a 
particular culture, since disciplinary efforts to 
abstract a so-called "political man" and construct
a chaotic and conflictual nation-state system are 
on the basis of partial and dualistic thinking 
and exclusionary attitudes. 
  To construct this Confucian theoretical alternative is not to deny the validity of Morgenthau's
work. But adding a Confucian perspective to the epistemology of international relations is a stage
through which we must pass if we are to think about constructing a non-Western theoretical frame-
work which goes beyond traditional realist perspective. Such inclusionary thinking is becoming im-
perative in a world in which the technology of war and a fragile natural environment threaten human
existence.
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CHAPTER 5: CHINESE IR: THINKING AND PRACTICING IN A
DIFFERENT WAY
Chapter  4  presents  a  Confucian  reformulation  of  Morgenthau's  six  principles  of  political
realism of international relations, which might more clearly help us to think international politics
differently  in  a  Confucian  way.  Further  in  this  chapter,  traditional  and  contemporary  Western
international relations theory (such as classical realism and neorealism, liberalism and neoliberalism,
Marxism,  the  English  School)  and more  modern  perspectives  on  these  theories  such  as  critical
theory, constuctivism, and postmodernism will be compared with Yijing concepts and the proposed
GPRT worldview in general. 
In the first part of this chapter, a summation of IRT (especially Rationalistic theories) and a
critical review on four pillars of IRT, namely, rationality (rationalist epistemology), human nature,
nation-state (the basic unit of the “international” system), and anarchy will be provided in Table 8
and 9. Correspondingly, four pillars of my GPRT, namely, correlativity, human tendency, tianxia,
and harmony will be comparatively discussed based on the Yijing texts and correlative terms such as
dao, de, he, junzi, shengren, tian, and xing in Table 9. In the second part of this chapter, I compare
and contrast  Realism and Liberalism with Chinese Global Process-Relational Theory based upon
Confucian (Decision-Making) Model of Situational Appropriateness in Roles and Relations. In
the third part of this chapter, I compare and contrast Chinese Global Process-Relational Theory with
Constructivism. In the last part of this chapter, I discussed about how Chinese correlative actors like
Admiral Zheng He (1371-1433) as an example of Confucian wangdao foreign policy decision-makers
and practitioners, shaped ancient order of the world, in order to partially answer two questions: What
are the contributions of the Yijing’s style of thinking to global politics? How to get out of security
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dilemmas? 
5.1 Beyond Rationality: Correlativity
    Question is: can we think international relations differently in a correlative way? To switch back
to my dissertation in the academic field of international relations, I attempt to identify correlativity as
a clear  style  of thinking (or philosophy),  a  style  which is  distinctly Chinese but not  necessarily
uniquely Chinese. It was formulated in Chinese ancient philosophical literature such as the  Yijing,
and has a powerful influence on Chinese decision-makers and intellectuals in their understanding of
global politics. The correlative model for decision making stands in stark contrast to that of rational
realists acting in narrowly defined self-interest terms. The entry point of the correlative model is
relationality, other than individuality. Relationality other than individuality can be another intriguing
way of expressing this theory of correlativity.  I expect such a tradition can be a basis for a unified
global  process-relational theory,  distinct from the Anglo-European/Indo-European tradition with a
strong sense of rationality, which is the basis of contemporary International Relations Theory. Along
the lines shown in figure 1, I develop my research from the Chinese world view to a Chinese theory: 
Figure 8: Basic Structure of Comparisons between the West and China 
There is no sense of dualism and transcendence (associated with ancient Greek Cosmology) in
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Yijing philosophy. The sky, earth, and ten thousand events mutually correlate with each other. It is
interactions  of the two basic  elements  of  a  polarity  like yin-yang  that  constitute  the forces,  and
produce change. The Confucian “polarity” implies a relationship of two events for example, each of
which constitutes  a  necessary  condition  for  the  other.  Each  particular  element is  both  self-
determinate and determined by every other particular element. A “polar” explanation of relationships
requires a  contextualist  interpretation of the world in which events are strictly interdependent.181
Such correlative polar metaphysics precludes all dualistic, absolute, and essentialist conceptions such
as self/other, identity, human nature, nation-state, and anarchy, which often appear in the Western
International relations Theory. Instead of concepts such as “international,” human nature, nation-
state, and anarchy, I whereupon use correlative terms such as “global,” renxing (human tendency),
tianxia  (all  under  the  sky  literarily,  or  all  in  the  world  of  correlations),  and  harmony  with
differences (he er bu tong) to construct my theory, which reflects the Chinese correlative yinyang
acosmology. Thus, a correlative thinking and scheme of contextualization replaced ontological and
dualistic assumptions that have accompanied Western concepts. 
Further,  most of the mainstream  western theories and perspectives on international  politics
take a rationalist paradigm for theoretical constructions. As to Realism, research on  a state as a
rational actor shuns subjective elements such as world views, ways of thinking process, and political
values of leaders, in favor of objective facts available, seeking essential meanings through definitions
and  causal  logic.“Correlativism”works  as a  Chinese  paradigm in  my  construction  of  Global
Process-Relational Theory. Chinese thinkers are content with the appeal to “examples” to provide
explanatory accounts. There was no hard and fast distinction between “objective” and “subjective”
connotations. Moreover, the precision is not in conception, but in correlativity and full message of
181 According to Roger Ames, the art of “contextualizing” can be illustrated by an analogy of “the relationship that exists 
between any particular note in a symphonic performance and the symphony as a whole. There is a sense in which the 
value and meaning of each note can only be understood within the context of the entire symphony. In these terms, then, 
each note has the entire symphony implicate within it. At the same time, the symphony is only available through one note
at a time as particular perspectives on the symphony…”Ames, Roger . Sun-Tzu The Art of Warfare. New York, NY: Bal-
lantine Books, 1993, p. 69.
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the clustered images. Similarly, an individual or a state is viewed within roles and relations. Within
a focus and field model, for any individual person as a focus, the field could be as small as a family
and as big and extensive as an entire society, or even universe. Similarly, a polity as a focus is always
considered  as  within  tianxia (all  in  the  world)  as  a  field.  In  the  next  chapter,  a holographic182
understanding of world systems of human becomings and tianxia will be provided in my  Global
Process-Relational Theory. 
I  summarize traditional and contemporary  Western international relations theory (especially
rationalistic theories) and more modern perspectives on these theories within the following 2-page
table. And I also compare them with my global  process-relational theory  at the  end of the  table.
According to my summarization, one can find that most of the mainstream theories and perspectives
share in common four theoretical pillars,  namely,  rationality (rationalist paradigm),  human nature,
nation-state (the basic unit of the “international” system), and  anarchy ( distinct from the  GPRT),
even though there are many different views among themselves. 
Table  8:  Western  International  Relations  Theory  vs.  Global  Process-Relational  Theory:  An  Overall
Comparison 
Approaches Major concepts Basic unit Basic model Paradigm
Real-
ism
Classical Realism
(Thucydides,  
Machiavelli,
Hobbes)
state of nature,
human nature, 
power, 
balance of power
s  tate  
power –state –
international politics
r ationalism  
Traditional Realism
(Carr, Morgenthau)
h  uman nature  , 
power, balance of
power, state
s  tate  
power –state –
international politics
r ationalism  
Structural Realism
(Waltz)
a  narchy  , self-help, 
power, balance of
power, security
s  tate/ great  
power
power –system –
international politics
r ationalism  /
structuralism
Offensive Realism
(Mearsheimer)
a  narchy  , self-help, 
power 
maximization,
great power power –state –
international politics
r ationalism  
182 Also see figure 13. 
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Approaches Major concepts Basic unit Basic model Paradigm
revisionist state
Defensive Realism 
(Waltz, Evera, Jevis, 
and Glaser, etc.)
a  narchy  , 
self-help,
Survival,
Power,
balance of power
s  tate  
power –
system –
international politics
r ationalism  
Neo-classical Realism
(Schweller, wohlforth, 
christens, and Zakaria, 
etc.)
a  narchy  ,           
self-help,
national interest, 
power,
domestic structure
s  tate  / domestic 
structure
power –
state and domestic –
international politics
r ationalism  
Liberal-
ism
Classical liberalism
(Grotius, Locke, Kant, 
Bentham, Smith)
anarchy/
harmony of 
interests 
s  tate  
Free trade/ republic/ 
international markets 
/social exchange – 
international politics
r ationalism  
Liberal idealism
(Wilson, Hobson)
anarchy/
common interests
(collective 
security/
mutual assistance)
s  tate  
law (international/ 
domestic)
 – international politics
r ationalism  /
legalism
Liberal 
institutionalism
(Haas, Keohane, 
Krasner, Nye, etc.)
a  narchy  /
harmony of 
interests
sub-state/
international 
organization
privatization /
international 
organization –  
cooperative interaction 
between states
r ationalism  /
functionalism
Neo-Liberal 
institutionalism
(Keohane)
a  narchy  /
uncertainty s  tate  
institution –  
cooperative interaction 
between states
r ationalism  /
institutionalism
Wendt’s Constructivism
a  narchy  ,
Idea, structure, 
culture 
s  tate  
shared ideas–
roles and structure 
– international politics
Constructivism
/ social identity
English School
(Bull, Wight, Buzan, etc.)
a  narchy  / shared 
norms, 
values and 
interests
international 
society-state
shared norms, values and
interests
 – international politics
r ationalism  / 
identity
New Marxism
(Wallerstein, Cardoso, Frank, 
etc.)
world history
world system-
class
productivity– 
international politics
historical 
materialism
Chinese School:
Global Process-Relational 
Theory
(Huang)
Renxing
(human tendency) 
yi li (appropriate 
interest)
shizhong 
(situational 
appropriateness)
he (harmony thru 
equilibrium) 
tianxia
(all under the 
sky literarily, 
or 
all in the world
of correlations)
shengren (sage)
 –Confucian relational 
power
(dao, de, quan, shi)
–tianxia
 –harmony with 
differences
Correlativitism
/ focus and field
Note:  a.  In  chapter  4  I  present  a  Confucian  reformulation  of  Morgenthau's  six  principles  of  political  realism of
international relations, which might more clearly help us to think international politics differently in a Confucian way.  b.
85
Even though Confucianism shares more in common with Reflexive theories  such as critical theory (Robert Cox) and
postmodernism (Foucault: power-knowledge; Derrida, deconstruction: double-reading),  most of the reflexive theories
cannot avoid sense of essentialism, which does not appear in Chinese-style texts. 
The  next  step: Four  pillars  of  IRT  within  Table  8,  namely,  rationality  (rationalist
epistemology), human nature, nation-state  (the basic unit  of  the  “international”  system), and
anarchy, will be compared with four pillars of my GPRT, namely,  correlativity, renxing (human
tendency), tianxia (all in the world), and harmony, which reflect typical Chinese world view, way
of thinking, and political values in the Yijing. 
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Table 9: Four Theoretical Pillars of IRT vs. Four Theoretical Pillars of GPRT
Comparison: Four theoretical pillars TheoreticalDevelopment
Background
I
R
T
Rationality
1. Rational actor: nation state in 
anarchy
2.  Aim:  maximizing  national
interests
3. Tools: collective security 
/mutual assistance, balance of 
power, self-help, institution–
cooperative interaction between 
states 
4.Rational Choices Model 
(foreign policy): individualism & 
utilitarianism / from “economic 
man” to “political man” / facts 
available/ short time
5. Ontology: substantialism 
6. Epistemology：positivism 
7. Methodology: atomism/ holism
8. Causal and linear thinking
9.  Rational  thought  generally
requires  its  users  to  accept  a
range of  unexamined,  or  at  best
unproven,  assumptions  that  then
predetermine the conclusions that
can  be  reached  logically  with
deductive  rigor.  From  the  17th
century  rationality  began  to
marginalize  spirit,  emotion,
intuition, will, experience, and so
on. 
            Paradigm: Rationalism Modernism
Internationali-
zation
Westernization 
Substance 
ontology
The substance 
ontology of 
early Greece 
thus establishes 
a doctrine of 
external 
relations among 
discrete “things”
that each has 
their essential 
integrity.
human nature
An essential 
understanding of 
person: “self” as 
essence/
(Essentialism/
Transcendentalism)
1.Individual
absoluteness.
2.Human beings:
As a philosophical 
presupposition, 
traditional western 
political thoughts 
(even before the 
Enlightenment) had 
often held that 
human nature is 
essentially self-
serving and ruthless,
and man is innately 
bad (Liberalism 
holds that human 
nature is basically 
good and individuals
are rational human 
beings).
nation-state
The basic and 
primary unit of 
international 
system and 
world politics; 
The major 
perspective 
from which 
world politics 
studied.
States behave as
individuals do, 
pursuing their 
own national 
interests like 
individuals or 
rational actors. 
Anarchy
Individual 
sovereignty with 
an anarchic 
logic:
self/ other 
dualistic 
competition.
(Liberal 
harmony is 
based on 
rationalism of 
the eighteenth 
century 
Enlightenment 
with a preference
for an optimistic 
view of human 
nature, and 
individual 
freedom and 
autonomy 
assumed to be 
realized by 
democracy, 
market 
capitalism, and 
free trade. 
And Liberalism 
places money 
power in the 
hands of private 
interests.)
G
P
Correlativity
1. Focus and field: a holographic
understanding of world systems; 
             Paradigm: Correlativitism Postmodernism
Globalization
Easternization
Nietzsche’s 
renxing 
(human tendency）
tianxia
(all  in  the
Confucian 
Harmony
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RT
a recognition that each and every 
unique phenomenon is 
continuous with every other 
phenomenon within one’s own 
field of experience. 
A focus is on “correlativity” (or 
interrelatedness, 
interdependence), rather than an 
individual from nowhere. Actions
are expected to be properly and 
particularly situated within roles 
and relations/ Pursuit for 
appropriateness fitting within the 
specific circumstances.
Foci and fields or “ecologically 
situated events” and their 
“environments”: intrinsic and 
constitutive nature of relations. 
This focus/field model contrasts 
with both positivist and idealist 
models.
2. Correlative thinking: 
a. absence of belief in a single-
ordered world and the 
employment of aesthetic over 
logical senses of order 
b. ziran (self-so-ing, self-do-ing), 
auto-creativity, ten-thousand 
things mutually entailing each 
other 
c. absence of ontological 
assertions that there is some 
underlying substratum-
essentialism 
3. “Correlative” Choices Model
(foreign policy)183: the art of 
contextualization: 
a. Full account of context or qu 
shi (tendency, advantage, and 
context)
b. A never-ending environmental 
scanning to identify 
A relational 
understanding of 
person: “self”as 
ongoing process/
ziran(自然 self-so-
ing); auto-creativity
1. Individual 
relativeness: for any 
individual person as 
a focus, field could 
be as small as a 
family and as big 
and extensive as an 
entire society, or 
universe.
2. Human 
becomings: 
“Individuality” as an
accomplishment: 
becoming 
distinguished in 
relations. 
3. Self-cultivation of
individuals – 
preeminently that of 
rulers and ministers. 
The ruler has to be a 
morally 
distinguished leader 
through self-
cultivation in the 
social environment 
wherein all people 
pursuit self-
cultivation. 
4.Appropriate 
interest: The actions 
of the ruler are 
required to be 
appropriate (yi) and 
accommodate the 
interests of all 
world)
The basic and 
primary unit of 
world politics is
more 
macroscopical, 
comprehensive 
and holistic. A 
“tianxia family”
(tianxia yijia) is 
a metaphor for 
the entire world.
Traditional 
Chinese view of
the world is a 
world without a 
sense of 
sovereignty 
idea, but only 
with the relative
distance and 
relationships.
A typical 
Confucian 
scenario of 
global system is
tianxia 
governed by 
worthies or 
sages, who are 
required to be 
moral examples.
We can look at 
the world as a 
whole and think
of the interests 
of all in a more 
macroscopical, 
comprehensive, 
and holistic way
Belief in 
achieving global 
harmony though 
human joint 
efforts. And 
especially the 
vital role of big 
countries as good
moral examples 
has much to do 
with the future of
the world. 
Whether the 
world is chaotic 
primarily 
depends on the 
vital role of big 
countries.
Confucian Har-
mony:
1. The art of 
combining and 
blending two or 
more foodstuffs 
so that they mu-
tually enhance 
one another 
without losing 
their distinctive 
flavors. 
2. Harmony is 
distinguished 
from mere agree-
ment by defining
it in terms of 
eliciting the opti-
mum contribu-
tion of each par-
ticular to its con-
text.
Without appeal 
to some origina-
attack on the 
rational ethos/
And movements
such as Process 
philosophy, 
Postmodernism,
and the new 
pragmatism
Processual 
metaphysics
The processual 
metaphysics as 
it is expressed in
the “Great 
Tradition” 
commentary on 
the Book of 
Changes and as 
it is implicit in 
the early 
Confucian texts 
treats 
phenomenon as 
conterminous 
events that are 
constituted by 
their internal 
relations.
183 Or called as Confucian “Rational” Choices Model by Prof. Richard Chadwick. 
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contingencies, correlations and 
correspondences as well as 
coherence and processes. 
c. Constant adjustments to the 
whole environment full of 
uncertainties. 
Aim: Situational Appropriateness
and Harmony not without 
Differences 
4. Correlativity and rationality:
The Yijing uses divination to 
spread amongst all levels of 
society practices of thought and 
reflection that contrast with the 
Western rationality. Correlative 
thinking is a kind of Peircian 
abduction--detective sleuthing 
and medical diagnostics in which 
you are looking for productive 
correlations. It is a holistic 
approach that includes giving 
reasons and patterns of 
coherence--whatever we might 
take as a definition of rationality.
concerned, rather 
than being only self-
interested (li).
5. We can have more
positive belief in 
human tendency and
therefore pay more 
attention to the 
moral cultivation of 
humans (even 
though we are still 
surrounded with 
international power 
politics).
(even though 
we are living in 
a world system 
of nation-
states).
tive principle and
the linear teleol-
ogy that comes 
with it, the world
has no grand pre-
assigned design.
3. Since Confu-
cian harmony is 
not seeking mere
agreement but 
pursuing good 
relationship be-
tween different 
civilizations, it is
still different 
from opinions of 
people like Kant 
and Leibniz. 
In sum,  a  theory  of  Confucian  harmony pursues  constructive  dialogues,  benefits  reciprocal
exchanges, and rejects clashes among civilizations.  Renxing,  tianxia, and Confucian harmony are
three  important  pillars  of my theory.  In order  to avoid  misinterpreting these three terms and the
relevant Chinese texts, we need start from interpreting correlativity (also see Table 5 in Chapter 1)
as the first and most important pillar of my theory, which is different from rationality as the basis for
assumptions of human nature, nation-state, and anarchy within the Western theoretical tradition. 
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5.2 Beyond Realism and Liberalism: Confucian Model of Situational Appropriateness in Roles 
and Relations
Realism seeks maximization of individual nations’ interests based on short-term and small-scale
considerations  of  concrete  situations.  Realist  scenario  of  international  relations  is  a  finite  game
(anarchy),  while  Confucian  theory  aiming  at  an  infinite  game  of  world  politics,  pursuits
appropriateness, i.e. , accommodating the interests of all concerned and at the same time taking into
account of both means and ends,  together with both longer term and larger scale, other than just
maximization  of  individual  nations’ interests.  Moreover,  Confucian  appropriateness  in  roles  and
relations is very much situational, different from liberalism emphasizing universal values. That is to
say, although Confucian theory looks like liberalism in the sense of their  common opposition to
realism, the pursuit of appropriateness is not based on universal principles but the concrete human
roles and relations. Correlative model of human tendency,  tianxia, and harmony is pragmatic other
than  idealistic.  In  this  narrow  sense,  compared  with  liberalism  promoting  universal  values,
Confucian logic is even closer to the realists’ pragmatic thinking. It is its unique central consideration
of appropriateness that intervenes to correct any deviations of Confucian logic.  
Liberalism promotes universal values and eternal principles in order to transfer international
relations from finite game to infinite game (just imaging a single-ordered world ruled by universal
principles  and  values),  while  Confucian  theory  also  aiming  at  infinite  game  (just  imaging
harmonization  process  with  auto-creative  tensions  and  not  without  differences),  which  pursuits
situational appropriateness other than abstract dogmas, is based on the political logic of “thinking
locally, acting globally”184 for global governance. That is to say, the value framework of Confucian
184 See Kasulis, Thomas P., "The Mosaic and the Jigsaw Puzzle：How It All Fits Together" in ed. Roger T. Ames and Pe-
ter D. Hershock, Value and Values: Economics and Justice in an Age of Global Interdependence. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press and East-West Philosophers’ Conference, 2015, p. 39.
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correlative model is situationally specific and particular, should not be universalized ideally. In this
narrow sense, Confucian logic is very much close to the political realist way of pragmatic thinking,
which rejects universal values and at least bases its decision-making process on concrete and specific
situations. 
5.3 Beyond Constructivism: Identity in Roles and Relations  
 Then what are the differences and similarities between Confucian theory and constructivism?
Firstly, constructivism also aims at universal values and norms, while Confucian theory focuses on
situational  appropriateness  in  roles  and  relations.  Secondly,  constructivism  is  based  upon
individualism, while the entry point of the Confucian correlative model is relationality, rather than
individuality. Thirdly, identity, a key concept of constructivism, in Confucian theory is considered as
within roles and relations, rather than essentialistically defined. Fourthly,  both Confucianism and
constructivism pay attention to emotions or feelings, which are not viewed as distinct from knowing.
Finally and particularly, Alexander Wendt’s Constructivism shares rationality (rationalist paradigm)
in common with most of the mainstream theories and perspectives. Wendt’s Constructivism is not an
exception in this sense. Wendt does not fully negate the three assumptions of rationalism (namely,
states  as rational  actors,  unitary state  and state-centrism,  and anarchy).  He only uses notions  of
“shared ideas” and “three cultures of anarchy” to reform the traditional approaches of rationalism. 
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5.4 China and the West: Belief Dynamic Systems Resonating with Each Other
Figure 9: Belief Dynamic Systems Resonating with Each Other
     When dealing with theoretical comparisons, if we treat China and the West as two belief dynamic
systems of ideas relating to and resonating with each other, on the basis of historical experience of
numerous  ideas  traveling  and  exchanging,  we  will  go  over  the  sensibility  of  oversimplified
dichotomy between China and the West. Although there should be further research about history of
ideas traveling both internally and externally from whom, where, when, and how,185 one thing is
certain nowadays: there is an overlapping theoretical area between the West and China as shown in
Figure 9.  
     As  I  mentioned  in  Transition  C in  the  5th part  of  the  Introduction,  there  are  at  least  two
philosophical Wests. The second West which rejects a variety of dualisms represents a 20 th century
epistemological revolution anticipating a productive conversation with Confucian thinking and also
witnessing the rise of a variety of contemporary theories,  a lot  closer to the Chinese correlative
paradigm than traditional dualist thinking, not only around the IR academia such as general systems
185 There have been several significant books about traveling ideas. For xixue dongjian (西学东渐 the Western learning into China), cf.
Tian, Chenshan. Chinese Dialectics: From Yijing to Marxism. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2005.  For dongxue xijian (东学西渐 
Chinese Learning into the West), cf. Hobson, John M. The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation. 5th printing with corrections, 2006 
ed. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. For how the Yijing influenced Leibniz, Hegal, and Marx, cf. 
Ames, Confucian Role Ethics and cf. Needham, Joseph. Science and Civilisation in China. Cambridge: Cambride University Press, 
1956. 
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theory, Gaia hypothesis, complex theory, contingency theory, fuzzy set theory, but also within the IR
academia such as New Marxism and Globalization Theory. Such modern theories share more or less
conceptional  similarities  with  the  Confucian  thinking;  some of  them  have  historical  or  logical
connections with the Yijing; some modern ideas among them even go all the way back to the Yijing. 
      Take Globalization Theory186 as an example: this rising IR approach (with major concepts like
globality and independence, basic research units like connectivity and dynamics, basic models such
as world connectivity and local-global nexus, and paradigms like critical rationality) shares mutually
inspiring similarities with Confucian thinking of  tianxia (all in a world of correlations), though its
concept of “connectivity” might be more suitable in its English sense for depicting Kasulis’s concept
of “external relation” other than “internal relation.”   
5.5 Toward a Post-hegemonic IR: Wangdao of Foreign Policy
    Question: Once we look at global predicaments through a more macroscopic, comprehensive
and holistic perspective, how should we think about and find possible solutions to them in pursuit of
situational appropriateness in roles and relations? After contrasting a correlative decision-maker with
a rational decision-maker, we can look at two opposite examples in practice: why did the voyages of
Zheng He (1371-1433) and Christopher Columbus (1451-1506) lead to different political, economic,
and cultural  consequences?  What  were  the  reasons for  the  differences  of  styles  of  Chinese  and
Spanish foreign  policies?  Though I  do not view the  two cases  from the  perspective  of  cultural
determinism, considering two cultures developed independently at that age, I would like to provide
and explore a  hypothesis concerning  Correlative Choices Model and Rational Choices Model for
186 Cf. Manfred B. Steger & Deane Neubauer. What Is Global Studies?: Theory & Practice. Routledge Ltd - M.U.A., 
2016.
93
foreign policy decision-making in this dissertation. 
Menzies described Zheng He's fleets as follows: “In every single respect——construction, cargo
capacity, damage control, armament, range, communications, the ability to navigate in the trackless
ocean and to repair and maintain their ships at sea for months on end---the Chinese were centuries
ahead of Europe. Zheng He's fleets would have had no difficulty in destroying any fleet that crossed
his path. A battle between this Chinese armada and the other natives of the world combined would
have resembled one between a pack of sharks and a shoal of sprats.”187 “China could have become the
great colonial power, a hundred years before the great age of European exploration and expansion.
But China did not.”188 What are the reasons? 
Emperor Zhu Di (1360-1424)’s foreign policy of Confucian  wangdao  (王道 literally means
sage kings’ dao), aiming at jin yue yuan lai (近悦远来 encouraging distant peoples to come) in the
short run and tianxia gongxiang taiping zhi fu (天下共享太平之福 promoting common prosperity
and pursuing holistic harmony globally) in the long run, mainly consisted of three concrete aspects: 
(1) Economic policies of hou wang bo lai (厚往薄来 Economically, a big country gives more,
and takes less) with mutual benefit; 
(2) Political  policies of  yi da shi xiao ( 以大事小 Politically,  a  big country respects  small
countries and their special local needs, deepening mutual understanding and trust) with self-
restraint and peaceful cooperation; 
(3) Cultural policies of you rong nai da (有容乃大 Culturally, a big country keeps openness
without  self/other  distinction,  rejecting  exclusionary  attitudes,  enhancing  cultural
exchanges, and encouraging mutual learning, so that it can become bigger) with respecting
187 Gavin Menzies, 1421: The Year China Discovered America, 1st Thus. ed. , Harper Perennial, June 3, 2008, p.70. 
188 Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405-1433. USA :Oxford 
University Press, January 9, 1997, p.20. 
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local customs varying from place to place and cherishing cultural diversities. 
Wangdao,  emphasizing  the  roles  of  big  countries  as  good  moral  examples within  global
relations and processes, frames a Chinese-style multi-tiered, comprehensive perspective on global
problem-solving in today’s globalized world.  Wangdao can be traced back to the Yijing philosophy
including the Chinese correlative worldview of tianxia (all in a world of correlations) and he er bu
tong (harmony not without differences), which has had a powerful influence on Chinese ancient
understanding of world order and foreign policy decision-making. 
However,  wangdao, as  one of the most important types of  Confucian ancient foreign policy,
has not been paid enough attention by modern policy makers and thinkers, who are familiar with the
concept of “hegemony” of individual nation states. In Chinese tradition,  wangdao is the opposite
word of badao (霸道). Badao has been conventionally mistranslated as “hegemony,” since badao is
a  negative  word  in  Chinese,  while  the  meaning  of  “hegemony” (often  associated  with  political
domination, not merely leadership) is not necessarily negative in English. From the history of Zheng
He’s voyages and Confucian foreign policy of wangdao, it seems that we can also find cultural roots
of Chinese contemporary foreign policies such as Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence189 and
Eight  Principles  for  Economic  Aid  and  Technical  Assistance  to  Other  Countries,190 which  are
189 The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence (1954) include: 1. Mutual respect of each other’s sovereignty and territories; 2. No 
invasion and other arm force attacks against each other; 3. No interference into each other’s internal affairs; 4. Equality and mutual 
beneficiary; 5. Peaceful co-existence. 
190 The Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries (1964) include: 1. Mutual equality and benefit.
Chinese Government would not consider its assistance a one-sided granting of benefit but believe assistance is mutual; 2.No attaching 
of any additional conditions or requirement of privileges to providing economic assistance. Chinese government would strictly respect 
the sovereignty of the nations that received its assistance; 3. In order to as much as possible avoid increase the assistance-receiving na-
tion’s burden, the Chinese government’s economic assistance is provided in the manner of free or low interest. Under necessary 
conditions, repayment of debt can be extended; 4. The purpose of Chinese Government’s aids is not to create a situation 
in which the aid receiving country would become reliant on China but to help it to step by step get on the road of self-re-
liance and independence; 5. For constructive projects, in order to help other nations, China would try to make investment 
as less as possible so that the nation receiving China’s aid may increase revenue and accumulate capital; 6. China would 
provide equipment and material of the best quality that it could produce and negotiate price based upon international 
market standard. If China fails in providing equipment and material that are unqualified and of inappropriate type, China 
Government would guarantee refund and change; 7. As for any technology that China provides other nations with, China 
guarantees that the workers of the technology receiving country will learn and fully mater the technology; 8. The experts 
sent by the Chinese Government will enjoy equal material treatment to those of the experts of the receiving countries. 
Any special demand and benefit would not be allowed. 
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opposed to power politics in dominance of international relations over the last few centuries.
 In contrast  to the Spanish short-term and small-scale policies towards peoples in America
(e.g., emphasis on acquiring gold, silver, and spices, irrespective of the cost in human lives and other
consequences for all concerned), Chinese Confucian policies reflect a longer-term and larger-scale
concern of interests of tianxia (all in the world including China itself):  based on the philosophy of
tianxia (also a world of correlations), "the tribute trade system saw more benefits going from China
to the tribute states rather than the other way round"191 so that China encouraged more peoples to ex-
changing politically, economically, and culturally (近悦远来  jin yue yuan lai) and also benefited
from a peaceful environment for itself. I will explicitly to explore how the three aspects of his poli-
cies can be traced back to Chinese world view and correlative thinking (summarized in the Yijing),
and Correlative Choices Model. A short, quick, and incomplete explanation is: 
According to the Confucian correlative conception, a person is viewed as irreducibly social, and
the “I” and the social context are reflexive and mutually entailing,192 a correlative actor thus is re-
quired to accommodate the  interests of all concerned, rather than being  only self-interested (li),
and at the same time required to take into account appropriateness of both means and ends. Put an-
other way, peoples of tianxia are viewed as correlated, interdependent, and in a continuum in a world
as a holistic entity of correlations so that interests of a people are correlated to other people’s inter-
ests. A people’s interests are not viewed as absolute but relative. Furthermore, Confucian harmony is
he er bu tong (harmony but not without differences). “Chinese culture is not shaped by any appeal to
universal categories establishing  ‘the unity of mankind.’”193 Cultural differences  among people are
191 Yaqing, Qin, "Why is there no Chinese international relations theory?" in ed. Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, Non-
Western International Relations Theory, Routledge 2010, p.36.  Cf. Fairbank, John K. China: A New History, Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Fairbank, John K. and Edwin O. Reischauser. China: Tradition and Transfor-
mation, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989. 
192 See Ames, Roger T., and David L. Hall. Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the
Zhongyong. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001, p. 84.
193 See Hall, David L., and Roger T. Ames.  Anticipating China: Thinking through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture .
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respected and cherished because they are viewed as momentums for correlative exchange of yin and
yang philosophically, bringing about holistic harmony with mutual benefits, rather than causes for
clash of civilizations. Such harmony was compared with the cooking art of combining and blending
two or more foodstuffs so that they mutually enhance one another without losing their distinctive fla-
vors.194 The role of big countries (as moral examples)195 is also worth more detailed discussions about
renxing (human tendency), human becomings, and moral cultivation from xiaoren (petty person) to
junzi (well-cultivated exemplary person as the model for social interactions) to shengren (sage, top of
junzi). 
     The ends of the Spanish king and Chinese emperor behind the two navigators were thereafter
different. The Spanish monarch Isabella I of Castile wanted to attain more gold, silver, and spices,
while the main aims196 of Chinese Emperor Zhu Di were to recover the Sea Silk Road, abandoned
during the former dynasty, and achieve tianxia harmony (at least a peaceful and mutually beneficial
relationship between China and other peoples around the world). The well-known facts were that
"the only interest of the Spanish and Portuguese was in gathering sustenance, gold and spices"197 and
Christopher  Columbus’s  voyage  was  followed  by colonization  and  racial  violence.  By contrast,
Zheng He's fleets brought about peace to the world outside China,  and promoted friendship and
mutual prosperity between China and the places where he visited.  Zheng He's fleets rounded up
pirates198 on the  Sea  Silk  Road from China to  Indian Ocean and  diplomatically mediated  many
disputes among countries in this  region. Moreover,  Chinese fleets  also aided many peoples with
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995, p. 90.
194 See Ames, Roger T., Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.275.
195 See Chapter 2, ibid.
196 About the aims of Zhu Di, there are many different arguments in the academic field. It can be demonstrated that the
main aims are here in this article. 
197 Gavin Menzies, 1421: The Year China Discovered America, 1st US. ed. Harper Perennial, June 3, 2008 , p.69. 
198 Such a coercive action represents a Confucian dialectic way of balancing coercion and moral education. Confucius is widely known
as an educator who emphasized moral education. However, when Confucius was the legal minister of his state Lu, he also decidedly
and severely sentenced Shao Zhengmao, a machinator who was a black sheep threatening the state's stability and harmony. 
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Chinese cargoes and ancient technology to improve productivity for their living. The king of Cochin
appreciated the help from Emperor Zhu Di: "How fortunate we are that the teachings of the sages of
China have benefited us. For several years now, we have had abundant harvests in our country and
our people have had houses to live in, have had the bounty of the sea to eat their fill of, and enough
fabrics for clothes."199 
More importantly,  Zhu Di, emperor behind Admiral Zheng He, decreed, “Let there be mutual
trade at the frontier barriers in order to supply the country's needs and to encourage distant people to
come ( 怀柔远人 huai  rou yuan ren).”200 Zheng He's  fleets  visited about  30 Asian and African
countries  from sea  to  intercommunicate  with  people  in  other  areas.  According  to  Menzies,  the
emperor's ships tried to discover and chart the entire world, and bring it into Confucian harmony
through trade and foreign policy.201 The clearest fact of Chinese foreign policy of yi da shi xiao (以
大事小 a big country respects small countries), which can also demonstrated the success of Chinese
policy of huai rou yuan ren (encouraging distant people to come), is: The king of Brunei, on the west coast
of Borneo, visited China with Zheng He’s fleets and was well received at court. To appreciate Zhu
Di's concern with thoughtfulness, he even decided to be put to rest in China forever after his death.
After  his  demise,  "the  emperor  (Zhu  Di)  stopped  official  business  at  court  for  three  days  and
assigned officials to attend to his burial."202 Today we can still  find his tomb in Nanjing, former
capital of Ming Dynasty. 
199 Cochin tablet, "Taizong Shi Lu", ch.183, quoted in Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet 
of the Dragon Throne, 1405-1433. USA :Oxford University Press, January 9, 1997, pp.145-6. 
200 Ibid, p. 88. 
201 Gavin Menzies, 1421: The Year China Discovered America, 1st US. ed. New York: Harper Perennial,June 3, 2008, p.454. 
According to Levathes, the Hongwu Emperor (Zhu Di's father, 1328–1398) also "reasoned at the beginning of the Ming Dynasty, it 
was foolish to try to support garrisons halfway around the world, so neither Zhu Di nor his successors tried." Levathes, op. cit., p.146.
202 Levathes, op. cit., p.104. 
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CHAPTER 6: PAVING A WAY TO AN ALTERNATIVE WORLD FUTURE
6. 1 A Summary of Confucian Global Process-Relational Theory
Based on comparisons between correlativity and rationality,  and between internal and external
relations, in this dissertation  I  have tried to construct a non-Western theory (see  Figure  10) on the
basis of Confucian  Decision-making  Model of Situational Appropriateness in Roles and Relations
(See  Chapter  1  and  5),  with  three  major  terms  of  renxing,  tianxia,  and  harmony not  without
differences to bring about an alternative scenario of infinite game (as compared with finite game in
Chapter 2) for world politics from a Yijing philosophical tradition (see Table 5) that has developed
independently of Anglo-European/Indo-European tradition. 
First, as I indicated in Chapter 2, renxing,  not equal to “human nature” in the Western context
and  should  be  translated  into  English  as  human  tendency  rather  than  “human  nature”  with  its
essentialistic meanings. Therefore, a person is viewed as a cultivation process in roles and relations
and there only exists notion of relationally constituted “human becomings” instead of an essentialist
understanding of discrete “human beings.”203 Notions of human tendency and human becoming are
viewed as the bases of Confucian moral cultivation from xiaoren (petty person) to junzi (exemplary
person as the model for social interactions) to shengren (sage, top of junzi).  
Second, Tianxia (all under the sky literally, or all in the world of correlations) provides a more
macroscopical, comprehensive and holistic view of the global system and overall interests in the era
of globalization,204 compared to the concept of “nation-state” with national interests in international
203 See Ames, Roger T., Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p. 88.
204 Cf. Zhao, Tingyang. The under-Tian System: A Philosophical Introduction of World System. Nanjing: Jiangsu Higher
Education Publisher, 2005. Since Zhao’s publications about globalization and Chinese ancient term of  under-Tian (He
used  a  translation  of  天下 as  under-Tian ,  which  is  different  from mine),  there  has  been  numerous  debates  and
discussions among Chinese scholars. 
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relations theory; 
Third,  Confucian harmony, as an  alternative scenario for world politics, is harmony (also a
process of harmonization)  but not without differences  and diversities.  This  sage-tianxia-harmony
connectional  framework simply  indicates  that  the  world peace  and prosperity  depends on moral
cultivation of every human being, particularly including the leading exemplary role of person or big
country. This framework paying attention to human interaction and affection, or mutual learning and
appreciation is different from traditional understanding of IR relying on simply material elements.
There is a Confucian processual belief: everybody can become sage! It is necessary and possible if
efforts to be made.  Besides the above-mentioned three major terms,  in Chapter 3  I also discussed
about Confucian relational power (dao 道, de 德, quan 权, and shi 势) and Confucian conception of
security (an 安 ,  which is a foundation of Confucian harmony).  Both conceptions of  power and
security in the Chinese sense are understood as more holographic, constitutive, and dynamic. 
“There is…something new about today’s political belief systems: A new global imaginary is on
the rise…We are witnessing the destabilization of taken-for-granted meanings and instantiations of
the national.”205 Therefore, within my  GPRT, I would switch people’s attention from international
relations  in  today's  world  to  global  relations.  I  argue  that  it  is  called  “global”  rather  than
“international” because the Global Process-Relational Theory is based on a “correlative” world view
of  tianxia (the  world of the sky, earth, and ten thousand events are  viewed as mutually correlating
with each other; and there is continuity through change in the relations among persons, the myriad of
things,  and events between the earth and the sky), which provides a global perspective and more
assistance in solving of many global political predicaments in the era of new globalization. 
205 Steger, Manfred B. "Neo-isms: What’s New about Ideology in the Global Age?" in The Global Studies Journal,
VOLUME 1, 2008. http://www.globalstudiesjournal.com.
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It  might  be  helpful  for  us  to  rethink  and  reconstruct  the  Chinese  tradition  and  develop  a
theoretical  school  of  global  politics  consisting  of  the  Yijing world  view  (correlative  yinyang
acosmology),  way  of  thinking  (correlative  thinking),  which  are  distinctively  different  from
transcendentalism and dualism behind the existing mainstream international relations theories,  as
shown in key concepts such as rationality, human nature, nation-state, anarchy, competition, power,
and security (mainly see Table 6,7,8,9,and10),  providing little assistance in solving of many global
issues such as potable water and food distribution, clean energy for mass mobility, financial stability,
security dilemma, and so on, which are intractable to contemporary theories especially with hopeless
human-essentialism, narrow state-centrism, and dogmatic universalism. 
In order to do so, I base my theory on holistic and emergent terms with the primacy of vital
relations (生生不息 shengsheng buxi), where relations are intrinsic and constitutive. This means that
instead  of  “inter”national  relations,  Confucian  Global  Theory would  advocate  “intra”national
relations—that  is,  relations  that  are  viewed as coterminous and mutually  defining,  which reflect
some of today’s trends of new globalization. Furthermore, the basic unit of the world is considered as
tianxia (all under the sky literarily, or all in the world of correlations) rejecting parochial nationalism
in my theory,  which is  a more  macroscopical,  comprehensive and  holistic term compared to the
concept  of  nation-state  in  the  international  relations  theory.  From  tianxia serving  as  a  more
correlative perspective when we look at global problems, interests of all in the world are  far  more
inclusive than national interests with more or less sense of exclusiveness. 
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Figure 10: A Summary of My Confucian Global Process-Relational Theory
What deserves to be mentioned the most is that notions such as anarchy and security dilemma are
not in the vocabulary of Confucianism. It was not so much that Confucian thinkers had prepackaged
answers to the same questions Western thinkers had asked, but they seemed to discuss about quite
different issues. As I mentioned in Figure 8 in Chapter 5,  while  one side views the world as di-
chotomy of either anarchy (chaos) or a single-ordered world ruled by universal principles and values,
the other side views the world as he er bu tong (和而不同 harmonization with auto-creative tensions
and not without differences and diversities), a self-so-ing process with  ambiguity, fragility, contin-
gency, difference, complexity, interdependence, and diversity of wanshi wanwu (万事万物 ten thou-
sand processes and events). In other words, “A ‘harmony’ that is effected by simply imposing exter-
nal  constraints  as  a  means  of  enforcing  order------the  application  of  laws,  edicts,  principles,  or
102
rules------is dehumanizing to the degree that it precludes personal participation and confirmation.”206
That is: a single-ordered world (ruled by universal principles and values) without enough acceptance
and tolerance of differences is not viewed as harmonious according to Confucian worldview. 
6. 2 Confucian Harmonization------Think Locally; Act Globally
Confucian harmony not without differences can also be approximately depicted by Venn diagrams
and through Kasulis’s doctrines of internal and external relations,207 whether the relations are person-
to-person, person-to-community, nation-to-nation. In his book on Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy
and Cultural Difference, Kasulis once “used the concept of intimacy as a heuristic for understanding
central orientations in Japanese culture” in contrast with “the rise of philosophical modernity in the
West as a transition from a medieval emphasis on intimacy to one based primarily on integrity.” Ac-
cording to him, “The dominant culture of the modern West——that is, the culture of Western philo-
sophical modernism starting with Descartes and culminating in eighteenth- and nineteenth- century
movements like the Enlightenment and positivism” highlights a fundamental orientation toward, and
emphasis on, “integrity” emphasizing “objectivity as public verifiability, external over internal rela-
tions, knowledge as ideally empty of affect,” and so on, “in almost direct opposition to the emphases
of intimacy” in other cultures.208 Of course, there are many important exceptions to Kasulis’s gener-
alization for Japan and the West, but if Japan can be roughly described by intimacy and the mod-
ernist West described by integrity, then in my opinion China should be described by both integrity
206 SeeAmes, Roger T, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.170.
207 See Kasulis, Thomas P., "The Mosaic and the Jigsaw Puzzle：How It All Fits Together" in ed. Roger T. Ames and Pe-
ter D. Hershock, Value and Values: Economics and Justice in an Age of Global Interdependence. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press and East-West Philosophers’ Conference, 2015, pp. 30-2. Figure 11, 12, and 13 are cited from this article. 
208 See Kasulis, Thomas P. Intimacy or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference. Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 2002, pp.24-5.
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and intimacy. Relatively speaking, Chinese people often tend to keep their integrity (in some degree)
within intimacy. As foci should be considered within fields, individuals should be viewed as within
relations, and nations should be imaged within  tianxia (all in the world of correlations). That is to
say, the uniqueness of each focus within manifold of relations (field) gives it a greater degree of in-
tegrity than the other model. This is the logic of Confucian harmony with differences and diversities
(he er bu tong 和而不同). 
    In Figure 11, the discrete parts plus their external relations constitute the whole, which consists of
nearly identical atomistic pieces. It is external relations such as contracts, putative laws, rules of ex-
change, universal principles of rights and responsibilities, or criteria of justice that join those inde-
pendent and discrete components together so as to form a imaginary single-ordered world. Other-
wise, without relations externally imposed (order), then there would be merely a state of chaos (inde-
pendent, unrelated things) and accordingly anarchy. 
Figure 11: Externally Related Whole Consisting of Atomistic and Discrete Entities
In Figure 12, by contrast, the whole dependent on internal rather than external relations con-
sists not of discrete, but adjoining entities (e.g.  wanshi wanwu “ten thousand  events” in Chinese
worldview) overlapping and interpenetrating each other, just as sons, daughters, parents, grandpar-
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ents, teachers, and neighbors interact with each other in an intimate and mutually constitutive man-
ner. “The overlap of A and B, insofar as the overlap is part of each, is not a discrete part,”209 but is
holographically reflected in the whole. It is within such intimate, overlapping relations that personal
cultivation is achieved. “To father”, “to mother”, “to brother”, “to sister”, and “to neighbor” serve as
solid and reliable ethical injunctions, and also concrete and flexible guidelines for action, unlike ra-
tional choice and abstract principles.210  
Figure 12: Internally Related Whole with Interdependence and Overlapping Relations
Figure 13 developed from Figure 12, is obviously a more precise description of a holograph
which  reveals  the  conception  of  Confucian  harmony:  Confucian  vision  for  civilizations  in  the
globalized world. Confucian harmonization begins from the wholeness of intimate interdependence
of all of dimensions of the human experience and the recognition of the mutually constitutive nature
of  relationality.  “If  reality  itself  is  (such)  an  all-inclusive  whole  consisting  of  interdependent
processes, it makes little sense to speculate about which entity sets the processes in motion…such a
metaphysics would probably not, therefore, have a philosophical narration of an event that brought
independent, unrelated things (chaos) into external relation (order).”211
209 See ibid, p.99.
210 See Ames, Roger T, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.168 and 
p.260.
211 See Kasulis, op. cit., p.100.
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Furthermore,  within such a correlative web of relations constituting each polity and event,
each part  of the whole is unique because of its  specific  interrelatedness with its adjoining parts.
Confucian  conception of  world harmony is  characterized by the  combination  of  uniqueness  and
interchangeability of variety of parts within a holographic whole (tianxia: an interdependent system
of all things), which cannot be reduced to merely the sum of its identical atomistic units. That is to
say, “Nothing happens unilaterally and in isolation,”212 and relational differences and processes can
make  the  entire  tianxia community  more  meaningful,  robust,  flourishing,  and creative.  Such as
tianxia community can be further descripted according to Kasulis213: the holographic whole and the
parts are in an internal, intimate, interdependent, and mutually constitutive relationship: the whole
contains  the part  as  much as  the  part  contains  the  whole.  Each part  can  only be  understood as
reflective of the whole, while the whole pattern can be found within any of the individual circles A,
B, C, and so forth since the whole is in every overlapping part. One cannot be understood without the
other.  Therefore,  mutual  learning,  mutual  understanding,  and  mutual  appreciating  among
civilizations on the basis of recognition of each other’s uniqueness and importance can make a more
peaceful, robust, creative, and colorful world.  
When  engaging  in  geopolitics,  Confucian  policy-makers  need  pay  more  attention  to  the
uniqueness, interchangeability, and complexity of local situations besides the holographically related
whole, instead of understanding global phenomena as discrete parts identical in essence and able to
be managed by imposing  transcultural or  universal models,  principles, or values  that might often
ignore local differences. That is to say, Confucian thinkers prefer specific examples within concrete
cultural,  social,  historical  contexts to  universal  models,  just  as  the  Yijing does  show  384  yao
212 See Ames, op. cit., p.71.
213 See Kasulis, op. cit., pp.95-9.
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symbolic  hexagram lines with 384 particular  situations and relevant countermeasures.  Therefore,
Confucian thinkers prefer “think locally; act globally” to “think globally; act locally.” In other words,
any  efficacious  plan  prepared  for  global  governance  must  adequately  respect  and  consider
differences among communities, races, nations, civilizations, and so on.  
Figure 13: Holographically Related Whole: Confucian Harmonization
     In sum, with the dominance of traditional mode of globalization gradually withdrawing 
from the historical stage in the direction of polarization of the poor and rich, demoralization, “clash 
of civilization,” and devastation of environment, it is time to rethink about patterns of globalization. 
That is: Globalization is not necessarily a bad thing. The real question is this: how to understand and 
treat differences among humans, and how to achieve harmony of human relations in this globalized 
world? Figure 11 and Figure 13 reveal two scenarios of the globalized world: Figure 11 indicates a 
traditional conception of harmony as synonymous with uniformity and conformity, i.e., an imaginary
single-ordered world, while Figure 13 emphasizes an alternative conception of harmonization with 
differences, complexity, diversity, inclusiveness, and auto-creativity (as roughly discussed through 
the example of Zheng He, earlier in 5.4) of wanshi wanwu (  万事万物 ten thousand processes and 
events). Figure 13 can also be used to represent “intra”national relations or global relations, 
107
compared with international relations (as shown in Figure 11), as illustrated at the beginning of this 
chapter.
6. 3 Confucian Understanding of Guanxi and Mianzi 
The entry point of Confucian logic is relationality other than individuality (discreteness). 
Chinese guanxi (关系) is internal, constitutive relations. It is relations, but a particular kind in a 
world that gives privilege to (vital) relationality. “In such a world constituted of unique individuals 
located within a dynamic matrix of roles and relationships, the performance of these roles and 
relationships can only be effectively driven by the giving and the receiving of deference”214 or mianzi
(面子 face value), which requires a holistic, empathetic, or even spontaneous responsiveness (on the 
basis of “an affective inquiry—a knowing through feeling—that requires a weighing of 
circumstances with empathy and concern”) to specific needs of others and specific circumstances.215
An interesting question: Did Confucian relationality necessarily lead to corruptions, as widely 
believed? Or let me put it like this: what type of relations does Confucianism promote? 
Confucianism tells people about what are appropriate relationships. Intimate human relation is 
favorable, but human relations are not employable for individual end. Confucian philosophy is 
opposed to inappropriate use of relationship for (maximization of) individual self-interests without 
accommodating interests of all concerned, without taking into account of both means and ends, 
without comprehensive considerations of larger and longer space-time complexities. That is, 
Confucian ethics is against a process in which healthy friendship turns into unhealthy relations, or 
214 Ames, Roger T, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2011, p.200. 
215 Ibid, pp.194-9.
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family relations turn into individual’s wealth or political status, or in which others turn into one’s 
short-term tool for achieving his/her goals. There should be necessary punishments of individuals 
who are inhumane and immoral, chasing profits and turning out to be demoralizing. 
In other words, Confucian philosophy developed on the basis of emphasis on appropriateness
(situational), i.e.,  balancing between the  interests of all concerned and self-interests. Confucianism
provides  us  with  a  perspective  of  looking  at  human  relations  through  awareness  of  situational
appropriateness. Simply speaking, the directions of beneficial, virtuous, and healthy relations should
be  generally  mutual,  rather  than  unilateral.  Situational  awareness  without  concern  about
appropriateness is very easy to fall into the trap of rational maximization of self-interests, as shown
by many Chinese individuals  who did just  as 100% self-interest  maximizers.  In  turn,  without  a
reformulation of realism into a larger and longer frame (infinite game), realism is just realism. How
important human cultivation is! 
To be concrete, it is not encouraged to use one’s natural relations as tools to achieve one side’s
individual  interests  or  extend one  side’s  ideologies.  For  example,  corruption  in  today’s  Chinese
society happens often because of misuse of family relations. Originally, the relations between family
members are not artificial, but natural. People should learn within their family relations during their
childhood as a starting point of endless human self-cultivation how to become a virtuous human
benefiting  his  or  her  community.  However,  some  corrupt  elements  may  use  their  relatives  as
networks for bribery and  murky conspiracy. Similarly, pyramid schemes, created by Lee Mytinger
and William Casselberry,  founders of NutrilleProducts, are based on the logic of turning healthy
social relations into individual self-interests. Charles Ponzi (1882-1949)’s pyramid scheme was one
of the most  infamous  ones in human history. Anti-Pyramid Promotional Scheme Act of 2003 now
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exists in the USA. However, pyramid schemes got into Japan, Taiwan, and mainland China. This
kind of  promotion  has  flourished  in  Mainland  China  for  more  than  10 years,  which  led  to the
invidious alienation of family relations and friendship. 
  
6.4 Interpreting China’s Rise and its Influence over the World Order
    How does China’s rise affect the world order? There have been numerous books and articles from
perspectives of economics, politics, and culture, published around the topic of China’s rise and its
implications  to  world  order  (e.g.,  Goldstein,216 Guo,217 Kang,218 Lampton,219 Shambaugh,220 and
Sutter.221 This is a topic inviting mainly interpretations rather than just objective answers, since it has
been very hard for people to get objective answers. One obvious reason is the influence of China’s
rise  is  multi-dimensional  and  long-term  so  that  few  people  can  describe  it  in  a  objectively
comprehensive way; A second reason is that China’s rise is distinctive from the rises of Western
powers like Portugal, Spain, Holland, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States of
America, because  China belongs to  a centuries-old tradition of philosophy and language that has
developed independently of  Europe.  I  would  emphasize that  philosophies  are  very  significantly
influential over the historical processes, or even more influential than material elements in some
particular situations or at certain particular moments. Among all the possible factors, worldviews,
modality of thinking, traditional virtues, and cultural and moral values will play fundamental roles in
216 Goldstein, Avery. Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security, Studies in Asian Secu-
rity. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005.
217 Sujian. China's "Peaceful Rise" In the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions. Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2006.
218 Kang, David C. China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.
219 Lampton, David M. The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2008.
220 Shambaugh, David L. Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005.
221 Sutter, Robert G. China's Rise: Implications for U.S. Leadership in Asia. Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Wash-
ington, 2006. & China's Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
110
determining the direction of social change.            
In order to show how an important role in making people’s behaviors philosophies and cultures
can play,  I  also  want  to  indicate  a  more  interesting  phenomenon:  if  you ask  Chinese  people  an
either/or question and invite a “yes” or “no” response, it is basically not as easy as for Westerners to
pick  up  a  “yes”  or  “no.”  You may  at  large  get  an  answer  such  as  “it  depends… (on  particular
situations),” “hard to say (at this moment),” “if…then”, and “when…” This kind of answers can be
traced back to Chinese  yin-yang correlative thinking in pursuit of situational appropriateness, and
perhaps ontology of events and processual metaphysics, distinctive from Western substance ontology. 
    Inspired by Samuel P. Huntington, more and more Chinese scholars and students (including me) are interpreting
international politics from the perspective of cultures or civilizations, though 99% of them criticized Samuel P.
Huntington’s “clash of  civilizations”.  This dissertation argues that as its unique culture and historical
experience shape its  purposes and means, China will take a distinctive way to  shape the world’s
order as I attempt to indicate in chapter 5 by an example of Admiral Zheng He (1371－1433). We can
find how a correlative actor, like Zheng He, makes decisions to pursuit harmony with differences of
tianxia (a world of correlations). Although I can't aver that today’s rising China will take the similar
purposes and means of Zheng He to shape the order of the world, but I believe: among all  the
possible factors, correlative worldviews, modality of thinking, traditional values in the  Yijing will
still  play fundamental roles in determining the direction of China’s changes,  which are arousing
many temporary suspicions. 
6.5 Obstacles to Confucian Correlative Approach222
    What are the obstacles to a Confucian correlative approach to restructuring our worldview with the
222 This discussion is based on personal communication with Richard Chadwick in 2016.
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goal in mind of transcending global predicament, especially the security dilemma? In its search for a
vision of its role in the international system, China may be limited by beliefs that grew out of history
challenges to its existence. For example:
     (1) Unfortunately because of many cultural reasons such as cultural reductionism and Orientalism
(more or less existing in the above-mentioned authors’ publications) and so on, there have been and
will be a great many misunderstandings about how China’s rise shapes the world order. We can
hardly expect the myths of China can be broken up very soon. One of my aims has been written a
dissertation starting from comparisons between Anglo-European/Indo-European and Chinese world
views and ways of thinking is to erase cultural reductionism and Orientalism, which are obstacles on
the road to a clearer China.  
As an example of reductionism, Mr. Zheng, Bijian, former Vice President of CCP central party
school, first ushered in the concept of “peaceful rise”223 to present China’s will to develop peacefully,
without fully consideration of special meanings of “rise” in Western culture. The rise of China is just
the “peaceful rejuvenation or revival of China,” rather than obtaining anything inappropriate, from
the perspective of Chinese. However, the English word “rise” (maybe  jueqi in Chinese, however,
jueqi  does  not  entail  the  historical  and  cultural  background  of  “rise” ） can  imply  a  negative
connotation of a threat to the existing international order. Westerners mainly remembered history of
the “rise” of Germany or Japan and its military challenge to the world order. Consequently, “rise”
was considered definitely not “peaceful” by many Western people.  Political  realist  theorists, like
John Mearsheimer,224 even assert  that  China’s  rise  brings  about  an inevitable  conflict  within the
existing international system and a challenge to the US hegemony as the rise of German empire did.
223 Zheng, Bijian. “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status”, Foreign Affairs, 84 (5). 2005, pp.38-48.
224 Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2001.
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Thereafter,  former Chinese President  Hu Jintao had to  change his policy of “peaceful rise” into
“peaceful development” in order to avoid confusion. However, “development” is also a word that
some people of the “Third World” countries do not favor. It is just a case of cultural reductionism,
which reflects that international communications without understanding about the other side’s history
and culture led to more troubles. There have been many similar cultural obstacles on China’s road to
the international arena. 
This is the most important question since it is about the application of my theory. In my dissertation,  I
discussed about how Chinese correlative actors shaped the order of the world with an example of
Admiral Zheng He. My line of thinking is to explain relatively typical ancient cases to find the
Chinese traditional cultural elements, which can be applied to explain the contemporary international
relations throughout readers’ own imagination. 
     (2) China’s past as the object of attacks by its neighbors to the north and to the west, as well as
from off shore. Such attacks scared a country’s people and its leaders’ collective consciousness. Such
scars  were rooted  in  a  strong  sense  of  national  fear  for  survival within  the  19th or  20th century
international jungle full of zero-sum game, power politics, colonism, nationalism, hegemonism, and
imperialism, which gave rise to Chinese patriotism, perhaps easy to turn into nationalism with strong
realist concern over geopolitical affairs,  that both unites people to fight for a stronger nation, and
perhaps justifies hatred of its former enemies or rational choices of maximization of national interests.
      More seriously, the modern history of national humiliation had made Chinese people more or less
lose their  cultural  confidence in  Confucianism and fall  into discourses of a  variety of  ideologies
imported  from  the  West  such  as  social  evolutionism  (including  social  Darwinism),  materialism,
individualism,  liberalism,  nationalism,  and political  realism.  If  this  ideological  complex makes  it
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susceptible  to  military  adventurism rationalized  as  defense  and  amplifies  egocentric  ambition of
economic expansionism or cultural conservatism, to transcend this complex——in its extreme form,
megalomaniacal——a Confucian correlative perspective of tianxia may be vital to encourage.  
(3)  Moreover,  China’s sudden rise to power, faster indeed than the USA’s rise, has the short
term advantages created by sudden wealth, power, prestige, and technical skill, but disadvantages in
its weak cultural and institutional adaptation resulting in confused policies aimed at export led growth
but resulting in a politically unstable peasant migrant work force,  increasing  national debt, various
financial bubbles,  and serious environmental problems. These are serious challenges opening China
up to the classical “overreach” syndrome. Just as many former emerging countries, so too will China
be faced with such challenges. To cope with these difficulties for its second rise,225 China will need to
thoroughly redirect its  energies with a vision that at  its  core must be of a correlative,  Confucian
nature. Confucian correlative reasoning aimed at larger visions of a peaceful, prosperous, powerful,
balanced, and principled China may provide an antidote.
    All in all, I have to leave more than three questions that this dissertation cannot fully answer:
whether Chinese people can really pay enough attention to the value of their own tradition; whether
the world can understand Chinese tradition; whether Chinese can be able to promote their  ancient
values? 
6.6 US-China Relations and the New World Order226
     What are the options for China and the U.S. in re-positioning themselves in the new world order?
As a  rising power (a dynamic emerging power), China can be a challenger, or a responsible stake
holder within the existing world order; as an established power (a global hegemon), the US can be a
225 Cf. Hsiung, James C. China into its second rise myths, puzzles, paradoxes, and challenge to theory. Singapore: World Scientific, 
2012.
226 This paragraph is based on personal communication with Reginald Yin-Wang Kwok and his seminar on Chinese for-
eign policy and US-China relations (2014).
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defender of hegemony, an enemy of China, or try to be friendlier to China. There seems to be not too
many options. However,  since US-China relations involve almost all of the important issues  from
economic development of each country to the recovery and stability of global economy, and from
handling  regional  and  international  security  issues  to  global  challenges,  US-China  relations  are
glutted with policy options of competition and cooperation multi-dimensionally at the same time.
Given this situation, in the near future the relationship between the two powers might be a new type
of  “not friends, and not enemies, but more communications.” Each of them cannot afford not to
understand the other multi-dimensionally. 
This dissertation aimed at improving cultural communication between the two civilizations. I
hope that within the near future, both China as the rising power and the US as the established world
ruler can achieve mutual understandings of each other’s different world views and ways of thinking,
in order to accommodate each other. However, before both giants finish re-positioning themselves in
the new world order, we will still witness the process of waxing and waning of their relations. But
one thing  is  certain:  China  is  expected  to  be more  active  in  communicating  with  the  U.S.  and
expressing its intentions, since China’s failing to communicate with the world, especially with the
U.S. due to reductionism and Orientalism, has put China’s intentions under suspicion. If Chinese
thinkers know more about the evolution of Western philosophy compared with Chinese philosophy,
and especially structural differences between China and the West, they may find how to express
China as many attempts made to do so in this dissertation. I also expect that more American young
policymakers can learn more about philosophies of other civilizations. Anyway, learning more about
others is very important before effective communication, as Confucius once said, “do not worry that
others fail to understand you; worry about you fail to understand others.” 
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All in all, “the vast Pacific Ocean has ample space for China and the United States,”227 since the 
wisdom of the Yijing, especially hexagrams such as qian (  谦 modesty), tongren (  同人 relationship), 
and dayou (  大有 prosperity), can be remedies for the competitions 
between the US and China. Admittedly, there are many differences between China and the 
US, but as long as both US and China respect each other’s major concerns and jointly manage 
differences and maintain peace, then common interests will be far out way than the 
differences that both sides might have. As Chung-ying Cheng and I pointed out in our latest book 
written in Chinese, according to the Yijing, “The (future) US-China relations can be 
not only reciprocal and complementary, but also mutually stimulating and motivating…The 
US and China can make common advance in future’s cooperation on the basis of mutual 
understanding, mutual demonstration, and mutual improvement.”228
6.7  Chinese  Initiatives:  From “Belt  and Road” to  “a Global Community with
Shared Future” 
As I mentioned in Chapter 5, cultural roots of Chinese contemporary foreign policies such as
Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence and Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical As-
sistance to Other Countries229 may be found from the history of Zheng He’s peaceful voyages imple-
menting Confucian foreign policy of wangdao. Today new Chinese President Xi Jinping consistently
emphasizing “a Global Community with Shared Future” on the basis of “win-win cooperation
227 As Xi Jinping stated in a Washington Post interview during Xi-Obama summit. See Billo, Andrew, and Yan Shufen. 
“Tiger, Tiger: Can the US and China 'Live Harmoniously'?” http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/tiger-tiger-can-us-and-china-
live-harmoniously. 2012/2/22. 
228 See Cheng, Chung-ying, and Tianyuan Huang. Yijing Wenmingguan: Cong Yixue Dao Guoji Zhengzhi Xinsiwei (易
经文明观：从易学到国际政治新思维 Philosophy of the Yijing: New Thinking on InternationalPolitics), Beijing: Peo-
ple's Oriental Publishing & Media Co. Ltd, 2017, pp.192-3.
229 See footnotes 191 and 192.
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and co-construction and sharing”230 has been taking wisdom of Zheng He (rather than Alfred Thayer
Mahan) to interact with the post-financial crisis world. 
As Admiral Zheng He (and Emperor Zhu Di behind him) recovered the Sea Silk Road in 15 th
century, Chinese President Xi Jinping is in practice promoting today’s global cooperative program of
jointly building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road (a modern version of
the ancient Silk Road), with five international cooperation priorities of enhancing interconnection
and intercommunication (hulian hutong 互联互通), including “policy coordination,” “facilities con-
nectivity,” “unimpeded trade,” “financial integration,” and “people-to-people bonds,” which is an
open, pluralistic, inclusive, and flexible global initiative instead of a closed, uniform, exclusive, and
awkward alliance. 
I pick up seven key points (as follows) from the Action Plan on the China-proposed Belt and
Road Initiative231issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (with State Council authoriza-
tion). Obviously,  even though  today’s international politics  is still  filled with discourses of  finite
game (zero-sum game with a definitive ending)  which people may be  already  tired of;  Confucian
correlative conception of infinite game (interaction without end, jointly continuing a more interesting
play) exerts tremendous influence over Chinese initiatives of global cooperation today: 
(1) The Belt and Road Initiative carries forward “the Silk Road Spirit – ‘peace and cooperation, 
openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit.’” 
(2) “The Belt and Road Initiative is in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. It
230 Since China first proposed the concept of "building a global community with shared destiny" in late 2012, it has gone on to shape 
China's approach to global governance.This Chinese concept was incorporated into a UN resolution in 2017. The 55th UN 
Commission for Social Development(CSocD) approved the resolution "Social dimensions of the New Partnership for Africa's 
Development" by consensus, which calls for more support for Africa's economic and social development by embracing the spirit of 
"building a human community with shared destiny." "According to Ross Terrill, a research associate at Harvard University's Fairbank 
Center, China's global governance idea focusing on the goal of building ‘a community of shared future for all humankind’ has shown 
the country's strategic thoughts on long-term development of bilateral ties between China and other countries, and has injected new 
impetus into the effort to establish a new world order." 
 For more details about this concept, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-03/20/c_136142216.htm.
231 See “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” 
http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html, 2015/03/28.
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upholds the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence…It advocates tolerance among 
civilizations, respects the paths and modes of development chosen by different countries, and 
supports dialogues among different civilizations on the principles of seeking common ground 
while shelving differences and drawing on each other's strengths, so that all countries can coexist
in peace for common prosperity.” 
(3) “The Initiative covers, but is not limited to, the area of the ancient Silk Road. It is open to all 
countries, and international and regional organizations for engagement, so that the results of the 
concerted efforts will benefit wider areas.” 
(4) The initiative “should be jointly built through consultation to meet the interests of all, and ef-
forts should be made to integrate the development strategies of the countries along the Belt and 
Road.” 
(5) The initiative “accommodates the interests and concerns of all parties involved, and seeks a 
conjunction of interests and the ‘biggest common denominator’ for cooperation so as to give full
play to the wisdom and creativity, strengths and potentials of all parties.”  
(6) “China is committed to shouldering more responsibilities and obligations within its capabili-
ties, and making greater contributions to the peace and development of mankind.”
(7) “We welcome companies from all countries to invest in China, and encourage Chinese enter-
prises to participate in infrastructure construction in other countries along the Belt and Road, and
make industrial investments there. We support localized operation and management of Chinese 
companies to boost the local economy, increase local employment, improve local livelihoods, 
and take social responsibilities in protecting local biodiversity and eco-environment.”    
 Conversations with African people show: So far, so good. China’s  efforts have been largely
welcomed by African people. For example, an African scholar majoring in International Business in
Honolulu told me in a very simple way on November 10th, 2017:  “China is popular in Africa be-
cause China not only takes, but also gives. And long-term trust is everything.” Further, based upon
my Confucian infinite-game theorization as a non-Western effort, I would anticipate: if China can
promote a new type of globalization with a strategy of harmonization of relations (instead of exter-
nally imposed order), and with a Confucian-role-ethical understanding of equality with differences
(instead of superficial sameness), there will be on the rise a fourth type of globalism——“reciprocal
globalism”——on the  basis  of  Confucius’s  expression  of “put  oneself  in  the  others’ place  (shu
恕).”232 Therefore, this is also a period in which the globalization theory including what were called
232 See footnote 175. As Ames pointed out, Shu 恕 is defined negatively as “do not impose on others what you yourself do
not want.” 
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market globalism, justice globalism, and Jihadist globalism (versus imperial globalism) by Manfred
B. Steger233 can be enriched according to China’s own experience of its second rise in this new era of
St.
At the very beginning both President Barack Obama and President Donald Trump held a cau-
tious attitude toward the China-proposed Belt and Road initiative, since they were suspicious of the
motives behind the initiative, which is widely seen as a realist tool to maximize China's national in-
fluence globally. However,  Donald Trump, who has been endlessly emphasizing American na-
tional interests and associated economic protectionism in this globalized age of post-financial
crisis,  finally decided to take this win-win opportunity and  send delegates  led by Matt Pottinger,
Special Assistant to the President and senior director for East Asia of National Security Council of
the White House, to attend the Belt and Road Forum (BRF) for International Cooperation on May 14
and 15, 2017. 
     
233 See Steger, Manfred B.Globalisms: The Great Ideological Struggle of the Twenty-First Century. 3rd ed. Lanham, Md.:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009.
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GLOSSARY
an  安 feeling safe
badao  霸道 hegemony with brutal force
bingjia  兵家 Militarists
cheng ren  成人 becoming human
cheng ren  成仁 becoming relationally virtuosic 
Changjing 长江 “Long River,” the Yangtze River 
dayou 大有 prosperity
dao  道 experience, ways of correlation, the proper way
de  德 excellence, potency, or power, and favor or bounty extended outward with the gratitude as a
response
dao-de  道德 Confucian role ethics
dongxue xijian  东学西渐 Chinese Learning into the West
fengshui  风水 an ancient Chinese philosophy which develops a dynamic system to deal with the
issue of harmonizing human existence with the surrounding environment
guanxi  关系 Chinese internal and constitutive relations
he er bu tong 和而不同  harmonization with auto-creative tensions and not without differences and
diversities 
he er bu tong: zhongxi zhexue de huitong  和而不同：中西哲学的会通  Seeking  Harmony not
Sameness: Comparative Philosophy and East-West Understanding
heli  合理 according with li (situational appropriateness)
he shi  合时 opportune or appropriately timed
hou wang bo lai  厚往薄来 Economically, a big country gives more, and takes less 
huxi  互系 correlativity 
ji  吉 propitiousness
jiao  教 instructing and transforming
jin yue yuan lai  近悦远来 encouraging distant peoples to come  
junzi  君子 exemplary person
li  理 situational appropriateness
lixing  理性 situational awareness of appropriateness
li 利 self-interest 
li  礼 religiousness, the expression of propriety through one’s roles and relations
Meng, heng. Yi heng xing, shizhong ye 蒙，亨。以亨行，时中也
mianzi 面子 face value
qi  器 means
qian  谦 modesty
qing  情 feelings
qu ji bi xiong 趋吉避凶 seek propitiousness and avoid unpropitiousness 
quan 权 weighing a situation before making a decision, adapting to circumstances 
Renju Huanjing Kexue Daolun  人居环境科学导论 Introduction to Sciences of Human Settlements
renxing  人性 human tendency
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Ruxue  yu  duwei  de  shiyong  zhuyi:  yizhong  duihua 儒学与杜威的实用主义：一种对话
Confucianism and Deweyan Pragmatism: A Dialogue
shengren  圣人 sage, top of junzi
shizhong  时中 situational appropriateness
shi  势 Manipulating circumstances to create a strategic advantage of situational tendency as an
alternative to the commitment of brute force
shengsheng buxi  生生不息 creative creativity, the primacy of vital relations
shenxin  身心 bodyheartminding
shun 恕 put oneself in the others’ place 
tian  天 sky, both what our world is and how it is
tianren heyi  天人合一 the continuity between the religious, natural, and cultural context and the
human experience
tianxia  天下 all  under  the sky, all  of the world,  a  world of  correlations,  all  in  a/the world of
correlations
tianxia yijia 天下一家 a tianxia family
tianxia gongxiang taiping zhi fu  天下共享太平之福 promoting common prosperity and pursuing
holistic harmony globally 
Tixing Huanjing Lun 体形环境论 Theory of Planning Physical Environment
tongren 同人 relationship
you rong nai da 有容乃大 Culturally, a big country keeps openness without self/other distinction,    
rejecting exclusionary attitudes, enhancing cultural exchanges, and encouraging mutual learning, so 
that it can become bigger 
wangdao  王道 sage kings’ dao 
wanshi wanwu 万事万物 ten thousand processes and events 
xiao  孝 family concern
xiaoren 小人 petty person
xixue dongjian  西学东渐 the Western learning into China 
xin  心 heart and mind
xing  性 tendency
xiong 凶 unpropitiousness 
yi-li  义利 appropriate interest, or balance between appropriateness and self-interest
Yixue Bentilun  易学本体论 Theory of Benti in the Philosophy of Yijing 
Yijing Wenmingguan: Cong Yixue Dao Guoji Zhengzhi Xinsiwei 易经文明观：从易学到国际政治
 新思维 Philosophy of the Yijing: New thinking on international politics
yin-yang huxi  阴阳互系 yin-yang correlativity
Yi yin yi yang zhi wei dao  一阴一阳之谓道 One yin and one yang are called dao
ying shi  应时 opportune or appropriately timed
yi  义 appropriateness
yi da shi xiao 以大事小 Politically, a big country respects small countries and their special local
needs, deepening mutual understanding and trust 
zhong 中 appropriateness, situational appropriateness
Zhouyi de xingcheng shi zhongguo zhexue siwei de yuantouhuoshui  周易的形成是中国哲学思维的
源头活水 The Yijing is the living water source of the endless flow of Chinese philosophy
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